Vicki L. Hesli

Emerging Party Systems in Post-Soviet Societies: Fact or Fiction?

The political science literature reflects two viewpoints regarding the formation of party systems in post-Soviet societies. Scholars drawing on traditional theories of party formation usually argue that the formation of institutionalized party systems in post-Communist states will be an extended process. However, newer studies reveal that parties, partisan support, and even party systems may form relatively quickly. To illuminate this debate, we offer analysis of both mass and elite cross-temporal data from Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania. These data reveal a rapid rise in partisanship, strong partisan voting in parliamentary elections, a sharp differentiation on issues between members of various party blocs, a high degree of issue cohesion among those who identify with a given party, and a strong correlation between the policy views of elites and ordinary citizens identifying with the same party. In short, the evidence strongly supports the conclusion that party systems are developing in the post-Soviet societies.

Faculty Research Productivity: Why Do Some of Our Colleagues Publish More than Others?

The justification for studying faculty research productivity is that it affects individual advancement and reputation within academe, as well as departmental and institutional prestige (Creamer 1998, iii). Publication records are an important factor in faculty performance evaluations, research grant awards, and promotion and salary decisions. The phrase “publish or perish” encapsulates the importance of research productivity to academic careers. In addition, questions are sometimes raised about whether an individuals status as a minority within academia (e.g., being a member of an underrepresented ethnic or racial group or being female in a male-dominated profession) affects his or her ability to publish or likelihood of publishing (Cole and Zuckerman 1984; Bellas and Toutkoushian 1999). Finally, most previous work that tackles the productivity causality puzzle comes from disciplines other than political science. Thus, one of the purposes of this report is to explore whether the existing findings about research productivity in other disciplines apply equally well to research productivity in political science.

Understanding Political Change in Post-Soviet Societies: a Further Commentary On Finifter and Mickiewicz

1V tSUnion. Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992), however, based on a 1989 survey in the Soviet Union, found that the less well educated were more supportive of individual locus of control than were the better educated. Examining survey data collected in the former USSR during 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1995, we find consistent reconfirmation of the modernization theory, despite a major decline in support for an opportunities society that occurs between 1992 and 1995. This recent increase in preference for socialism is explained by rising nationalism, growing nostalgia for communists, and disillusionment with certain aspects of the market economy, particularly the perceived growth of social inequality.

Predicting Rank Attainment in Political Science: What Else Besides Publications Affects Promotion?

We report the results of hypotheses tests about the effects of several measures of research, teaching, and service on the likelihood of achieving the ranks of associate and full professor. In conducting these tests, we control for institutional and individual background characteristics. We focus our tests on the link between productivity and academic rank and explore whether this relationship reveals a gender dimension. The analyses are based on an APSA-sponsored survey of all faculty members in departments of political science (government, public affairs, and international relations) in the United States.

The Disposition to Secede: "An Analysis of the Soviet Case"

The purpose of this article is to identify the conditions that set the stage for the secessionist movements within the Soviet Union. Using the statistical procedures of discriminant and regression analysis, the following thesis is tested: Secessionist movements are undertaken for the reason of emancipation from economic exploitation, for the purpose of maintaining or preserving an endangered culture, or for the purpose of achieving redress from some form of political grievance. An evaluation of the parameters produced by estimating linear regression models indicates that high levels of social and economic development together with concentrated populations are the structural factors that provide the contextual environments most conducive to early demands for sovereignty. Other factors that are related to separatism are pervasive international ties, Christian traditions, and relatively small populations and territory. The analysis serves to challenge widely held assumptions that a reaction against Russian settlement in minority enclaves, state-sponsored efforts at Russification, and relative deprivation were prime motivators behind secessionist activity.

National Identity: Civic, Ethnic, Hybrid, and Atomised Individuals

Abstract We challenge the civic–ethnic dichotomy drawn by previous authors and propose a four-category typology of identities based on out-group tolerance and in-group attachment. Drawing from work on national identity formation and nation-building, we test hypotheses about the processes that cause individuals to adopt one identity over others using survey data based on representative samples of five ethnic groups in Ukraine. We find that the effects of socialisation processes vary greatly depending upon ethnic group. Our results challenge some long-held assumptions about the potential destabilising effects of ‘ethnic’ identities and the degree to which ‘civic’ identities correspond to values and behaviours supportive of democracy.

The gender base of institutional support in Lithuania, Ukraine and Russia

This literature review pertains to womens status in Soviet society. This study examined the degree to which attitudes toward established institutions, support for the reform process, and generalized political orientations significantly reflect gender differences. Regression models were tested among Russians, Ukrainians, and Orthodox believers in Russia. Gender differences were apparent in the evaluations of the Communist Party. Ukrainian women were more supportive of the Communist Party. Age was the only significant factor in Russia; increased age was associated with more positive attitudes toward the Communists. More Ukrainian and Russian women than Orthodox women believed that political reform is moving too rapidly. Less educated and higher income women were more likely to believe that reform is proceeding too rapidly. Russian men were more likely to have participated in a political rally than Russian women in the model which includes socioeconomic controls. Russians with higher education were more frequent participants in political demonstrations than Russians with less education. Ukrainian women were more likely than men to be pacifists. Over 20% of the variance in pacifism scores was explained by sex and sociodemographic factors. The author concluded that gender differences are apparent in the strength of pacifism, the frequency of participation in demonstrations, attitudes toward reform, and evaluations of the Communist Party. Russian women compared to US women did not necessarily support liberal, democratic reforms. Lithuanian women and urban women were less supportive of the status quo and established economic and political institutions compared to Russian, Ukrainian, or rural women. Women and men responded similarly at the same educational levels. Women had a more humanitarian view of the environment and peace. A four-stage stratified sample of 2336 individuals (796 in Russia, 826 in the Ukraine, and 714 in Lithuania) was used. The survey instrument was designed by a team from the University of Iowa working with Soviet scholars.

The Impact of Time and Economic Circumstances on Popular Evaluations of Russia's President

Building on the economic voting literature, the article hypothesizes that support for democratic reformers in a post-Soviet society can be expected to vary with economic conditions and also with where the country is in the transition process. Using a series of nine repeated surveys covering the time span from 1991 to 1999 in the Russian Federation, it tests both a reward-punishment hypothesis and a “price of reform” hypothesis. Among the best predictors of positive evaluations of President Yeltsin are time in the transition process (early in the process rather than late) and positive outlooks about the economic prospects for ones own family. Yet, political evaluation measures are found to have equal importance in understanding the dynamics of democratic support. In evaluating support for the opposition, the article finds that support for the Communist Party is directly related to negative economic evaluations, to experience with severe hardship, and to low monthly income.

Political norms in rural Russia: Evidence from public attitudes

IN ANY COUNTRY, the citizens who reside in cities, as opposed to towns and villages, are likely to have a disproportionate visibility in public life and in the mass media. This greater visibility translates into greater influence over perceptions (domestic and foreign) about the nature, pace or style of life characterising that country. Yet paying insufficient attention to rural citizens may bias ones understanding of political dynamics. Certainly, that possibility exists for analysts of political change in the former Soviet Union. During much of the Soviet period, few Western scholars had access to the countryside and few rural Soviet residents could travel to the West. Both the Harvard Interview Project and the Soviet Interview Project, which surveyed emigres from the USSR, included predominantly former residents of Soviet cities. Some of the first Western-sponsored direct surveys of Soviet publics were conducted only in Moscow or by telephone, which leaves the small town and rural populace underrepresented. Even now, in post-Soviet Russia, the dramatic changes in the two largest cities of Moscow and St Petersburg-the cities which most Western scholars frequently visit-may convey a misleading impression about the depth of support for market reforms and democratic institutions. Thus great care must be taken to place rural outlooks and behaviours in the proper relationship to urban ones. In a recent article in this journal, Stephen K. Wegren argues for the importance of analysing political values among Russias rural population.1 We agree with his call for greater scholarly attention to this important segment of the Russian populace. The evidence that Wegren is able to present, however, relates only indirectly to such values. We shed additional light on the state of rural Russian political norms using data from large-scale surveys of randomly selected citizens. We focus on the values of rural Russians (350 were interviewed in 1991 and 284 in 1992) but contrast them with the values of urban Russians as well as with those of respondents in Ukraine and Lithuania.2 The ability to provide these contrasts permits us to assess the particularity of Russian rural outlooks and therefore reexamine several of Wegrens conclusions. We find that, while Russian rural political preferences are not distributed in the same way as among urban dwellers, they actually have shifted in response to changing conditions. In fact, the distributions we find lend little support to Wegrens culturalist approach and much stronger support to theories that stress the varying political

Job Satisfaction in Academia: Why Are Some Faculty Members Happier Than Others?

In studying the correlates of job satisfaction among political science faculty we confirm some findings from other disciplines, such as the relationship between institutional type and satisfaction. We demonstrate that those working in top-ranked departments or in private institutions tend to have higher levels of satisfaction with their jobs and with their contributions to the profession. Both job satisfaction and professional satisfaction tend to be highest among full professors; and greater productivity in terms of publishing is independently linked to greater levels of professional satisfaction. In contrast, comparatively higher undergraduate teaching loads undermine professional satisfaction. We also determine that men and women do not differ systematically from one another in their satisfaction levels. We do, however, document significantly lower levels of satisfaction among racial minorities in political science departments. In exploring this finding, we uncover reports of discrimination and dramatic differences in levels of collegiality experienced by different subgroups of faculty members. Experiences with discrimination undermine job satisfaction and are more frequently reported by women than men and are more common among minority faculty than nonminorities.