Virginie Masson

Kidnapping model: an extension of Selten's game

Seltens game is a kidnapping model where the probability of capturing the kidnapper is independent of whether the hostage has been released or executed. Most often, in view of the elevated sensitivities involved, authorities put greater effort and resources into capturing the kidnapper if the hostage has been executed, in contrast with the case when a ransom is paid to secure the hostages release. In this paper, we study the asymmetric game when the probability of capturing the kidnapper depends on whether the hostage has been executed or not and find a new uniquely determined perfect equilibrium point in Seltens game.

Information, interaction and memory

This paper extends previous work on evolutionary games by introducing non-trivial memory into a model where information flows and interactions are captured using networks, as in Alós-Ferrer and Weidenholzer (J Econ Theory 143:251–274, 2008). We consider two-player

The Effects of Information and Interactions on Contagion Processes

K \times K

How does daylight saving time affect electricity demand? An answer using aggregate data from a natural experiment in Western Australia

K×K coordination games and analyze best response dynamics as well as imitation dynamics. We show that for any arbitrary information network, including those with asymmetric information exchanges, the introduction of non-trivial memory corroborates the results of previous studies: with best response, agents select the

A model of informal favor exchange on networks

\frac{1}{2}

Testing for Stochastic Dominance in Social Networks

12-dominant strategy while imitators favor efficiency. Furthermore, we expose the sensitivity of the efficiency results to the interaction patterns.