Uskali Mäki

The Handbook of Economic Methodology

This handbook is a multidisciplinary reference work on the developing field of economic methodology. There are over 100 commissioned essays on the subject, along with biographical information. Topics covered include: analytical Marxism, bounded rationality, hysteresis, and supervenience.

Models are experiments, experiments are models

A model is a representation of something beyond itself in the sense of being used as a representative of that something, and in prompting questions of resemblance between the model and that something. Models are substitute systems that are directly examined in order to indirectly acquire information about their target systems. An experiment is an arrangement seeking to isolate a fragment of the world by controlling for causally relevant things outside that fragment. It is suggested that many theoretical models are (‘thought’) experiments, and that many ordinary experiments are (‘material’) models. The major difference between the two is that the controls effecting the required isolation are based on material manipulations in one case, and on assumptions in the other.

Models and the locus of their truth

If models can be true, where is their truth located? Giere (Explaining science, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1998) has suggested an account of theoretical models on which models themselves are not truth-valued. The paper suggests modifying Giere’s account without going all the way to purely pragmatic conceptions of truth—while giving pragmatics a prominent role in modeling and truth-acquisition. The strategy of the paper is to ask: if I want to relocate truth inside models, how do I get it, what else do I need to accept and reject? In particular, what ideas about model and truth do I need? The case used as an illustration is the world’s first economic model, that of von Thünen (1826/1842) on agricultural land use in the highly idealized Isolated State.

Economics Imperialism Concept and Constraints

The paper seeks to offer [1] an explication of a concept of economics imperialism, focusing on its epistemic aspects; and [2] criteria for its normative assessment. In regard to [1], the defining notion is that of explanatory unification across disciplinary boundaries. As to [2], three kinds of constraints are proposed. An ontological constraint requires an increased degree of ontological unification in contrast to mere derivational unification. An axiological constraint derives from variation in the perceived relative significance of the facts explained. An epistemological constraint requires strong fallibilism acknowledging a particularly severe epistemic uncertainty and proscribing against over-confident arrogance.

Kinds of Assumptions and Their Truth: Shaking an Untwisted F-Twist

In an insightful article published in this journal, Alan Musgrave (1981) has argued that once we distinguish between three kinds of assumptions, Milton Friedmans F-twist--according to which the truth of the assumptions of an economic theory is irrelevant to its acceptability--can be untwisted. It is shown that once we bring in more clarity on the formal identity of the different kinds of assumptions, Musgraves contribution can be further refined: distinctions can be drawn between detectability and negligibility assumptions, and between domain and applicability assumptions; the suggested gap between as-if assumptions and other kinds can be removed; another type, that of joint negligibility assumption, can be introduced; the untwisting of the F-twist can be accepted in all cases except in the case of early-step (heuristic) assumptions; and the art of paraphrase is shown to constitute the basis for Musgraves strategy and to have limits. Copyright 2000 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG

Scientific realism and Austrian explanation

In the recent writing on the methodology of economics there has been a shortage of systematic analyses of realism and explanation and an absence of analysis of their inter-relationships. This article attempts to provide a detailed account of the structure of economic explanation built upon realist and essentialist premises. Invisible-hand explanations characteristic of Austrian economics and the question of using the quantity theory for explaining inflation are used as illustrations. From another perspective, the analysis amounts to providing a reconstructive interpretation of the deep structure of the Austrian approach to explaning economic phenomena. It is suggested that realist-essentialist explanations be analysed in terms of redescription, reduction, ontological identification, and unification: Austrian (as well as some other) explanaions can be analysed as reductive theoretical redescriptions of economic phenomena using ontological identification statements and pursuing ontological unification of ap...

Explanatory Unification: Double and Doubtful

Explanatory unification—the urge to “explain much by little”—serves as an ideal of theorizing not only in natural sciences but also in the social sciences, most notably in economics. The ideal is occasionally challenged by appealing to the complexity and diversity of social systems and processes in space and time. This article proposes to accommodate such doubts by making a distinction between two kinds of unification and suggesting that while such doubts may be justified in regard to mere derivational unification (which serves as a formal constraint on theories), it is less justified in the case of ontological unification (which is a result of factual discovery of the actual degree of underlying unity in the world).

Scientific Realism and Some Peculiarities of Economics

I suggest that the issue of realism about science should be contextualized in terms of the peculiarities of particular disciplines and kinds of theories. Instead of any absolute and universal assertions for or against scientific realism we end up with a sort of relativization of realism. This amounts to a defence of concrete and local as against abstract and global philosophy of science. This suggestion is supported by using the case of economics as evidence.

Is Coase a Realist

Ronald Coase has been a vigorous critic of mainstream economic theory, arguing that it is unrealistic and that a good theory is realistic. The attributes realistic and unrealistic appear in three senses at least in Coase: one related to narrow ness and breadth; another related to abstracting from particularities (and the issue of blackboard economics); and the third related to correspondence with the legal. This does not yet make Coase an advocate of realism. It is therefore separately argued that each of the three kinds of realisticness as a property of theories is consistent with realism as a theory of theories.

Science as a free market: A reflexivity test in an economics of economics

One prominent aspect of recent developments in science studies has been the increasing employment of economic concepts and models in the depiction of science, including the notion of a free market for scientific ideas. This gives rise to the issue of the adequacy of the conceptual resources of economics for this purpose. This paper suggests an adequacy test by putting a version of free market economics to a self-referential scrutiny. The outcome is that either free market economics is self-defeating, or else there must be two different concepts of free market, one for the ordinary economy, the other for science. Both conclusions will impose limits on the applicability of the ordinary economic concept of the market to the study of science.