Tore T. Petersen

Anglo-American Rivalry in the Middle East: The Struggle for the Buraimi Oasis, 1952–1957

a remote oasis on the south-east tip of the Arabian peninsula, seemed in the early 1950s an unlikely spot for international confrontation; few Americans knew it even existed. Roughly circular, and about six miles across, it had a population of between six and ten thousand inhabitants clustered in nine villages, three of them controlled by Abu Dhabi, and the rest by the sultan of Muscat and Oman. Buraimi was blessed with abundant

Anglo-American relations over Aden and the United Arab Emirates, 1967–71

ABSTRACT The British decision to withdraw from Aden in 1967 was a political decision made because of Labours distaste for imperialism and empire. As Aden descended into chaos and disorder, the Americans watched with equanimity; accepting an increased Soviet and Chinese presence in the Federation after British withdrawal. Later, the Nixon administration supported British attempts to federate tiny Arabian sheikhdoms on the tip of the Arabian Peninsula into the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The main American concern was for Britain to hand over the Tunbs and Musa Islands to the Shah of Iran whom Nixon had anointed American shieldbearer in the Gulf. This the British willingly did in order to secure access to the lucrative Iranian market, while at the same time the Heath government succeeded in creating the UAE.

The October 1973 War: Politics, Diplomacy, and Legacy

the Templars—received great royal patronage across medieval Europe, perhaps for their ‘piety’ (p. 153). Hurlock attempts to show the role these orders played; there were larger interactions between them and the people of WISE, which in turn makes explicit the impact the crusades had on Europe. Despite this, she remarks that the orders were also criticised by writers. In her conclusion, Hurlock exhorts that the crusades had a palpable impact on domestic life in WISE, though it was witnessed more strongly in Britain during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Nevertheless, the language of the crusade rhetoric was by and large exploited by the Kings of England for their personal interests and domestic warfare. There is a factual error when Hurlock states that ‘Jerusalem was under Muslim rule ... from 614 to 1099’ (p. 9). We know that the Muslims did not conquer Jerusalem until 638, under Umar, the second caliph of Islam. Therefore, it should have been 638 to 1099. Overall the book is well written and provides a comparative study of the impact the crusades had on England, Ireland, Scotland and Wales. It brilliantly compares the impact on each country, and gives a balanced treatment of the affected areas from c. 1000–1300. It is a potentially valuable contribution to the existent crusade literature and paves the way for further research.

Politics and Society in the Middle East before the Arab Spring

The Middle East is often seen and described as region in turmoil, and it has had more than its fair share of local upheavals, coups, regional wars, and Great Power interference. But surprisingly, since the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and with the borders of the modern Middle East largely imposed by London and Paris, very little territory has changed hands permanently. State governments have also until recently been remarkably stable. Despite outside interference and much local unrest, regime change does not occur often. Even the so-called Arab Spring leaves much to be desired in this regard. The army is still in power in Egypt and, in Syria, Bashar al-Assad presently continues to cling to power. It is all the more remarkable as stability has been challenged by outside interference, regional wars, and domestic

Alliance Restored?: an Uneasy Partnership 25 June 1954 to 26 July 1956

‘“Oilism” and not colonialism’, Churchill remarked, ‘[was] the evil in the world today’, referring to the recent problems in Iran and Buraimi during the Anglo-American summit in late June 1954. There was much to discuss, as the spring of 1954 had been a very trying time for Anglo- American relations. Aside from the Middle East, problems had flared up over first Indo-China and then Guatemala. When French forces in Indo-China were facing a disastrous defeat at Dien Bien Phu during the spring of 1954, Dulles tried to shore up French resistance by a plan termed ‘United Action’, where a coalition by the United States, Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and the countries in Indo-China would intervene in the war. Dulles believed that such a coalition would prevent communist China from intervening, and a military effort not being tainted with accusations of French colonialism. However, ‘United Action’ was stranded by Britain’s refusal to support it.

The Suez Crisis and its Aftermath: 29 October 1956 to 5 March 1957

The allies issued their ultimatum to Egypt and Israel on the afternoon of 29 October warning both parties to withdraw to ten miles either side of the Canal, and agree to its temporary occupation by British and French forces. Israel, being a partner to the conspiracy, complied willingly, as its forces were between 75 to 125 miles east of the Canal. Egypt, as expected, turned the ultimatum down since Egyptian forces then might have to withdraw up to 135 miles from the front.

Suez: the Debate

The Anglo-French invasion of the Suez Canal in November 1956 resulted in an open break between the United States and its major European allies. The American response was swift and severe: the United States immediately condemned the invasion in the United Nations, speculated against the pound (thus threatening Britain with severe economic distress) and prevented Britain from withdrawing money from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Britain was entitled to withdraw the money and an injection from IMF would have shored up the declining value of the pound. In addition, the United States withheld oil from Europe until Britain and France agreed to withdraw their military forces. The United States was able to do that because Egypt had blockaded the Suez Canal and other Arab nations had blown up the oil pipelines; thus the only oil available to Europe was from the western hemisphere which was controlled by the United States. President Eisenhower, however, did not think the British had been chastened enough and effectively forced the British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, out of office. The American ambassador to London, Winthrop Aldrich, described Eisenhower as ‘vitriolic’ and ‘unstatesmanlike’. Why did the United States adopt such severe measures against its closest ally?

Iran: Britain Loses Control over its Jewel in the Middle East

Iran nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in 1951. AIOC was Britain’s largest overseas investment, and the company’s refinery in Abadan was the largest oil refinery in the world. There, 4500 Englishmen lived in a self-contained unit, with its own fleet, hospitals and schools, and even The Times flown in daily from London. While upsetting to the British, Iran’s action was not entirely unjustified. AIOC had realized almost £200m in profit in 1950, of which the British government pocketed more than £50m in taxes, while Iran received only £16m . Iranians were excluded from all toplevel positions in the company, and Iran had to pay more for its own oil than the British did. In fact, it would have been cheaper for Iran to import oil from the Soviet Union than use its own domestically produced oil.

Egypt: Opening Wedge to the Middle East

In July 1952, in Egypt, a group of revolutionary officers, under the leadership of Gamal Nasser took power and retired the corrupt King Farouk abroad. The new regime had one major goal, to rid Egypt of British control and dominance. The chief symbol of the British presence in Egypt was the 80,000 British soldiers stationed along the Suez Canal in a complex of bases more than 65 miles long and three miles wide. The main Egyptian concern was, thus, the withdrawal of the British troops, a goal Nasser shared with the previous Egyptian regime. The British Labour Party had been willing to evacuate the base in 1946. Unfortunately, the agreement floundered over the future of Sudan, Farouk demanding to become King of Sudan, while Britain wanted the Sudanese themselves to decide whether they wanted any future association with Egypt or not. Thereafter both the Egyptian and the British positions hardened considerably. The British attitude was also determined by Britain’s withdrawal from Palestine in 1948, which deprived her of suitable bases outside the Suez Canal area. When the Conservatives returned to office in 1951, the British, led by Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, realizing the difficulties in maintaining a base in a hostile country were willing to withdraw their soldiers, if their continued influence in Egypt were ensured. To do so, Eden constantly sought to enlist American aid.

Prelude to Disaster: the Suez Crisis, 26 July to 29 October 1956

Eden was dining with the King of Iraq and the King’s closest advisers when he received news that Nasser had nationalized the Suez Canal. His visitors left early and the Prime Minister immediately called key members of his cabinet together, and invited the French Ambassador and the American Charge d’Affairs to participate. While technically legal, the Cabinet considered Nasser’s nationalization the last in a long series of provocations, which had to be rectified, by force if necessary. Soon, alarming messages were reaching the United States.