Tone Kvernbekk

On the Problems of Asking for a Definition of Quality in Education

In this article we discuss the problems of asking for a definition of quality in education from a philosophy of language perspective. We take the concept of quality as it appears in higher education discourse as our example. More specifically we discuss the possibility of obtaining a precise, unified definition of quality by addressing the problem of asking “what is” questions. We use definition theory and theory pertaining to linguistic vagueness, including Wittgenstein and the idea of family resemblance. We suggest that quality is an inherently vague concept, which runs us into boundary problems and forces us to operate in grey zones. This means that if your “what is” question is a question for the essence of quality, you make demands that the concept cannot fulfil. Recognition of this fact implies that our expectations concerning concept precision and unity should be modified. Our discussion illuminates why it is so difficult to find a definition of the concept of quality.

On Identifying Narratives

This article analyzes the concept of narrative.How do we recognize a narrative when we seeone? Which criteria do we or should we apply?The article itself serves as a (possible)example of a narrative, and is thus adiscussion of itself as a narrative product. Ialso discuss the possible narrative structureof the process leading up to the completedarticle. I first discuss two approaches tocategorization and the most commonly referredto criteria for identifying narratives. Next Idiscuss various roles found in narratives andthe roles found in the current article. FinallyI discuss the problems principally involved inpunctuation of sequences and thus in decidingwhich narrative we are dealing with. Itis concluded that the categorization criteriaare too vague to perform the job they areintended to do.

Knowledge that Works in Practice [1]

Abstract This paper addresses the nature of knowledge that works in practice. It is argued that knowledge that works plausibly can be viewed as causal knowledge of action‐result linkages. Two properties commonly ascribed to such knowledge are analysed. Against the view that knowledge that works is particular, it is argued that it is general and indeed must be so if it is to increase teacher effectiveness. Against the related idea that particular knowledge is experience based as opposed to theory based, two lines of argument are developed. First, empirical evidence is invoked to demonstrate the difficulties involved in data‐based inferences. Second, the thorough‐going effect of preconceptions and theory on experiential learning is discussed. [1] This paper is part of a research project funded by the Research Council of Norway.

THE APPLICATION OF SCIENCE EDUCATION THEORIES

This article addresses the question of what bearing the nature of educational theories has on their application to practice. More specifically, attention is focused on the application of normative goal-directed theories of science education. An account of normative goal-directed theories and of their application is presented. This account highlights the constituent elements and structures that should be found in a normative goal-directed educational theory. A particular version of the science education theory of constructivism is then examined to determine what elements and structures are found in it, and, as a result, what can be said about this theory and its application. Finally, a series of implications are drawn for the general problem of applying science education theories.

A dialogue about the quality of education

Explores the concept of quality in education, by means of a dialogue. Discusses different conceptions and dimensions of quality, and shows how they are largely contingent on different views of what education is all about. Attempts to transcend commonly encountered dichotomies by proposing an alternative approach, taking the notions of arete and phronesis as points of departure. Assessing educational quality implies high complexity if the approach is going to be comprehensive and holistic, and take both external and internal factors into account. The framework of the discussion is the political context, on the assumption that this is the right context for questions concerning the worthwhileness, values in and quality of education. The authors hope that this dialogue illustrates the irenic mode of communication briefly discussed in the paper.

On the Argumentative Quality of Explanatory Narratives

This article tentatively draws together the three concepts of argumentation, narrative and explanation. The three concepts are all highly rich ones and denote complex areas. Some parts of each conception may have implications for or illuminate the other two — that will depend on what one takes each of them to be, and on the perspective one chooses to employ. The existence of rival views within all three areas further adds to the complexity.

Revisiting Dialogues and Monologues

In educational discourse dialogue tends to be viewed as being (morally) superior to monologue. When we look at them as basic forms of communication, we find that dialogue is a two‐way, one‐to‐one form and monologue is a one‐way, one‐to‐many form. In this paper I revisit the alleged (moral) superiority of dialogue. First, I problematize certain normative features of dialogue, most notably reciprocity. Here I use Socrates as my example (the Phaedrus). Second, I discuss monologue, using Jesus as my example (St. Lukes gospel). I argue that there are values in the monological form that tend to be overlooked and unrecognized, for example the freedom of the audience not to respond.

Parity: (im) possible? Interplay of knowledge forms in patient education

A central purpose is to examine the kind of knowledge that patient experience represents; its origin, properties and tenability. We will use the term insider knowledge to designate the knowledge, beliefs and viewpoints constructed by patients about their own illnesses and predicaments more generally. It is our contention that an analysis of insider knowledge is necessary if the value of such knowledge for patient education is to be reasonably assessed. We discuss the epistemological status of professional knowledge and insider knowledge and what it might mean to afford them parity. Basically, we argue that patient-oriented programmes must give insider knowledge a status that acknowledges its privileged access to the insiders own intentions, perceptions, evaluations, decisions, reasons, notions and feelings, and thus yields distinctive insight into these areas. At the same time, patient education will be stunted if the fallibility of such knowledge is not openly addressed.

Evidence-based practice in education : functions of evidence and causal presuppositions

* Introduction * Evidence * The Indirect Function of Evidence * The Instrumental Character of Evidence-based Practice * Interlude: on finding ones way in the casual landscape * The Logic of Intervention * Reproducibility * What does it take for an Intervention to Work? * The Best Laid Schemes * Conclusion Bibliography

Narrative: A Brief Introduction

Etymologically, “narrative” derives from the Latin narrare, meaning “telling,” and gnarus, which means “being acquainted with something,” “having knowledge of something.” Storytelling is a universal human activity, found in all cultures. There is no known language, Jerome Bruner points out, that does not mark narrative essentials such as actor, action, object, event, direction in time, beginnings and endings, and not to forget a teller and an audience (Bruner, 2002). The story-telling impulse is ubiquitous. The stories themselves, on the other hand, may be unique and local. They may vary in both content and intended and actual functions, and we may vary in what we think stories do for us and how. Why do we tell stories? What is it about this cognitive form that makes it so attractive? What do stories do for us? Thomas King, in a lovely book about North American First Nation stories, says that if he ever gets to a different planet, the first stories he would like to hear are creation stories (King, 2003). These are basic to our self-understanding: “[...] for contained within creation stories are relationships that help to define the nature of the universe and how cultures understand the world in which they exist” (p. 10). Concerning stories of a less fundamental kind, Kenneth Burke (1945) suggests that stories, fictional or actual, minimally should feature an actor, in some recognizable context, who tries to achieve a goal by some means or other. What drives the story, Burke argues, is Trouble (with a capital T); that is, some form of mismatch or imbalance between the story elements. The means was inadequate, the hero was interrupted by an enemy, or the context changed randomly. Trouble thus designates a plan that went awry and did not come to fruition, and herein lies the impetus to narrative. First, our plan may itself be conceived of as a narrative, as a representation of our knowledge of how things usually work and how we therefore can expect them to work when we implement our chosen means. But more importantly, we use narrative to make sense of things when they do not go as planned, when we run into Trouble. We react to unexpected events and we construct narratives to explain them. Stories, Bruner (2002) suggests, are part of our everyday armamentarium for coping with surprise. As a corollary we might employ narrative to run “thought experiments” in order to resolve Trouble and devise better strategies, for example, telling imagined stories of what would happen if... What would be the result if we performed action x rather than y... These forms of everyday predictions are clearly aided by deeply embedded cultural narratives. Narratives may thus shape our behavior and thought by providing models of the world, of how things are, how they hang together and what they mean; and in return we reshape and revise our own basic narratives. We should also note here that stories may have detrimental effects. Thomas King (2003) attributes much power to stories. Stories can control our lives in many ways, he says. One thing is personal stories that we are not able to move past. Another thing is stories that serve to form and fixate general group identities. King mentions Edward S. Curtis, who wanted to capture the image of the North American Indian before it was too late and therefore spent some 30 years photographing Indians. Add to this James Fenimore