Vincent Yzerbyt

When moderation is mediated and mediation is moderated.

Procedures for examining whether treatment effects on an outcome are mediated and/or moderated have been well developed and are routinely applied. The mediation question focuses on the intervening mechanism that produces the treatment effect. The moderation question focuses on factors that affect the magnitude of the treatment effect. It is important to note that these two processes may be combined in informative ways, such that moderation is mediated or mediation is moderated. Although some prior literature has discussed these possibilities, their exact definitions and analytic procedures have not been completely articulated. The purpose of this article is to define precisely both mediated moderation and moderated mediation and provide analytic strategies for assessing each.

I Belong, therefore, I Exist: Ingroup Identification, Ingroup Entitativity, and Ingroup Bias

Merging insights from the intergroup relations literature and terror management theory, the authors conducted an experiment in which they assessed the impact of death-related thoughts on a series of ingroup measures. Participants in the mortality-salience condition displayed stronger ingroup identification, perceived greater ingroup entitativity, and scored higher on ingroup bias measures. Also, perceived ingroup entitativity as well as ingroup identification mediated the effect of the mortality salience manipulation on ingroup bias. The findings are discussed in relation to theories of intergroup relations and terror management theory. A new perspective on the function of group belonging also is presented.

Power can bias impression processes: Stereotyping subordinates by default and by design.

Powerholders may engage in two stereotyping processes: (a) by default, inattention to stereotype-inconsistent information, due to lack of dependency, and (b) by design, effortful attention to stereotype-consistent information, due to explicit control. Study 1 manipulated control (not dependency) over internship applicants; powerful decision-makers increased attention to stereotypic attributes, consistent with stereotyping by design. Study 2 measured differences in trait dominance as an analog to situational control, replicating Study 1. Study 3 separately manipulated perceiver control and dependency; powerful perceivers increased attention to powerless targets’ stereotypic attributes (by design) and also decreased attention to counter-stereotypic attributes (by default). Study 4 compared powerful perceivers’ ratings of potential subordinates to their own prior ratings of target categories and target traits. Relative to the powerless, powerful perceivers’ impressions were based significantly less on target traits, supporting the attention results.

Stereotypes and social cognition

Preface - Susan T Fiske The Concept and Measure of Stereotypes Classical Theories about Stereotypes Social Identity Theory The Social Cognition Approach Intergroup Phenomena A View from the Bridge Confirmation of Categorical Information Dilution of Stereotypes Overattribution Bias as Na[um]ive Theory Conclusion

Stereotypes as explanations: The formation of meaningful beliefs about social groups

Stereotyping is one of the biggest single issues in social psychology, but relatively little is known about how and why stereotypes form. Stereotypes as Explanations is the first book to explore the process of stereotype formation, the way that people develop impressions and views of social groups. Conventional approaches to stereotyping assume that stereotypes are based on erroneous and distorted processes, but the authors of this book take a very different view, namely that stereotypes form in order to explain aspects of social groups and in particular to explain relationships between groups. In developing this view, the authors explore classic and contemporary approaches to stereotype formation and advance new ideas about such topics as the importance of category formation, essentialism, illusory correlation, interdependence, social reality and stereotype consensus. They conclude that stereotypes are indeed explanations, but they are nevertheless highly selective, variable and frequently contested explanations.

The Interplay of Subjective Essentialism and Entitativity in the Formation of Stereotypes

In line with our subjective essentialist view of stereotypes (Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997), we propose that two classes of factors that mutually reinforce each other influence the perception of groups. The perception of a strong level of similarity and organization among group members (i.e., group entitativity) suggests the existence of a deep essence that would account for the detected regularities. Conversely, the existence of naïve theories regarding the presence of an underlying core encourages the search for resemblances and connections within the group. After a short presentation of the recent literature dealing with the concepts of entitativity and essentialism, we review a series of studies from our laboratory showing the impact of entitativity on essentialism as well as the influence of essentialism on entitativity. We also provide empirical evidence for this bidirectional process from both the outsider and the insider perspective. Finally, we examine the potential role of cultural differences both in the ascription of a fundamental nature to an entitative assembly of people and in the use of a priori naïve theories to create surface similarity among group members. As a set, these efforts point to the importance of taking into account the constant dialogue between perceivers theory-based explanations and group members perceptual characteristics if one wishes to understand group stereotypes.

Metacognition: Cognitive and social dimensions

From Social Cognition to Metacognition - Guy Lories, Benoit Dardenne and Vincent Y Yzerbyt Illusions of Knowing - Asher Koriat The Link between Knowledge and Metaknowledge Rapid Feeling-of-Knowing - Adisack Nhouyvanisvong and Lynne M Reder A Strategy Selection Mechanism The Feeling-of-Knowing as a Judgement - Guy Lories and Marie-Anne Schelstreate Knowing Thyself and Others - Thomas O Nelson, Arie Kruglanski and John T Jost Progress in Metacognitive Social Psychology Social Influence on Memory - Herbert Bless and Fritz Strack Beliefs, Confidence and the Widows Ademoski - William B Swann Jr and Michael J Gill On Knowing What We Know about Others Social Judgeability Concerns in Impression Formation - Vincent Y Yzerbyt, Benoit Dardenne and Jacques-Philipppe Leyens The Consciousness of Social Beliefs - Mahzarin R Banaji and Nilanjana Dasgupta A Program of Research on Stereotyping and Prejudice Protecting Our Minds - Timothy D Wilson, Daniel T Gilbert and Thalia Wheatley The Role of Lay Beliefs The Metacognition of Bias Correction - Duane T Wegener, Richard E Petty and Meghan Dunn Naive Theories of Bias and The Flexible Correction Model Correction and Metacognition - Leonard L Martin and Diederik A Stapel Are People Naive Dogmatists or Naive Empiricists during Social Judgements

Culture, gender, and the self: Variations and impact of social comparison processes

Psychological differences between women and men, far from being invariant as a biological explanation would suggest, fluctuate in magnitude across cultures. Moreover, contrary to the implications of some theoretical perspectives, gender differences in personality, values, and emotions are not smaller, but larger, in American and European cultures, in which greater progress has been made toward gender equality. This research on gender differences in self-construals involving 950 participants from 5 nations/cultures (France, Belgium, the Netherlands, the United States, and Malaysia) illustrates how variations in social comparison processes across cultures can explain why gender differences are stronger in Western cultures. Gender differences in the self are a product of self-stereotyping, which occurs when between-gender social comparisons are made. These social comparisons are more likely, and exert a greater impact, in Western nations. Both correlational and experimental evidence supports this explanation.

Social Categorization and Fear Reactions to the September 11th Terrorist Attacks

Two experiments were run in The Netherlands and Belgium 1 week after the terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center in New York on September 11, 2001. The aim was to investigate whether social categorization affected emotional reactions, behavioral tendencies, and actual behaviors. Results showed that focusing participants’ attention on an identity that included American victims into a common ingroup led them to report more fear and stronger fear-related behavioral tendencies and to engage more often in fear-related behaviors than when victims were categorized as outgroup members. Results are discussed with respect to appraisal theories of emotion and E. R. Smith’s model of group-based emotions.

The Primacy of the Ingroup: The Interplay of Entitativity and Identification

In the present chapter, we move away from the traditional focus on the outgroup encountered in the literature on intergroup relations and argue that the ingroup is psychologically primary. We build upon the notion of entitativity first proposed by Campbell (1958) and suggest that entitative ingroups meet basic needs related to group membership better than less coherent ingroups. We provide initial support for the privileged status of entitative ingroups by reviewing contemporary research on group homogeneity. Next, we report on a research program showing that social identification and ingroup entitativity go hand in hand. First, we address the influence of ingroup identification on group entitativity in such phenomena as the “black sheep” effect and ingroup overexclusion. Second, we examine the impact of ingroup entitativity on social identification. We conclude by proposing that ingroup entitativity may also be related to a feeling of efficacy which need not produce conflict and discrimination toward outgroups. Globally, the accumulated evidence strongly suggests that the perception of ingroup entitativity plays a key role in intra- and intergroup relations. Ones own family is an ingroup; and by definition all other families on the street are outgroups; but seldom d o they clash… One knows that ones lodge has distinctive characteristics that mark it off from all others, but one does not necessarily despise the others. The situation it seems can best be stated as follows: although we could not perceive our own ingroups excepting as they contrast to outgroups, still the ingroups are psychologically primary. We live in them, by them, and sometimes, for them. Hostility toward outgroups helps strengthen our sense of belonging, but it is not required (Allport, 1954, pp. 40–41).