Ulrik Kjær

Local Party System Nationalisation: Does Municipal Size Matter?

Abstract Local party systems are not necessarily copies of their countrys national party system. Some national parties do not field candidates in all municipalities, while in other municipalities there are non-partisan lists/local parties. In this article it is hypothesised that the larger the municipality (in number of inhabitants), the more the local party system will resemble the national party system (and vice versa). The hypothesis is tested using data from the 2001 local elections in Denmark. For this purpose, an index of local party system nationalisation is developed. The index is formulated in general terms so as to make it applicable in other settings and in comparisons between countries and over time.

The Gendered Division of Labor in Assignments to Political Committees: Discrimination or Self-Selection in Danish Local Politics?

The literature on the descriptive representation of women in parliaments is voluminous, and most studies focus on different levels of womens representation across legislatures (e.g., Krook 2010; Matland 1998; Paxton 1997; Reynolds 1999; Siaroff 2000). The number of women in parliaments is counted across the globe, and explanations as to what facilitates and hinders the election of female politicians are sought. At a macro level, PR systems, high district magnitudes, and, of course, gender quotas are some of the institutional mechanisms that have been identified as advantageous for womens ambitions to conquer seats in legislatures. These aspects of the electoral system have also drawn widespread attention among electoral engineers, since they can be manipulated, far more so than can socioeconomic factors (such as womens educational level or participation in the labor market) or cultural factors (such as dominant religion or the cultural perception of womens societal role), both of which have also been identified as important to womens descriptive representation at the parliamentary level (see, e.g., Christmas-Best and Kjaer 2007).

Local Political Leadership: The Art of Circulating Political Capital

Abstract In this article, local political leadership is modelled as circulation of political capital. Based on intensive case studies of the political leadership performance of four mayors in Denmark, this article asks why the concept of political capital, introduced to local government studies in 1961 by Banfield, has in many ways sunk into oblivion. This article resuscitates the concept of political capital, using it to generate a general theory of local political leadership. In this framework, the crucial component of effective leadership is the mayors ability, within a given institutional framework, to circulate (earn and spend) political capital. Effective leadership occurs when the leader continuously invests his or her political capital in ways which yield the greatest return. Clarence N. Stones distinction between ‘power over’ and ‘power to’ is central to the model. Mayors performing what James H. Svara has labelled ‘facilitative leadership’ can in some cases accumulate substantial amounts of political capital.Abstract In this article, local political leadership is modelled as circulation of political capital. Based on intensive case studies of the political leadership performance of four mayors in Denmark, this article asks why the concept of political capital, introduced to local government studies in 1961 by Banfield, has in many ways sunk into oblivion. This article resuscitates the concept of political capital, using it to generate a general theory of local political leadership. In this framework, the crucial component of effective leadership is the mayors ability, within a given institutional framework, to circulate (earn and spend) political capital. Effective leadership occurs when the leader continuously invests his or her political capital in ways which yield the greatest return. Clarence N. Stones distinction between ‘power over’ and ‘power to’ is central to the model. Mayors performing what James H. Svara has labelled ‘facilitative leadership’ can in some cases accumulate substantial amounts of po...

The Decreasing Number of Candidates at Danish Local Elections: Local Democracy in Crisis?

Abstract While the qualitative dimension of local political recruitment is the subject of extensive discussion in the literature, little attention has been paid to the quantitative aspect, i.e., how many candidates run for local elections. Using Danish local politics as a case study, this analysis of election report data demonstrates that the political parties show substantial rational actor behaviour when deciding the number of candidates to be put forward. The number of candidates running at Danish local elections has for the last four decades been continuously decreasing. Applying demand-side hypotheses derived from Rational Choice Institutionalism led to the conclusion that some, but not all, of the decline in the number of candidates can be attributed to changes in the institutional set-up of the Danish local elections.Abstract While the qualitative dimension of local political recruitment is the subject of extensive discussion in the literature, little attention has been paid to the quantitative aspect, i.e., how many candidates run for local elections. Using Danish local politics as a case study, this analysis of election report data demonstrates that the political parties show substantial rational actor behaviour when deciding the number of candidates to be put forward. The number of candidates running at Danish local elections has for the last four decades been continuously decreasing. Applying demand-side hypotheses derived from Rational Choice Institutionalism led to the conclusion that some, but not all, of the decline in the number of candidates can be attributed to changes in the institutional set-up of the Danish local elections.

Political Representation and Geographical Bias in Amalgamated Local Governments

Abstract There is a strong tendency across the world to amalgamate political jurisdictions, especially local governments. Merger of jurisdictions entails integration of local interests, and former jurisdictions have to struggle to secure political representation and specific area interests in the new amalgamated jurisdiction. We argue that this struggle is affected by the strength of the centre–periphery dimension of the new amalgamated jurisdiction. When a large city is merged with less populated jurisdictions, a strong centre–periphery dimension is created, and this leads to a numerical over-representation of the periphery in the legislature of the amalgamated jurisdiction. We test the argument empirically using a recent large-scale amalgamation reform that allows us to compare 66 amalgamations with different centre–periphery dimensions. Our argument is supported when we examine representation by seats in jurisdiction councils (descriptive representation) and politicians’ advancement of local interests (substantive representation).

The Mayor’s Political Career

From time to time the claim is made that ‘politicians are all the same’ — not least when politicians are lambasted in the aftermath of unpopular decisions or actions. The differences between the various individuals who make up the political elite are claimed to be minor compared to the differences between persons belonging to the upper strata of the hierarchy of formal political power and the mundane rest of the population. Even scholars often stress this point (e.g. Putnam 1976; Best and Cotta 2000), thereby basically supporting the conclusion of classical elite theorists stating that the primary line of division of the population is between the elite and the non-elite (Pareto 1935; Mosca 1939). Politicians do differ from the electorate at large — they form a subspecies of human being by the very fact of having a political mandate. And in some cases they not only have politics as an avocation but also as a vocation — living not just for politics but also off politics (Weber 1919).

The Impact of Assembly Size on Representativeness

Choosing the number of seats in a legislature is a balancing act between efficiency and representativeness. This article focuses on representativeness and hypothesises that the larger the assembly, the higher the vote–seat proportionality, the higher the number of parties represented, and the higher the representation of otherwise under-represented groups. An approach using simulations of elections is introduced and applied in testing the hypotheses in the case of Danish local elections. Two thousand six hundred and forty-six elections are simulated, and a positive, but non-linear, relationship is demonstrated between number of seats and proportionality, number of parties, and percentage of women councillors.

Representativeness and Local Politics in Denmark

It is becoming a tradition in Denmark that, every fourth year, when the lists of candidates for local elections are presented, a popular debate about their socio-demographic characteristics ensues. Attention focuses on the extent to which the pool of candidates resemble their electors; or, rather, how great the disparity is. Soon after the elections, the debate intensifies when it becomes clear that the divergence has been further enlarged by the electoral process, and much is made of the elected representative’s inability to mirror the voters in respect of age, gender, marital status, occupation, wealth, and so on. Yet interest in these matters dies away quickly, to lie dormant until the next local elections. It is natural that this concern about the representativeness of councillors should coincide with election time, but it is regrettable that it should fade before the subsequent ‘so what?’ question has been answered, or even discussed. By now, the habit of presenting the profile of councillors without further comment has become so deeply rooted in the popular debate in Denmark that the follow-up question – does it matter? – is not even asked.

Urban Political Leadership and Political Representation The Multifaceted Representational Role of Danish Mayors

The concepts of political leadership and political representation are applied to urban politics, and based on a case study of four mayors in Denmark, four mayoral representational functions are identified: “representative,” “master of ceremonies,” “local secretary of state,” and “ombudsman.” The four functions separate the mayor from the councillors who act only as representatives. With regard to representational focus (who is represented), the case study demonstrates that mayors have a much broader focus than councillors. The different functions and focuses of mayors and councillors are combined into two ideal types of representation, “leader style” and “legislator style.”The concepts of political leadership and political representation are applied to urban politics, and based on a case study of four mayors in Denmark, four mayoral representational functions are identified: “representative,” “master of ceremonies,” “local secretary of state,” and “ombudsman.” The four functions separate the mayor from the councillors who act only as representatives. With regard to representational focus (who is represented), the case study demonstrates that mayors have a much broader focus than councillors. The different functions and focuses of mayors and councillors are combined into two ideal types of representation, “leader style” and “legislator style.”

What are the Local Political Costs of Centrally Determined Reforms of Local Government

Abstract Taking advantage of a quasi-experimental setting and drawing upon analysis of electoral results and a survey of voters, this article explores the political costs of reform through the example of the 2009 local elections in Denmark. The article finds that the local parties of mayors were punished at the polls for implementing municipal amalgamations decided by the central government. However, the effect on the mayoral parties’ electoral result is more indirect than direct. Analyses of the electoral results demonstrates that the political parties holding the mayoralty in times of amalgamations tend to nominate very tenured mayors as candidates, thereby missing the positive first-term incumbency effect, which a new mayor could have acquired. And analyses of a survey of voters demonstrates higher levels of dissatisfaction with the municipal service in amalgamated municipalities, leading to a higher cost of ruling for mayoral parties which have led the implementation of an amalgamation.