Trevor Taylor

Smart procurement and the partnership with industry

The new Labour government has conducted a defence review but has not pledged to increase the spending on defence. While there is no will to reduce the commitments of the British Armed Forces, there will soon be even greater financial strain than is currently the case. Professor Taylor here looks at the different options available to the British forces in overcoming the looming difficulties. He examines Smart Procurement from where the concept stands today. The partnerships which are envisaged to be developed between government and industry is explained in detail looking at: industrial incentives, the difference in work ethic and culture in government and industry, the possibility of restructuring the defence industry to generate transnational businesses designed to serve the demands for higher cost effectiveness, the role of competition in the defence sector and industrys role in equipment support and‐military operations. He concludes that if the level of production is going to go up and the unit costs d...

THE ESSENTIAL CHOICE

Abstract The UK has long viewed itself as a core player on the international stage, whilst maintaining some degree of autonomy from both Europe and the US. But plummeting budgets and shifting public opinion may mean that the forthcoming Strategic Defence Review is the beginning of a more co-operative and limited defence posture.

V. Implications of the Government–Defence Industry Relationship

This Whitehall Paper has addressed how government manages its relationship with defence businesses operating in large part from within its territory. The analysis in the previous chapters has conceptualised the role of government through three dimensions: as the customer, sponsor and regulator of such businesses. The United Kingdom, Germany and the United States were used as exemplars of other states due to the applicability of the dynamics between their governments and domestic defence industries. Each country has a significant domestic defence industrial sector, aims to sustain the capability to deploy its armed forces overseas, and has been involved in operations since the end of the Cold War that were difficult to anticipate except shortly before they occurred. An early finding from this research was that, whilst the challenges facing respective governments are often similar, policy responses in relation to the homeland’s defence industrial base remain essentially national. Consequently, how a government responds to these challenges is contingent on a country’s political ambition, its culture, history and world view. There is no ‘one size fits all’ approach, but there are certain factors that must be addressed if a state is to develop an effective relationship with its essential defence businesses. This chapter addresses these factors and the policy implications based on this review. The analysis below begins by highlighting core conclusions and lessons from the preceding chapters. The case for engagement with ideas generated around the government–defence industrial relationship is then reaffirmed. Thereafter, the discussion outlines the essential objectives required across the government–defence industrial relationship within a

III. The State–Defence Industrial Relationship: Government as Sponsor

The previous chapter considered the notion of the modern state as the customer of defence industries, typically generated through some kind of commercial ‘customer–supplier’ relationship. This chapter conceptualises the state as the sponsor or ‘enabler’ of the very businesses from which it receives defence equipment, material and services. This difference in emphasis hints at the interdependence of state and defence businesses beyond the conventional dynamics of the marketplace, reinforcing the view offered in Chapters I and II of the state–defence industry relationship as complicated and subject to competing factors. Indeed, the sense that government finds it desirable, or even necessary, to sponsor this element of its industrial base suggests that the relationship exists beyond just the commercial or managerial spheres. To what degree this is the case, and for what purpose, is explored in this chapter. It is important to remember that the concern, here, is with the defence industrial base operating from within the state’s borders, the companies that manufacture equipment and consumables, and those that provide services to the military. The concept of a ‘sponsor’ is, of course, different from that of a ‘customer’. It is, however, the very nature of the defence market that causes analysts and decision-makers to reach beyond the ‘customer’ label when attempting to understand the relationship between government and industry. The sense of just one customer (the government), limited suppliers and limited information precludes the dynamics of a perfect market from working, and the lethal nature of

WHAT'S NEW?: UK DEFENCE POLICY BEFORE AND AFTER THE SDSR

Abstract Much attention on the Strategic Defence and Security Review focused on the issues of deterrence and inter-service rivalry. But a number of other important choices, not obviously apparent in the document, might instead suggest the direction in which British defence policy has evolved. The outcome may be affordable, but is it at the cost of shortterm coherence?

The Place of Management in Defence (and Defence Education)

RUSl JOURNALAPRlL2005 Introduction: the military, management and the defence sector Since the nineteenth century there has been recognition that the professional :officer needs extensive training and education. Indeed, the American academic Samuel Huntington sees the possession of an extensive body of knowledge as being central to the professionalization of the officer corps.’ The precise content of the knowledge needed by officers has been a matter of more or less continuous review, with the latest instalments in the United Kingdom being the Defence Training Review and the Army’s Review of Officer Career Courses. In the last forty years, the formal study of management has expanded enormously in the civilian world and is continuing to grow. There is clearly an issue of whether and how management education should be a part of the knowledge associated with the professional military officer. Management is about the costeffective use of resources to deliver goods and services.As an activity, it involves forecasting and planning, organizing, directing and leading, coordination, the monitoring of progress and the development of people. Within defence, management is an activity of central significance. The only way to generate modern defence capability, which involves the integration of airborne, maritime and land-based units, people, equipment, doctrine, support, transport, recruitment, information, individual and collective training, communication, strategy, policy and a range of other variables, is through complex management activity. While armed forces clearly benefit from having a strong military ethos, such an ethos is “The trend is clearly to outsource more and more of the components of defence capability to the private sector”

The Abe Doctrine: Japan’s Proactive Pacifism and Security Strategy

© RUSI JoURnal JUnE/JUlY 2018 governance and Europe’s refugee crisis, among other topics. As a manifesto, the book makes an unapologetic case for a more federal European Union. The main argument of the book rests on a premise – that the EU is broken and that the European status quo is unsustainable. As Verhofstadt puts it: ‘We cannot continue to stand separately and muddle along like this while globalization mercilessly batters our member states’ national sovereignty’ (p. 25). He is especially critical of the EU’s inclination to engage in declaratory diplomacy and ‘empty decisions’ with little follow-up; and of the EU’s use of soft law and informal agreements as substitutes for hard regulation. He is damning of the Union’s inability to address European decline, accusing the EU of having failed young Europeans. Indeed, Verhofstadt’s diagnosis of Europe’s problems is not unlike that of the most strident of Eurosceptics. His proposed solution, however, is quite different. Verhofstadt argues for more Europe; and proposes the ‘transformation’ of the EU into a United States of Europe. Indeed, a consistent thread in the book is that the EU needs to model itself on and be much more like the US. While this is a tricky position to hold these days, Verhofstadt is not advocating the election of a European ‘Trump’, but does want to see less diffuse leadership in the Union. It is from a constitutional standpoint that the US is held up as a beacon of federalism in the light of which the EU’s inadequacies are reflected. The rationale for ‘more Europe’ is that it would allow the EU to compete globally with other regional blocs, and to deal more effectively with its own internal crises. Thus, Verhofstadt argues that the EU requires a new constitutional settlement. In so doing he confirms his faith in institutional solutions to political and economic problems. The EU needs a proper government and an elected president, he argues. The Parliament should have enhanced powers, including the right to tax EU citizens. And while federalism may not imply the creation of a European superstate, many of Verhofstadt’s proposals do involve some element of centralisation – in the arena of defence policy and in the field of fiscal policy, for example. At the same time, the author bemoans the lack of political will and courage among Europe’s leaders, while accepting that he himself, when prime minister, had to compromise and take pragmatic decisions. While it is clearly much easier to stick to one’s principles as the leader of a political group in the European Parliament than it is as the premier of an EU member state, Verhofstadt’s argument assumes a great deal, not least that political leaders agree with his ‘more Europe’ argument but are too cowardly to act on it. There is one glaring omission in this book. In constructing an argument that a United States of Europe is rational, logical and sensible – and thus the only way to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the EU – issues of democracy and the role of Europe’s citizens are neglected. Even if it is fair to say that ‘the delusional spirit of nationalism still haunts the continent’, it is too simplistic to view all public opinion (which does not agree with one’s own pro-European stance) as evidence of the rise of populism. Admittedly, this puts words into Verhofstadt’s mouth – it is not quite what he says. But in reading this book, this reviewer was left with the feeling that, despite Verhofstadt’s liberalism, his approach to European integration is too ‘classical’ and ‘top-down’ to resonate with most pol it ic ians, c it izens and commentators involved in European politics today. Perhaps this explains the source of this reviewer’s gloom – that while having sympathy for some of the positions he holds, he was not able to convince this reviewer that his vision of a United States of Europe, as he explains it in this book, is either feasible or desirable. 

How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything: Tales from the Pentagon

© RUSI JOURNAL DECEMBER 2017 whose ability to exert influence over the current wave of potential extremists may have passed. And this in some ways is one of the bleaker conclusions to draw from these books: terrorist groups have long narratives and histories, and are focused on horizons that extend well beyond those of the security services and governments they are fighting against. The past determines the present, and the present determines the future. Thus far, the West has been unable to stay ahead of the curve, and there is little evidence that it will be able to in the future. Both of these books help to cast a clearer light on the past and its links to the present, and how persistent and dangerous the terrorist threat that we face from violent Islamist groups, and Al-Qa’ida in particular, remains. 

Insights, Forecasts and Sometimes Getting It Wrong: A Commentary on Three RUSI Journal Articles from 1920: A Comment on Three RUSI Journal Articles from 1920

Reviewed works: ‘The Air Force’ by Air Commodore H R Brooke-Popham (1920) ‘Possibilities of the Next War’ by Major-General Sir Louis C Jackson (1920) ‘The Submarine and Future Naval Warfare’ by Lieutenant W S King-Hall (1920)

The US Third Offset Strategy

The US third offset strategy (3OS) may transform the way in which Western powers generate future battle-winning capabilities and the technologies that enable and sustain them. In this article, John Louth and Trevor Taylor explore the nature of the 3OS, the strategic thinking that is driving it forward and the ambitions it seeks to satisfy. They discuss the key technologies within the strategy and explore the impact that their emergence will have on allies of the US. They conclude by discussing the opportunities and challenges presented to decision-makers on both sides of the Atlantic.