Torben Stühmeier

Getting beer during commercials: adverse effects of ad-avoidance

This paper studies the impact of ad-avoidance behavior in media markets. We consider a situation where viewers can avoid advertisement messages. As the media market is a two-sided market, increased ad-avoidance reduces advertisers value of placing an ad. We contrast two financing regimes, free-to-air and pay-TV. We find that a higher viewer responsiveness to advertising decreases revenues and entry in the free-to-air regime. In contrast, in the pay-TV regime, lower income from advertisements is compensated by higher subscription income leaving revenues and the number of channels unaffected for a fixed total viewership.

Regulating Advertising in the Presence of Public Service Broadcasting

Television advertising levels in Europe are regulated according to the Audiovisual Service Media Directive, where member states of the European Union usually impose stricter regulation on their Public Service Broadcasting (PSB) channels. The present model evaluates the effects of symmetric and asymmetric regulation of ad levels on competition for viewers and advertisers in a duopoly framework where a public and a private broadcaster compete. If both broadcasters face the same advertising cap, regulation can be profit-increasing for both channels. If the public broadcaster is more strictly regulated, this may benefit the commercial rival if higher revenues in the advertising market outweigh the loss in viewership.

Competition and antitrust in internet markets

The rapid rise, enduring growth and success of Internet markets and e-commerce platforms have spurred a lively and sometimes heated debate among academics and policy-makers: do Internet markets foster competition or are they prone to concentration, possibly to the point of monopolization? Competition economists and lawyers vigorously discuss the peculiarities of these markets and whether traditional rules and interpretations of competition law are sufficient to deal with potential new competition problems. The cases against search engine Google have received most public and academic attention, closely followed by the e-book case against Apple. In addition, numerous cases concerning vertical restraints in online sales have recently been brought before European courts. These vertical restraints include across-platform parity agreements (APPAs), which are a special form of a most-favored customer clause, general bans on online sales or bans on particular platforms, dual pricing systems, and selective and exclusive distribution systems. This chapter starts with a brief discussion of the peculiarities of online markets and then discusses recent antitrust cases related to the Internet.

Wettbewerb im deutschen Mobilfunkmarkt

Abstract This paper studies competition in the German market for mobile telecommunications, motivated by recent suggestions that T-Mobile and Vodafone possess a position of collective dominance. Allegedly, their position of joint dominance is secured through a combination of first-mover advantages and discrimination between on-net and off-net prices. While our qualitative analysis remains inconclusive, as some factors tend to favour collusion while others make collusion more difficult to sustain, our empirical analysis suggests that T-Mobile and Vodafone cannot act independently of their smaller rivals, but that they are disciplined by their smaller competitors’ offerings

Cloud Computing als Instrument für effiziente IT-Lösungen: Betriebs- und volkswirtschaftliche Potenziale und Hemmnisse

ZusammenfassungFür kleine und mittlere Unternehmen spielt Flexibilität eine zunehmend wichtige Rolle. Cloud Computing erhöht die Flexibilität der IT-Strukturen. Außerdem sind die regionale Unabhängigkeit der Arbeitsplätze und eine bessere Vereinbarung von Familie und Beruf, verbunden mit Möglichkeiten zur flexiblen Arbeitszeitgestaltung, zunehmend notwendig, um qualifizierte Fachkräfte zu gewinnen. Die Analyse zeigt, dass Cloud Computing in vielen Unternehmen zur Verbesserung der Wettbewerbsfähigkeit beitragen kann. Darüber hinaus hat Cloud Computing auch positive gesamtwirtschaftliche Effekte. Die Senkung der Fixkosten erlaubt den Markteintritt von kleinen und mittelständischen Unternehmen und führt damit zu einem intensiveren Wettbewerb. Dadurch kommt es zu Produktivitätssteigerungen, die zu Wachstumsimpulsen führen.AbstractFor small and medium size enterprises flexibility is becoming more and more important. Cloud computing increases the flexibility of IT-infrastructure. In addition, regional independence of the workplace, better compatibility of family and work, and flexible working hours are essential to gain qualified workers. The paper shows that cloud computing has the potential to increase the competiveness of small and medium size enterprises. Furthermore, cloud computing will have positive macroeconomic effects. By lowering fix costs, cloud computing allows the market entry of small and medium enterprises. This intensifies competition. As a result productivity increases which has a positive effect on growth.

Media market concentration and pluralism

Media market structures are changing constantly. Traditional media outlets such as newspapers are being hard-hit by the digitalization of content, causing market exit and long-term consolidation in many countries. Competition policy in media markets is not only concerned with this trend because of reduced economic competition, but also because of potentially reduced pluralism. Accordingly, this paper analyzes the relationship between media market concentration and pluralism. In particular, we distinguish between internal pluralism, namely the range of views o.ered by a single outlet, and external pluralism, which refers to the market supply of pluralism. We show that internal pluralism is high in concentrated markets, but external pluralism is not. Moreover, a monopoly market does not necessarily o.er less pluralism than a competitive one.

Price disclosure rules and consumer price comparison

Abstract Search frictions are regarded as a major impediment to active competition in many markets. In some markets, such as financial and retail gasoline, governments and consumer protection agencies call for compulsory price reporting. Consumers could then more easily compare the firms’ offers. We show that for a given level of price comparison, mandatory price reporting indeed generally benefits consumers. Such regulation, however, feeds back into firms’ strategies, resulting in lower levels of price comparison in equilibrium. This effect may dominate so that the regulation leads to higher expected market prices.

Das Leistungsschutzrecht für Presseverleger: Eine ordnungspolitische Perspektive

Abstract Since the beginning of the year 2009 the German press publishers have lobbied for their own neighbouring right which should protect even short snippets of online press articles. The new right should basically protect the press publishers’ investments in the online environment. Currently there is an intensive debate among several involved interest groups about the expected effects of such a right. The present article aims to sheds some light on the expected economic effects. It states that a neighbouring right is not sufficiently justified by economic theory and can distort efficiency both from an ex ante and an ex post point of view.

Semi-Collusion on Investments in the Mobile Internet Market

This model analyzes mobile network operators (MNOs) incentives to invest in their facilities in the era of the mobile internet, given a widespread use of third generation (3G) services. Usually, MNOs agree on reciprocal roaming to offer full service to their subscribers. Roaming induces investment spillovers, as due to roaming agreements also rival customers benefit from investment of a MNO. It will be analyzed how different regimes of access regulation affect MNOs incentives to invest. Semi-collusion on investments should be allowed, if investment spillovers are sufficiently large. The model is able to provide a rational for a bill-and-keep access pricing regime, proposed by the European Commission, given that a regulator is both able to determine access prices and investments. Given that a social planer only regulates access prices, an access price of zero may lead to over-and underinvestments from a welfare perspective.