Varun Sahni

India and the Great Powers

Six propositions drive this article. First, Indias relations with the great powers as they evolve over the next two decades are going to be conditioned by Indias own emergence as a great power. Second, it will take at least 15 to 20 years for a balance to re-emerge in the contemporary hegemonic system; hence, Indias emergence will be simultaneous with the relative decline of the United States (US). Third, Indian policy makers and analysts need to think structurally about Indias external relations, especially with the US and China. Fourth, Indias relations with the great powers are inseparable from the broader issue of emerging Asian balances and security architectures. Fifth, India needs to keep a keen eye on other major powers, among whom Russia, Japan, the European Union (EU) and Brazil will be particularly important. Finally, while building its capabilities along a broad spectrum, India must not lose sight of the normative component that is inherent in great power status.

Freezing the fighting: Military disengagement on the Siachen Glacier

Since 1984, India and Pakistan have confronted each other militarily for control over the Siachen Glacier and its approaches in the eastern Karakoram mountain range, adjacent to the borders of India, Pakistan, and China. The longest-running armed conflict between two regular armies in the twentieth century, the conflict in Siachen has resulted in hundreds of casualties, mainly because of adverse climatic conditions and harsh terrain. The economic cost of sustaining a conflict in that geographically remote and climatically inhospitable region has also been extremely high for both countries. Past efforts by India and Pakistan to find a mutually acceptable solution have failed, mainly because of mutual distrust and suspicion. This paper examines Indian and Pakistani perceptions, preference, and policies, and identifies options for resolving the conflict. This paper also identifies the most appropriate verification and monitoring technologies to assist policy-makers in ensuring agreement stability and compliance. While a future agreement on resolving the dispute will depend, above all, on the political will of the Indian and Pakistani leaderships, adequate, appropriate verification and monitoring mechanism will enhance their ability to reach a sustainable and durable accord of the Siachen conflict. 1 fig.

The Fallacies and Flaws of Area Studies in India

Area studies programmes were established in Indian universities in two waves. The first wave emanated from an individual initiative of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1955 and the second from a committee set up by the University Grants Commission (UGC) in April 1963, soon after India’s military defeat at the hands of China in 1962. While a large number of area studies programmes now exist in Indian universities, they have, from their earliest days, been handicapped by four conceptual fallacies and nine operational flaws. The fallacies are related to the subject matter, disciplinary focus, terms of reference and policy relevance, and the flaws are—the absence of theory, lack of multidisciplinary perspectives, analyses that are based on macro-level research, scarce fieldwork, deficiencies in language skills, lack of quantitative research projects, event-driven research agendas, predominance of secondary sources in research, and taught courses which are too broad in their formulation and too narrow in their subject matter. Each fallacy is fundamental; the flaws, taken together, have been fatal for the area studies programmes in India. The article ends with seven suggestions on how these programmes could be revitalized.

India's foreign policy: Key drivers

In explaining the eight key factors that drive contemporary Indian foreign policy, the article provides the context for looking at Indias engagement with the continent, an issue addressed in different ways by other articles in this volume. It also looks at the non‐drivers, some of which may surprise observers who may have thought them to be crucial elements of the countrys foreign policy.

The protean polis and strategic surprises: do changes within India affect South Asian strategic stability?

Abstract In this article, we view India not as a unitary rational actor—the conventional conceptualisation in strategic studies—but rather as a liberal democratic polis composed of the three arenas of civil society, political society and the state. We seek answers to two related questions. The first pertains to the changes that are currently underway in Indian state and society. What is the probable impact of these internal dynamics upon strategic stability in the region? We restrict our analysis to the four most important factors in each of the three political arenas. The answer we arrive at is that the majority of factors making up the internal dynamics of contemporary India either enhance regional stability or, at best, have a mixed impact upon it. Our second concern is to discern the sources of strategic surprises from an Indian perspective. Are the stimuli for strategic surprises from the Indian perspective more internal or external? We conclude that the two India–Pakistan crises since overt nuclearisation in 1998—the 1999 Kargil Conflict and the 13 December 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament—presented a strategic surprise for India, not Pakistan. Far from being surprised, Pakistan could be considered the prime mover behind these two strategic surprises.

India and Missile Acquisition: Push and Pull Factors

THIS ARTICLE ASKS and answers a simple question: What are the factors that are ‘pushing’ and ‘pulling’ India to acquire missiles? Over the past decade-and-a-half, with India and Pakistan periodically descending into crisis mode—Exercise Brasstacks (1987), the 1990 standoff, the Kargil Conflict (1999) and the 2002 military mobilisation— this is a question surely worth asking. After all, with each succeeding crisis, the importance of missiles as a factor in the military-strategic calculus of India and Pakistan would appear to be increasing. Conversely, the likelihood of missile non-proliferation/ non-acquisition becoming a norm in South Asia is diminishing rapidly. Seven propositions are advanced in this article and subjected to analysis. Some are unexceptionable, even self-evident; others would certainly be contested. The answer to our underlying question lies in the interstices of these seven propositions. Taken together, they would suggest a powerful set of domestic (‘push’) and international (‘pull’) factors that will keep India on the missile-acquisition path. Whether that amounts to missile ‘proliferation’ is one of the issues that will be analysed in this article.

Not Quite British: A Study of External Influences on the Argentine Navy *

Political studies of military institutions in Latin America have tended to lay heavy stress on their external linkages, with a good deal of emphasis being placed upon the ‘differential degrees of dependence upon other countries for supplies, parts, training and equipment by the various service branches’. This particularly the case when scholars attempt to explain why two military institutions differ in their political behaviour and ideological orientation. Thus, we find Lieuwen asserting that [t]he aristocratic tendencies of [Latin American] naval officers… often were moderated by the democratic views of the British and United States officers who were their professional advisers. Conversely, before World War II, authoritarian attitudes of some Latin American armies were reinforced by the influence of German, Spanish, and Italian military missions.

Subordinate, Subsumed and Subversive: Sub-national Actors as Referents of Security

Identity politics, the politics of difference, is always intrinsically and intensely relational. We define who we are, and who we are not, by either linking ourselves with, or differentiating ourselves from, those around us.1 Coping with difference has always been an important aspect of human and social life. Sometimes difference is enriching, at other times merely functional; often, however, it is ominous and menacing. When difference seems to be, or indeed becomes, threatening, what emerges is a securitization of difference. It is this dimension of security — how the state deals with the threat of difference within itself, and how sub-national actors position themselves vis-a-vis the threat posed by the state — that is the principal theme of this chapter.

China–India Partnership

Given the generally troubled history of China–India relations, is there any sense in speculating about a future partnership between the two countries? In order to counter the scepticism inherent in this question, it is worth recalling that China–India relations have spanned the security spectrum—war at one end, alliance at the other—through much of the twentieth century. That the two countries fought a war—brief and limited, but war nonetheless—against each other in 1962 is a part of Indian popular memory. There is, however, a tendency to forget that the two countries were allies during the Second World War, before Indian Independence and the Chinese Revolution. If the two countries were once allies in the global struggle against fascism, perhaps their future relations could over time evolve in the direction of a partnership. The challenge lies in identifying issues and defining an agenda for cooperation, which is what this brief article proposes to do. In our search for an agenda for cooperation, we will begin by asking a conceptual question: what makes countries come together? Three possible answers, each flowing out of a distinct strand of international relations theory, could be advanced to answer this question. Realists argue that states make alliances to aggregate power. Liberals suggest that states cooperate to solve problems and thereby enhance their opportunities. Constructivists hold that states come together to build community. Theoretical disputes aside, each of these answers rings true. We will, therefore, use each of them in turn as an analytical frame to analyse the future of China–India relations.