Alexander Sergunin

When Two Aspire to Become One: City-Twinning in Northern Europe

The contribution probes the burgeoning phenomenon of city twinning by engaging with four city-pairs transcending and challenging the difference-producing impact of national borders in northern Europe (Imatra–Svetogorsk; Tornio–Haparanda; Valga–Valka; Narva–Ivangorod). It also aims at discussing the dynamics and meaning of twinning in a broader, more principled and critical perspective. Despite a number of obstacles, city twinning has more recently turned into an established form of overcoming of the divisive effects of borders. The model of cities re-imagining their borders, activating them through increased cooperation, not only changes the local landscapes but may entail broader state-related and European consequences as well.

Understanding Russia's Soft Power Strategy:

This article examines the specifics of Moscows soft power strategy. The sources of the Kremlins interest in the soft power concept are explained. The article discusses how the soft power concept fits in the current Russian foreign policy philosophy. Russias soft power resources, institutions and instruments are described. Special attention is given to the limitations and constraints of Moscows soft power strategies. The reasons why these strategies are often being inefficient are explained. The Kremlins inclination to the combination of the soft and hard power strategies is identified.

Is Russia a revisionist military power in the Arctic

In contrast with a widespread perception of Russia as an expansionist power in the Arctic, this article argues that Moscow does not seek military superiority in the region. Rather, Moscows military strategies in the Arctic pursue three major goals: first, to demonstrate and ascertain Russias sovereignty over its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the region; second, to protect its economic interests in the High North; and third, to demonstrate that Russia retains its great power status and still has world-class military capabilities. The Russian military modernization programs are quite modest and aim at upgrading the Russian armed forces in the High North rather than providing them with additional offensive capabilities or provoking a regional arms race. The Russian ambitions in the Arctic may be high, but they are not necessarily implying the intentions and proper capabilities to confront other regional players by military means. On the contrary, Moscow opts for soft rather than hard power strategy in the Arctic.

Paradiplomacy as a Capacity-Building Strategy

In response to the harsh reality of declining EU—Russia cooperation, the subnational actors of Russia’s Northwest are employing paradiplomacy as a resource for problem solving and ensuring their sustainable development.

Russia in search of its Arctic strategy: between hard and soft power?

In contrast with the internationally wide-spread stereotype of Russia as a revisionist power in the High North, this paper argues that Moscow tries to pursue a double-faceted strategy in the region. On the one hand, such a strategy aims at defending Russia’s legitimate economic interests in the region. On the other hand, Moscow is open to cooperation with foreign partners that are willing to partake in exploiting the Arctic natural resources. The general conclusion is that in the foreseeable future Moscow’s strategy in the region will be predictable and pragmatic rather than aggressive or spontaneous.

Russian military reform: institutional, political and security implications

This critical comment examines the incentives, major priorities, difficulties and first results of the Russian military reform that is being implemented since 2008. The authors conclude that despite numerous drawbacks and barriers to the reformist efforts certain successes can be identified. Particularly, there is a clear shift from the old-fashioned, Soviet-type army to a more compact, mobile, better equipped and combat-ready armed forces that are capable to cope with todays challenges to Russian national security.

On the Russian Military Reform: A Rejoinder

Having read Gregory Lannon’s, Charles Bartles,’ and Stephen Blank’s articles on the Russian military reforms I’d like to make several comments both to develop/update those authors’ argumentation and challenge some of their points. I find myself in agreement with them on a number of key points regarding the aims, nature, and effectiveness of the Russian military reform. For example, I agree with Charles Bartles’ assessment that under Anatoly Serdyukov, the first really civilian Defense Minister, the Russian armed forces had undergone the most serious structural changes in the post-Soviet era. At the same time, I’d like to define more precisely the MedvedevSerdyukov military reform’s objectives. In contrast with the Yeltsin and Putin who tried simply to downsize the huge Soviet-born military monster, the current Russian leadership wants to create a principally new army. The Kremlin aims at making the armed force structure adequate to, on the one hand, the nature of domestic and external threats to Russia’s military security and, on the other, Russia’s economic, technical, demographic, and intellectual capabilities. The priority is to develop the armed forces and other services designed to deter aggression, as well as mobile elements, which can be quickly delivered and deployed in the required area(s) and carry out mobile operations in any region where the security of Russia might be threatened. I agree with Gregory Lannon who believes that the ongoing Russian military reform is generated by the radical change of Moscow’s threat perception and abandonment of the Soviet-type global ambitions. However, I disagree with his point that Russia’s future strategic role will be reduced to the purely regional one and that Moscow will be mostly concentrated on countering

Russian Foreign-Policy Decision Making on Europe

This chapter focuses on how Russia’s policies toward Europe have been made in the post-communist era. In particular, it pays attention to the powers, roles, and functions of actors participating in the decision-making process. Both governmental and nongovernmental actors are examined. It further assesses the efficiency of the foreign policy mechanism and identifies major problems in its organization and functioning.

Russia’s Arctic Strategy

Moscow has extremely important national interests in the Arctic region. These interests include access to, and exploitation of, the mineral and biological natural resources of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF). The region is the most prolific producer of Russian gas (95 per cent of total Russian production) and oil (approximately 70 per cent). Russian geologists have discovered some 200 oil and gas deposits in the AZRF. There are 22 large shelf deposits in the Barents and Kara seas, which are expected to be developed when oil and gas prices rise again. The AZRF is also abundant in other mineral resources. Its mining industries produce primary and placer diamond (99 per cent of total Russian production), platinum-group elements (98 per cent), nickel and cobalt (over 80 per cent), chromium and manganese (90 per cent), copper (60 per cent), antimony, tin, tungsten, rare metals (between 50 per cent and 90 per cent) and gold (about 40 per cent).

Russia’s Arctic strategies in the context of the Ukrainian crisis

Abstract This study aims to examine Moscow’s Arctic policies in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis. Particularly, it tries to explain why the Kremlin – in contrast with its strategies in the post-Soviet space – opted for a cooperative model of its behaviour in the High North. Furthermore, this paper discusses the question whether Moscow has radically changed its Arctic strategies in the context of the Ukrainian crisis or its course basically remained the same? Based on the analysis of Russia’s principal doctrinal documents, this article explores Moscow’s threat perceptions and its strategic priorities in the Arctic. The authors emphasise the inward-, rather than outward-looking nature of Russia’s Arctic strategy which focuses on numerous economic, societal, environmental and socio-cultural problems of the Russian North. In fact, Moscow’s international strategy in the region is subordinated to its domestic needs. On the other hand, Russia’s preoccupation with its internal problems does not preclude the Kremlin from a rather assertive international course when it comes to the protection of Russia’s national interests in the Arctic. In this context, the authors analyse Moscow’s renewed claim on the expansion of the Russian continental shelf and military modernisation programmes. In sum, the authors believe that Russia is serious about being a responsible and predictable actor who is interested in fostering regional cooperation and strengthening multilateral regimes and institutions in the Arctic.