Clive Jones

Missing the ‘devils’ we knew? Israel and political Islam amid the Arab Awakening

While the immediate outcome of the Iraq War of 2003 was certainly to Israels strategic advantage, the more immediate and indeed visceral challenge of the ongoing Al-Aqsa intifada has dominated the security horizons of most Israelis. The legacy of this conflict, with its strong Islamist overtones, has clearly had a bearing on how the Arab Awakening has come to be perceived by Israel. Taking this experience as its starting point, this article examines the response by Tel Aviv to the Arab Awakening at an elite level and how, for the most part, Israeli perceptions of its Islamist essence, an essence that rejects popular accountability, continues to be viewed through a predominantly Realist prism. Such perceptions look set to endure, shaping Israels immediate attitudes towards the Palestinians and the wider Arab world. The authors argue that while Israeli concerns over the trajectory of the Arab Awakening do carry empirical weight, such concerns can be equally understood as part of a wider critique with regard to Israels own emerging democratic deficit. This was seen most recently in a raft of legislative bills put before the Knesset between 2009 and 2012 designed to curb civil liberties in Israel; alongside its continued occupation of Palestinian lands and wider demographic shifts, such moves increasingly tarnish Israels proud claim to be both Jewish and democratic.

The Writing on the Wall: Israel, the Security Barrier and the Future of Zionism

Most analyses and commentary surrounding the construction of Israels security barrier or fence have focused on the adverse impact this has had on bilateral relations with the Palestinian Authority, its institutions and people. For most Israelis, such concerns voiced by the Palestinians themselves as well as the wider international community denies agency to their physical security in the face of an Islamist nemesis that apparently brooks no compromise. But while the perceived role of the barrier in reducing terrorist attacks inside Israel has enjoyed widespread approbation among Israelis, less attention has been devoted to the impact that the barrier has had upon competing ideas and identities over the very nature of Zionism itself. As such, this paper argues that the true impact of the barrier is as much about ensuring the coherence of Israels ideological boundaries as it is about enhancing the physical protection of the state.

Ideo‐theology and the Jewish state: from conflict to conciliation?

Abstract The assassination of Israeli premier Yitzhak Rabin provided the most vivid demonstration to date of religious‐nationalist opposition inside Israel to the principle of exchanging land for peace. This article sets out to explore this world view and its intellectual origins, exploring in the process how the use of sacred Judaic texts have become both the monopoly of religious‐nationalism and the template for politically inspired violence against those in Israel suspected of condoning territorial compromise. This article concludes that if the ideo‐the‐ology of religious‐nationalists is to be assuaged, a religious discourse supporting territorial retrenchment has to become part of the political fabric of the centre‐left in Israel.

The Tribes that Bind: Yemen and the Paradox of Political Violence

Beset by multiple security challenges, not least the emergence of a powerful Al Qaeda franchise, Yemen appears the antithesis of the “Weberian” state model. But while these challenges are acute, they should be seen as part of a wider “political field,” dominated by powerful tribes and conditioned by patrimonial networks that have long framed the modes of political exchange between the center and periphery. This remains crucial to understanding the wider eddies of tribal politics in Yemen, and in turn, the limits of a purely military response by Washington as it seeks to confront Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

Britain and the Arabian Gulf: New Perspectives On Strategic Influence

On 16 January 1968 the Prime Minister, Sir Harold Wilson, in a supplementary statement on British defence policy, announced that the complete withdrawal of British armed forces from the Gulf was to be completed by the end of 1971. This declaration was made in response to chronic problems in the British economy and, in particular, the need to cut defence expenditure in light of the devaluation of the pound announced in November 1967.’ While seen at the time as

Private Military Companies as ‘Epistemic Communities’

The role of the private military company (PMC) remains one of the more controversial aspects of security studies. For many, they represent little more than corporate ‘dogs of war’, beneficiaries of misplaced munificence from donor countries unable or unwilling to intervene in failed states directly or in areas where the challenge of post-war reconstruction is particularly violent. Such moral objections, however well intentioned, have done little to assuage the exponential growth of such actors, fuelled in no small part by ongoing internecine strife in Iraq and Afghanistan. By equating PMCs with the ideal of an ‘Epistemic Community’ however, this article suggests this normative ideal can help towards a functional understanding of the roles that such actors could and should perform in areas of civil conflict and post-war reconstruction.

Saudi Arabia After the Gulf War: the Internal-External Security Dilemma

The Gulf War of 1990 to 1991 marked a watershed in the political development of Saudi Arabia. While the coalition forces led by the United States removed the direct threat presented to Riyadh by Saddam Hussein, the crisis exacerbated religious, economic, ethnic and social tensions that now challenge the consensual base of popular support previously enjoyed by the House of Saud. In turn, these domestic challenges have moulded a new Saudi approach to regional politics. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait exposed the limitations of Saudi Arabia’s previous dependence on its accumulated wealth to buy security for the regime. Generous loans and contributions made to Arab states, the Palestinians and various Islamic organizations may have bought the regime time, but, as the crisis demonstrated, this did not necessarily translate into regional stability. Indeed, the Gulf War demonstrated that the external security of Saudi Arabia remained dependent upon a confluence of interest with the West and in particular, Washington. Yet this relationship remains problematic for King Fahd, not least because of the emotive impact such ties have had upon the growing Islamic opposition inside the Kingdom. While in part fuelled by the economic anomie now facing Saudi society, dependence upon direct American military aid provided a powerful means of challenging the legitimacy of the self-proclaimed ’Servant of the two Holy Places’, King Fahd himself. Although the positioning of non-Muslim troops on Saudi soil during the crisis was condoned by afatwa issued by the chief Saudi religious authority, Sheikh Abdul Aziz Bin Baz, wider Islamic sentiment condemned as apostasy such an overwhelming presence and an overt attempt by the West to occupy the ’Muslim Heartland’.’ 1

WHAT'S LEFT OF THE LEFT IN ISRAEL? THE SHADOW OF THE FEBRUARY 2009 NATIONAL ELECTION

The February 2009 elections mark a water-shed in Israeli politics and highlight an increasingly rightward drift in Israeli politics: Labour had its worst ever result. The violent intifada shattered belief that negotiations with the Palestinians could ever be successful and the security barrier seemed increasingly necessary if Israel was to remain both Jewish and democratic. The coalition government constructed by Binyamin Netanyahu was carefully balanced and looks durable, the more so as, somewhat surprisingly, it includes Labour and Barak as defence minister. Kadima could face some hard days in opposition unless Netanyahu falls out with Washington, or the coalition collapses.

Israel’s Security Nexus as Strategic Restraint: The Case of Iran 2009–2013

ABSTRACT This article examines the debates in Israel between 2009 and 2013 over Iran’s nuclear programme as a reflection of a particular type of civil–military or civil–security relationship. It analyses how key actors within that relationship – particularly those with an intelligence background – engaged with media outlets in Israel and further afield to influence domestic and international opinion over how best to contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions. In so doing, it seeks to address one fundamental question: are governments in Jerusalem any longer the final arbiters over deciding what is in the national security interests of the State of Israel?

Israel’s relations with the Gulf states: Toward the emergence of a tacit security regime?

ABSTRACT By drawing on the literature about security regimes, this article posits the idea that a particular type of regime, which can be termed a “tacit security regime” (TSR), has begun to emerge between Israel, on the one hand, and several Gulf Arab states, on the other. It is a regime which, unlike liberal institutional variants that attempt to privilege the promotion of collective norms, remains configured around perceptions of threats to be countered and strategic interests to be realized. By examining the development, scope, and scale of this nascent TSR, this article explores the extent to which Israel, mindful of Washington, DC’s regional retrenchment, sees the emergence of such a regime as redefining the political and strategic contours of Israel’s relations with much of the Middle East.