Valery Konyshev

Is Russia a revisionist military power in the Arctic

In contrast with a widespread perception of Russia as an expansionist power in the Arctic, this article argues that Moscow does not seek military superiority in the region. Rather, Moscows military strategies in the Arctic pursue three major goals: first, to demonstrate and ascertain Russias sovereignty over its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the region; second, to protect its economic interests in the High North; and third, to demonstrate that Russia retains its great power status and still has world-class military capabilities. The Russian military modernization programs are quite modest and aim at upgrading the Russian armed forces in the High North rather than providing them with additional offensive capabilities or provoking a regional arms race. The Russian ambitions in the Arctic may be high, but they are not necessarily implying the intentions and proper capabilities to confront other regional players by military means. On the contrary, Moscow opts for soft rather than hard power strategy in the Arctic.

The Arctic at the crossroads of geopolitical interests

The authors analyze the Arctic strategies of the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), and Russia. They also discuss Russian-Norwegian relations and the militarization of the Arctic.

Russia in search of its Arctic strategy: between hard and soft power?

In contrast with the internationally wide-spread stereotype of Russia as a revisionist power in the High North, this paper argues that Moscow tries to pursue a double-faceted strategy in the region. On the one hand, such a strategy aims at defending Russia’s legitimate economic interests in the region. On the other hand, Moscow is open to cooperation with foreign partners that are willing to partake in exploiting the Arctic natural resources. The general conclusion is that in the foreseeable future Moscow’s strategy in the region will be predictable and pragmatic rather than aggressive or spontaneous.

Russia’s Arctic Strategy

Moscow has extremely important national interests in the Arctic region. These interests include access to, and exploitation of, the mineral and biological natural resources of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF). The region is the most prolific producer of Russian gas (95 per cent of total Russian production) and oil (approximately 70 per cent). Russian geologists have discovered some 200 oil and gas deposits in the AZRF. There are 22 large shelf deposits in the Barents and Kara seas, which are expected to be developed when oil and gas prices rise again. The AZRF is also abundant in other mineral resources. Its mining industries produce primary and placer diamond (99 per cent of total Russian production), platinum-group elements (98 per cent), nickel and cobalt (over 80 per cent), chromium and manganese (90 per cent), copper (60 per cent), antimony, tin, tungsten, rare metals (between 50 per cent and 90 per cent) and gold (about 40 per cent).

Russia’s Arctic strategies in the context of the Ukrainian crisis

Abstract This study aims to examine Moscow’s Arctic policies in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis. Particularly, it tries to explain why the Kremlin – in contrast with its strategies in the post-Soviet space – opted for a cooperative model of its behaviour in the High North. Furthermore, this paper discusses the question whether Moscow has radically changed its Arctic strategies in the context of the Ukrainian crisis or its course basically remained the same? Based on the analysis of Russia’s principal doctrinal documents, this article explores Moscow’s threat perceptions and its strategic priorities in the Arctic. The authors emphasise the inward-, rather than outward-looking nature of Russia’s Arctic strategy which focuses on numerous economic, societal, environmental and socio-cultural problems of the Russian North. In fact, Moscow’s international strategy in the region is subordinated to its domestic needs. On the other hand, Russia’s preoccupation with its internal problems does not preclude the Kremlin from a rather assertive international course when it comes to the protection of Russia’s national interests in the Arctic. In this context, the authors analyse Moscow’s renewed claim on the expansion of the Russian continental shelf and military modernisation programmes. In sum, the authors believe that Russia is serious about being a responsible and predictable actor who is interested in fostering regional cooperation and strengthening multilateral regimes and institutions in the Arctic.

The Changing Role of Military Power in the Arctic

In the Cold War era, military power was a coercive instrument in a global confrontation between two superpowers and capitalist and socialist systems. The Arctic region was part of this global confrontation; it was a home for strategic nuclear forces (especially Soviet ones) and an important area for significant military activities. Both the United States and the Soviet Union pursued containment strategies, with mutually assured destruction (MAD) doctrine at their cores.

Russian military strategies in the Arctic: change or continuity?

ABSTRACT This paper examines the nature of Moscow’s military strategies in the Arctic. It is argued that the roles of military power have radically changed since the Cold War era. According to Russian strategic thinking, instead of being a coercive instrument in a global confrontation between two superpowers and capitalist and socialist systems, now military power has new functions, such as to ascertain Russias sovereignty over its (not their) exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the region, protect Moscow’s economic interests in the North, prevent illegal migration and potential terrorist attacks against critical industrial and infrastructural objects, fulfil some dual-use functions (such as search and rescue operations, monitoring air and maritime spaces, providing navigation safety, mitigating natural and man-made catastrophes), help academic community in developing Arctic research, and carry some symbolic functions. These new roles, however, do not preclude military power from fulfilling its traditional functions, such as territorial defence, power projection, deterrence, and containment. Russia’s military modernisation programmes are described. The authors arrive at a conclusion that these programmes do not provoke an arms race or undermine the regional cooperation. To prevent negative security trends, a system of arms control and confidence- and security-building measures should be developed in the region.