Vance Locke

Distinguishing cognitive and somatic dimensions of state and trait anxiety : development and validation of the state-trait inventory for cognitive and somatic anxiety (STICSA)

To date, little research has endeavoured to discriminate between cognitive and somatic dimensions of trait anxiety and, consequently, it remains uncertain whether these anxiety dimensions can be reliably distinguished at the trait level. The four studies presented here support the validity of the distinction between cognitive and somatic anxiety at both state and trait levels. The research involved the development and validation of a self-report questionnaire, the State-Trait Inventory for cognitive and somatic anxiety (STICSA). The nature of the anxiety dimensions assessed by this new measure was then investigated. The results indicate that the state scales of this new measure assess the degree of cognitive and somatic anxiety experienced at a particular point in time. The trait scales of the STICSA predict the situations in which different individuals will display elevations in cognitive and somatic state anxiety. Trait cognitive and somatic anxiety are indeed distinct constructs that can be reliably and validly assessed. Theoretical and applied implications of this finding are discussed.

Race coding and the other-race effect in face recognition

Other-race faces are generally recognised more poorly than own-race faces. According to Levins influential race-coding hypothesis, this other-race recognition deficit results from spontaneous coding of race-specifying information, at the expense of individuating information, in other-race faces. Therefore, requiring participants to code race-specifying information for all faces should eliminate the other-race effect by reducing recognition of own-race faces to the level of other-race faces. We tested this prediction in two experiments. Race coding was induced by requiring participants to rate study faces on race typicality (experiment 1) or to categorise them by race (experiment 2). Neither manipulation reduced the other-race effect, providing no support for the race-coding hypothesis. Instead, race-coding instructions marginally increased the other-race effect in experiment 1 and had no effect in experiment 2. These results do not support the race-coding hypothesis. Surprisingly, a control task of rating the attractiveness of study faces increased the other-race effect, indicating that deeper encoding of faces does not necessarily reduce the effect (experiment 1). Finally, the normally robust other-race effect was absent when participants were instructed to individuate other-race faces (experiment 2). We suggest that poorer recognition of other-race faces may reflect reduced perceptual expertise with such faces and perhaps reduced motivation to individuate them.

Anxiety and impression formation: Direct information rather than priming explains affect-congruity

Both affect-priming and affect-as-information theories predict that when people are anxious they will form affect-congruent impressions of others, but via different mechanisms. Affect-priming asserts that memory mediates the influence of anxiety on judgement, whereas affect-as-information asserts that people attribute anxiety to the target of judgement. As these theories predicted, anxious participants in Study 1 found an impression-formation target to be more threatening than did control participants. However, this effect was not mediated by memory, and was attenuated in Study 2 when anxious participants attributed their affect to a source other than the target. These findings suggest that anxious people form affect-congruent impressions of others because they attribute their anxiety to the impression-formation target rather than because anxiety primes affect-congruent memory.

Cultural Difference in the Application of the Diagnosticity Principle to Schematic Faces

Tversky’s (1977) diagnosticity principle implies that categorization affects similarity, and that similarity in turn is based on context. However, Nisbett, Peng, Choi, and Norenzayan (2001) suggest that Chinese and Westerners differ in their sensitivity to context and categorization. Because of these differences, it is not clear whether Chinese should follow the diagnosticity principle. To explore these possibilities, we conducted a cross-cultural experiment using participants from Australia and China to repeat the experiment of Tversky (1977) using schematic faces as stimuli. Results showed that Australians, but not Chinese, made similarity judgments in a manner compatible with the diagnosticity principle. We suggest that: 1) the use of the diagnosticity principle depends upon contextualvariables for Chinese people; and 2) Chinese participants judged neutral schematic faces asmore positive than Western participants did