Ulrich Glassmann

Beyond the German Model of Capitalism: Unorthodox Local Business Development in the Cologne Media Industry

Abstract On the basis of a media firm-survey and the measurement of in-town enterprise concentration, this paper explains the extraordinary sub-sectoral specialization and the spatial concentration towards radio and television in a German city: Cologne. A peculiar mix of institutional support, typical of German capitalism and unorthodox deviance from such arrangements is discovered in all matters of collective goods provision, including vocational training, enterprise financing, etc. Using a case study-approach, this article shows how the German model of capitalism can be rearranged for new markets on the local level, successfully overcoming institutional constraints by informal cooperation and institutional entrepreneurship.

Regionen im Wettbewerb: Die Governance regionaler Wirtschaftscluster

„A governance system is defined as the totality of institutional arrangements — including rules and rule-making agents — that regulate transactions inside and across the boundaries of an economic system“ (Hollingsworth et al. 1994b: 5). Diese allgemeine Definition klart, worum es in jener Teildisziplin der Sozialwissenschaften geht, die den Begriff der „Governance“ nicht auf das Regieren in der Politik, sondern auf die Transaktionen in der Wirtschaft moderner (kapitalistischer) Gesellschaften bezieht. Es geht ihr um die institutionellen Grundlagen der Koordination von Wirtschaftssubjekten, die sich in unterschiedlichen „okonomischen Systemen“ bewegen, auch wenn diese Systeme allesamt als „kapitalistisch“ eingestuft werden. Wie in der Struktur dieses Bandes bereits deutlich wird, lasst sich diese Forschung uber die Governance der Wirtschaft in vier Teilbereiche mit einer je eigenen Abgrenzung des Untersuchungsgegenstandes untergliedern: Die Governance der Volkswirtschaft einzelner Lander oder Landerfamilien (z.B. das „Modell Deutschland“ im Unterschied zur liberalen politischen Okonomie der USA): In dieser Perspektive stehen die nationalen Besonderheiten der Governance wirtschaftlicher Transaktionen im Vordergrund. Die Governance einzelner Wirtschaftssektoren (z.B. Chemische Industrie, Autoindustrie, Maschinenbau, Ernahrungsindustrie): In dieser Perspektive rucken sektorale Aspekte der Governance in den Vordergrund. Dabei wird angenommen, dass in der Governance von einzelnen Wirtschaftsbranchen uber alle Lander hinweg sektorale Besonderheiten identifiziert werden konnen, die den spezifischen sektoralen Koordinationsanforderungen geschuldet sind. Die Governance einzelner regionaler Wirtschaftscluster (z.B. der Textilproduktion in Prato, der Biotechnologie in Munchen-Martinsried oder der Medienwirtschaft in Koln). Die Governance (-Probleme) im Rahmen der Systemtransformation ehemals sozialistischer Lander.

Social Rights, Family Networks and Regional Varieties of Capitalism in Mediterranean Countries

Glassmann U. Social rights, family networks and regional varieties of capitalism in Mediterranean countries, Regional Studies. Mediterranean economies are characterized by a strong territorial divide. In some regions governmental modernization strategies led to the predominance of a ‘family welfare model’ that guaranteed generous welfare entitlements on the basis of labour contracts by large firms or the civil service. In other regions a ‘family business model’ prevails, which has evolved due to the decision of the male breadwinner to sacrifice social rights for less protected (small firm) employment opportunities. This choice leads family members to strive for higher educational attainment and formal labour participation causing better economic performance compared with regions where the ‘family welfare model’ persists.

Eine verlorene Generation

Das Ende seiner Regierungszeit gab Matteo Renzi auf einer Pressekonferenz kurz nach Mitternacht am 05. Dezember 2016 bekannt. Am Tag zuvor war das von seiner Regierung initiierte Verfassungsreferendum gescheitert, in dem es u. a. darum ging, die Befugnisse der zweiten Parlamentskammer zu schwachen und die Macht des Ministerprasidenten zu starken. Renzi selbst hatte das Referendum zu einer Art Vertrauensfrage uber seine Regierung aufgebaut und genau in diesem Sinn hatten es viele Wahler auch verstanden.

Restraining free-riders: The effects of actor types and decision rules in the public goods game

Many experiments comparing individual and group behavior find that groups behave more egoistically than individuals. However, most of these studies do not control for the influence of within-group decision-making rules that might have an important impact on group behavior. In this article, we report findings from laboratory experiments comparing individual and group behavior in a public goods game. We find that rather than cooperation levels differing between individuals and groups per se, the intragroup decision-making rule has an influence on the cooperativeness of groups. Groups decide either by majority or unanimity rule. While groups deciding by majority rule reach roughly the same level of cooperation as individuals, groups deciding by unanimity rule contribute significantly lower amounts to the public good.

Decision Costs and Welfare Effects of Democratic Voting Rules: an Experimental Analysis

Abstract What impact do majority rule and unanimity rule have on welfare and decision costs? According to Buchanan and Tullock ([1962] 1999) the unanimity principle must be regarded as a democratic norm, because it guarantees Pareto-efficient welfare effects. We present experimental results from a public goods game, which demonstrate in contrast to this assumption that majority rule can produce greater welfare effects than unanimity rule. This result suggests a critical revision of theoretical approaches which narrow the legitimacy of majority rule in this respect.

Changing Varieties of Capitalism. Societal Consequences of Spatial and Institutional Fragmentation in Germany and Italy

While an economy is always ‘embedded’ in society, the relationship between the two is undergoing profound changes in Europe, resulting in widespread instability which is emphasised by the current crisis. This book analyses these changes, and in particular pressures of intensifying international competition, globalization and financialization within Europe.

Entscheidungskosten und Gemeinwohleffekte demokratischer Abstimmungsregeln – eine experimentelle Untersuchung

Decision Costs and Welfare Effects of Democratic Voting Rules – An Experimental Analysis Abstract: What impact do majority rule and unanimity rule create on welfare and decision costs? According to Buchanan and Tullock ([1962] 1999) the unanimity principle must be regarded as a democratic norm, because it guarantees Pareto-efficient welfare effects. We present experimental results from a public goods game, which demonstrate in contrast to this assumption that majority rule can produce larger welfare effects than unanimity rule. This result suggests a critical revision of theoretical approaches which narrow the legitimacy of majority rule in this respect.