Tobias Regner

Do I Really Want to Know? A Cognitive Dissonance-Based Explanation of Other-Regarding Behavior

We investigate to what extent genuine social preferences can explain observed other-regarding behavior. In a dictator game variant subjects can choose whether to learn about the consequences of their choice for the receiver. We find that a majority of subjects showing other-regarding behavior when the payoffs of the receiver are known, choose to ignore these consequences if possible. This behavior is inconsistent with preferences about outcomes. Other-regarding behavior may also be explained by avoiding cognitive dissonance as in Konow (2000). Our experiments choice data is in line with this approach. In addition, we successfully relate individual behavior to proxies for cognitive dissonance.

An artist life cycle model for digital media content: Strategies for the Light Web and the Dark Web

This paper surveys and categorizes emerging digital media business models. We apply the customer activity cycle of Vandermerwe (2000) to the consumption of digital media, taking three phases into account: pre-consumption, consumption and post-consumption. Our analysis of the business models focuses on their social costs and benefits. We derive the parameters as follows: convenience of use, exposure, ease of compliance and administration. We distinguish two polar environments for digital media: the Dark Web with content created by the masses, and the Light Web with content created by big media. We develop an artist life cycle model in which different business models appear to be optimal at different stages of an artists career. Voluntary payment-based models seem to be ideal for newcomers in the Dark Web, while digital rights management-based and complementary product and service-basedmodels are the likely choice of established artists in the Light Web. Established artists might change their approach again, using voluntary payment-based or complementary product and service-based models when they retire.

Why consumers pay voluntarily: evidence from online music.

Customers of the online music label/store Magnatune can pay what they want for albums as long as the payment is within a given price range (

Governance of digital content in the era of mass participation

5–

Is Observed Other-Regarding Behavior Always Genuine?

18). On average, customers pay significantly more than they have to. We ran an online survey and collected responses from 227 frequent Magnatune customers to gain insights about the underlying motivations to pay more than necessary. We control for individual response- as well as sample selection-bias and find that reciprocity appears to be the major driver for generous voluntary payments. Being inclined to conform to social norms is a positive determinant for payments around the recommended price (

More Than Outcomes: The Role of Self-Image in Other-Regarding Behavior

8).

Preferences-Dependent Learning in the Centipede Game

The realm of digital media is undergoing fundamental changes as it moves from mass media to an era of mass participation. This emergence of content created by the masses requires to re-consider the conventional intellectual property rights framework. Free content and protected content co-exist (in the Dark/Light Web).We propose an alternative environment for the governance of digital content. It incorporates psychological aspects into its economics framework. Multi-agent systems play an important role in order to create an infrastructure that makes the voluntary-based environment sustainable.We propose a platform based on an open contracts design that encourages voluntary payments. Peer-based reputation and recommendation mechanisms as well as socio-emotive instruments facilitate norm adherence in this online environment. They leverage the efficiency of alternative voluntary payment models based on fairness concerns and reciprocity.The envisioned platform matches Dark Web content to consumers who value it highly, provides Dark Web content creators with a basic reward for their work and reduces the infringement of protected content in the Dark Web.

Magnatune - Variable Pricing for Music

We investigate to what extent genuine social preferences can explain observed other-regarding behavior. In a social dilemma situation (a dictator game variant), people can choose whether to learn about the consequences of their choice for the receiver. We i¬ nd that a majority of the people that show other-regarding behavior when the payoffs of the receiver are known chose to ignore them if possible. This behavior is inconsistent with genuine other-regarding preferences. Our model explains other-regarding behavior as avoiding cognitive dissonance: People do not behave fairly because they genuinely care for others, but because they like to think of themselves as being fair. The model can explain our data as well as earlier experimental data.

Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice

We conduct a modified dictator game in order to analyze the role self-image concerns play in other-regarding behavior. While we generally follow Konow (2000), a cognitive dissonance-based model of other-regarding behavior in dictator games, we relax one of its assumptions as we allow for individual heterogeneity among individuals’ standards of behavior. Subjects’ self-image, their belief regarding the average socially appropriate behavior of others and our proxies for the cognitive dissonance costs are positively correlated with the dictator game choices.We also find that subjects whose choices involve two psychologically inconsistent cognitions indeed report higher levels of experienced conflict and take more time for their decisions (our proxies for cognitive dissonance).

Efficient Contracts for Digital Content

We study experimentally whether heterogeneity of behavior in the Centipede game can be interpreted as the result of a learning process of individuals with different preference types (more and less pro-social) and coarse information regarding the opponents past behavior. We manipulate the quality of information feedbacks provided after each play. If subjects rely only on their personal database, long run behavior resembles a Self-confirming equilibrium whereby less pro-social types take at earlier nodes due to prediction errors. Aggregate information release decreases heterogeneity of behavior by increasing the passing rates of pro-selfs and play moves towards Bayesian Nash equilibrium.