Viral V. Acharya

Too Many to Fail - An Analysis of Time-Inconsistency in Bank Closure Policies

While the ‘too-big-to-fail’ guarantee is explicitly a part of bank regulation in many countries, this paper shows that bank closure policies also suffer from an implicit ‘too-many-to-fail’ problem: when the number of bank failures is large, the regulator finds it ex-post optimal to bail out some or all failed banks, whereas when the number of bank failures is small, failed banks can be acquired by the surviving banks. This gives banks incentives to herd and increases the risk that many banks may fail together. The ex-post optimal regulation may thus be time-inconsistent or suboptimal from an ex-ante standpoint. In contrast to the too-big-to-fail problem which mainly affects large banks, we show that the too-many-to-fail problem affects small banks more by giving them stronger incentives to herd.

Should Banks be Diversified? Evidence from Individual Bank Loan Portfolios

We study empirically the effect of focus (specialization) vs. diversification on the return and the risk of banks using data from 105 Italian banks over the period 1993-1999. Specifically, we analyze the tradeoffs between (loan portfolio) focus and diversification using a unique data set that is able to identify individual bank loan exposures to different industries, to different sectors, and to different geographical regions. Our results are consistent with a theory that predicts a deterioration in bank monitoring quality at high levels of risk and a deterioration in bank monitoring quality upon lending expansion into newer or competitive industries. Our most important findings are that industrial loan diversification reduces bank return while endogenously producing riskier loans for all banks in our sample (this effect being most powerful for high risk banks), sectoral loan diversification produces an inefficient risk-return tradeoff only for high risk banks, and geographical diversification results in an improvement in the risk-return tradeoff for banks with low levels of risk. A robust result that emerges from our empirical findings is that diversification of bank assets is not guaranteed to produce superior performance and/or greater safety for banks.

Cash-in-the-Market Pricing and Optimal Resolution of Bank Failures

As the number of bank failures increases, the set of assets available for acquisition by the surviving banks enlarges but the total amount of available liquidity within the surviving banks falls. This results in ‘cash-in-the-market’ pricing for liquidation of banking assets. At a sufficiently large number of bank failures, and in turn, at a sufficiently low level of asset prices, there are too many banks to liquidate and inefficient users of assets who are liquidity-endowed may end up owning the liquidated assets. In order to avoid this allocation inefficiency, it may be ex-post optimal for the regulator to bail out some failed banks. We show however that there exists a policy that involves liquidity assistance to surviving banks in the purchase of failed banks and that is equivalent to the bailout policy from an ex-post standpoint. Crucially, the liquidity provision policy gives banks incentives to differentiate, rather than to herd, makes aggregate banking crises less likely, and, thereby dominates the bailout policy from an ex-ante standpoint.As the number of bank failures increases, the set of assets available for acquisition by the surviving banks enlarges but the total amount of available liquidity within the surviving banks falls. This results in ‘cash-in-the-market’ pricing for liquidation of banking assets. At a sufficiently large number of bank failures, and in turn, at a sufficiently low level of asset prices, there are too many banks to liquidate and inefficient users of assets who are liquidity-endowed may end up owning the liquidated assets. In order to avoid this allocation inefficiency, it may be ex post optimal for the regulator to bail out some failed banks. Ex ante, this gives banks an incentive to herd by investing in correlated assets, thereby making aggregate banking crises more likely. These effects are robust to allowing the surviving banks to issue equity and allowing the regulator to price-discriminate against outsiders in the market for bank sales.

Bankruptcy Codes and Innovation

Do legal institutions governing financial contracts affect the nature of real investments in the economy? We develop a simple model and provide evidence that the answer to this question is yes. We consider a levered firms choice of investment between innovative and conservative technologies, on the one hand, and of financing between debt and equity, on the other. Bankruptcy code plays a central role in these choices by determining whether the firm is continued or liquidated in case of financial distress. When the code is creditor-friendly, excessive liquidations cause the firm to shy away from innovation. In contrast, by promoting continuation upon failure, a debtor-friendly code induces greater innovation. This effect remains robust when the firm attempts to sustain innovation by reducing its debt under creditor-friendly codes. Employing patents as a proxy for innovation, we find support for the real as well as the financial implications of the model: (1) In countries with weaker creditor rights, technologically innovative industries create disproportionately more patents and generate disproportionately more citations to these patents relative to other industries; (2) This difference of difference result is further confirmed by within-country analysis that exploits time-series changes in creditor rights, suggesting a causal effect of bankruptcy codes on innovation; (3) When creditor rights are stronger, innovative industries employ relatively less leverage compared to other industries; and (4) In countries with weaker creditor rights, technologically innovative industries grow disproportionately faster compared to other industries. Finally, while overall financial development fosters innovation, stronger creditor rights weaken this effect, especially for highly innovative industries.

Causes of the Financial Crisis

ABSTRACT Why did the popping of the housing bubble bring the financial system—rather than just the housing sector of the economy—to its knees? The answer lies in two methods by which banks had evaded regulatory capital requirements. First, they had temporarily placed assets—such as securitized mortgages—in off‐balance‐sheet entities, so that they did not have to hold significant capital buffers against them. Second, the capital regulations also allowed banks to reduce the amount of capital they held against assets that remained on their balance sheets—if those assets took the form of AAA‐rated tranches of securitized mortgages. Thus, by repackaging mortgages into mortgage‐backed securities, whether held on or off their balance sheets, banks reduced the amount of capital required against their loans, increasing their ability to make loans many‐fold. The principal effect of this regulatory arbitrage, however, was to concentrate the risk of mortgage defaults in the banks and render them insolvent when the housing bubble popped.

On the optimality of resetting executive stock options

Recent empirical work has documented the tendency of corporations to reset strike prices on previously-awarded executive stock option grants when declining stock prices have pushed these options out-of-the-money. This practice has been criticized as counter-productive since it weakens incentives present in the original award.We find that although the anticipation of resetting will typically result in a negative effect on initial incentives, resetting can still be an important, value-enhancing aspect of compensation contracts, even from an ex-ante standpoint. Indeed, we find a precise sense that some resetting is almost always optimal. We also characterize the conditions that affect the relative optimality resetting. We find, for example, that the relative advantages of resetting decrease as managerial ability to influence the resetting process increases, as the relative importance of external (industry-or economy-wide) factors in return generation increase, and as the direct or indirect cost of replacing the incumbent manager decrease. Our analysis, in summary, that the case against resetting is quite weak.

A Model of Liquidity Hoarding and Term Premia in Inter-Bank Markets

Financial crises are associated with reduced volumes and extreme levels of rates for term inter-bank loans, reflected in the one-month and three-month Libor. We explain such stress by modeling leveraged banks’ precautionary demand for liquidity. Asset shocks impair a bank’s ability to roll over debt because of agency problems associated with high leverage. In turn, banks hoard liquidity and decrease term lending as their rollover risk increases over the term of the loan. High levels of short-term leverage and illiquidity of assets lead to low volumes and high rates for term borrowing. In extremis, inter-bank markets can completely freeze.

Caught between Scylla and Charybdis? Regulating Bank Leverage When There is Rent Seeking and Risk Shifting

We consider a model in which banks face two moral hazard problems: 1) asset substitution by shareholders, which can occur when banks make socially-inefficient, risky loans; and 2) managerial under-provision of effort in loan monitoring. The privately-optimal level of bank leverage is neither too low nor too high: It efficiently balances the market discipline that owners of risky debt impose on managerial shirking in monitoring loans against the asset substitution induced at high levels of leverage. However, when correlated bank failures can impose significant social costs, regulators may bail out bank creditors. Anticipation of this action generates an equilibrium featuring systemic risk, in which all banks choose inefficiently high leverage to fund correlated, excessively risky assets. That is, regulatory forbearance itself becomes a source of systemic risk. Leverage can be reduced via a minimum equity capital requirement, which can rule out asset substitution. But this also compromises market discipline by making bank debt too safe. Optimal capital regulation requires that a part of bank capital be invested in safe assets and be attached with contingent distribution rights, in particular, be unavailable to creditors upon failure so as to retain market discipline and be made available to shareholders only contingent on good performance in order to contain risk-taking.

Testing Macroprudential Stress Tests: The Risk of Regulatory Risk Weights

Macroprudential stress tests have been employed by regulators in the United States and Europe to assess and address the solvency condition of financial firms in adverse macroeconomic scenarios. We provide a test of these stress tests by comparing their risk assessments and outcomes to those from a simple methodology that relies on publicly available market data and forecasts the capital shortfall of financial firms in severe market-wide downturns. We find that: (i) The losses projected on financial firm balance-sheets compare well between actual stress tests and the market-data based assessments, and both relate well to actual realized losses in case of future stress to the economy; (ii) In striking contrast, the required capitalization of financial firms in stress tests is found to be rather low, and inadequate ex post, compared to that implied by market data; (iii) This discrepancy arises due to the reliance on regulatory risk weights in determining required levels of capital once stress-test losses are taken into account. In particular, the continued reliance on regulatory risk weights in stress tests appears to have left financial sectors under-capitalized, especially during the European sovereign debt crisis, and likely also provided perverse incentives to build up exposures to low risk-weight assets.

A Crisis of Banks as Liquidity Providers

Can banks maintain their advantage as liquidity providers when exposed to a financial crisis? While banks honored credit lines drawn by firms during the 2007 to 2009 crisis, this liquidity provision was only possible because of explicit, large support from the government and government-sponsored agencies. At the onset of the crisis, aggregate deposit inflows into banks weakened and their loan-to-deposit shortfalls widened. These patterns were pronounced at banks with greater undrawn commitments. Such banks sought to attract deposits by offering higher rates, but the resulting private funding was insufficient to cover shortfalls and they reduced new credit.