Wayne P. Steger

The New Hampshire Effect in Presidential Nominations

In order to demonstrate challenges to conventional wisdom (Aldrich 1980a, b; Bartels 1985 1988; Orren and Polsby 1987), this article develops several forecasting models of the presidential primary vote to compare to a baseline model of the aggregate primary vote (APV) that uses pre-primary and New Hampshire primary data. The models indicate that candidates’ Gallup poll position and cash reserves are significant positive predictors of a candidates’ primary vote share, though there are differences between forecasting models of the primary vote in Democratic and Republican nomination campaigns. Parallel models incorporating results of the New Hampshire primary improve the predictive power of the baseline model, indicating that the bellwether primary has a “correcting” effect on the relative standings of some candidates seeking a presidential nomination. This effect is substantially greater for Democrats than for Republicans.

The Viability Primary Modeling Candidate Support before the Primaries

Public support before the primaries is the strongest predictor of presidential candidate attrition and of the aggregate primary vote. Yet little is known about the factors that drive candidate preferences before the primaries. This article examines pre-primary candidate support in national Gallup polls for open presidential nomination races from 1976 to 2004. The study finds that candidate background characteristics have marginal effects on mass partisan support during the earliest phase of the nomination campaign and that campaign-related factors significantly affect pre-primary candidate support once the campaign begins. Prior levels of support, network news coverage, and party elite endorsements are significant factors in explaining variation in mass partisan support for candidates throughout the nomination campaign. The decisions of well-known, party “heavyweights” to enter or not enter the race affect the choices available to partisan voters and the overall competitiveness of the nomination campaign.

The Determinants of Presidential Foreign Policy Choice

What explains presidential decision making on foreign policy? This question is addressed by assessing the relative influence of the international and domestic environments on presidential foreign policy choice. Unlike previous studies, which have focused on the relatively small number of presidential decisions to use force, the authors look at the broad range of conflictual and cooperative policies that presidents have pursued. Using data from the Conflict and Peace Data Bank, they estimate a model of presidential foreign policy choice over the years 1948 through 1978. The results indicate that presidents respond mostly to the rhythms of international events and not domestic politics when making foreign policy. In particular, little evidence is found to support the findings or earlier research that public approval influences presidential decision making on foreign policy.

Candidate Competition and Attrition in Presidential Primaries, 1912-2000

This article analyzes candidate competition and attrition in presidential primaries from 1912 to 2000. We use a modified market concentration index to measure the number of effective candidates entering presidential primaries and to calculate winnowing across presidential primaries. We test competing hypotheses about the increasing number of candidates entering primaries. We find that the number of effective candidates increased following the reforms of the 1970s. We reject the hypothesis that the number of candidates entering primaries increased gradually as a function of long-term factors. We also find similarities in the winnowing of candidates in each party during the prereform and postreform eras, which suggests the timing of candidate withdrawal owes to more than differences in each party’s delegate allocation rules. Republican presidential primaries more efficiently winnow candidates than do Democratic presidential primaries in both the prereform and postreform eras.

The "Two Presidencies" in Future Research: Moving Beyond Roll-Call Analysis

The two presidencies literature ostensibly seeks to determine whether presidents exercise more power over foreign policy than over domestic policy. In a laudable effort to be rigorous, scholars have sought to answer the question by examining roll-call voting in Congress. Doing so, however, changes the question from the power of the president versus Congress to the success of the president in Congress. Because presidents act without the approval of Congress far more often on foreign policy than they do on domestic policy, the two questions are not identical. Even with the narrower question of presidential success in Congress, several methodological problems cast doubt on the validity of previous studies. Future research needs to confront the problems plaguing roll-call analysis, and it needs to revisit the original question of how presidential influence varies across policy domains.

Presidential Policy Initiation and the Politics of Agenda Control

This study examines whether and why presidents have greater success on legislation initiated bv their administrations compared with that proposed by others in government. I argue that presidents are more successful on legislation initiated by their administrations because agenda setting and policy initiation are sources of influence in the legislative process and because the administration can accommodate legislative preferences when it initiates legislation. I found, first, that presidents between 1953 and 1974 were more successful on legislation initiated by their administrations than they were on legislation initiated by others in government. Second, there are major differences between majority and minority presidents owing to partisan control of congressional decision-making institutions. The filtering effects of the congressional committee system favor majority presidents while distorting the success of minority presidents, especially in the House.

Interparty Differences in Elite Support for Presidential Nomination Candidates

Studies of the 1970s and 1980s viewed the political party insiders as having little influence on the selection of the presidential nominees. Recent studies, however, find a significant effect for party elite endorsements in presidential nomination campaigns. This study presents a theory of elite influence in the postreform presidential nomination system and analyzes patterns of elite party endorsements to address questions of when and why elites converge on a preferred candidate. Both party- and candidate-centric factors appear to affect elite endorsements of presidential candidates. Elite elected officials are mainly motivated to have a nominee with electoral appeal. Fewer elite Democratic elected officials endorse presidential candidates, they endorse later, and they tend to divide their endorsements among the presidential candidates to a greater degree than do elite Republican elected officials.

Campaigns and Political Marketing in Political Science Context

Wayne P. Steger, PhD, is Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, DePaul University, 990 West Fullerton, Suite 2200, Chicago, IL 60614 (E-mail: wsteger@ depaul.edu). Sean Q Kelly, PhD, is Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Timon Hall, Room #11, Niagara University, Niagara, NY 14109 (E-mail: sqkelly@niagara.edu). J. Mark Wrighton, PhD, is Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, 321 Horton Social Science Center, Department of Political Science, University of New Hampshire, Durham, NH 03824 (E-mail: Mark.Wrighton@unh.edu).

The Occurrence and Consequences of Electoral Mandates in Historical Context

This study revisits the debate over electoral mandates by assessing the occurrence and consequences of landslide electoral victories since the 1860s. The study builds on Keelers (1993) formulation of mandates in terms of the opportunities afforded by an election. Viewing elections as creating policy opportunities allows a more straightforward assessment of the relation between election outcomes and the legislative activity that follows. The idea of policy windows also avoids some of the criticisms directed at electoral mandates. Using public laws enacted from 1860 to 1998,1 find that landslide electoral victories precede less active Congresses almost as often as they precede surges of legislative activity. Using qualitative historical information, I further find that the legislative opportunities afforded by a landslide victory are conditional upon unity of the presidents party.

Conditional Arbiters: The Limits of Political Party Influence in Presidential Nominations

The 2016 Republican presidential nomination challenges arguments about political party insiders’ influence on the outcome. This article argues, first, that party insider influence is conditional on the participation, coalescence, and timing of party stakeholders behind a front-runner during the invisible primary, and second, that party insider influence has probably declined since the 2000 presidential election. Data on endorsements by elite elected officials in open presidential nominations from 1984 to 2016 show that party insiders’ participation and convergence of support behind the front-runner is less extensive than what was found by Cohen, Karol, Noel, and Zaller (2008), though the data sets differ. Party insiders participate and unify more readily when the party coalition is stable and there is a candidate in the race who has demonstrable national support. Party elites remain on the sidelines when the party coalition is divided or when there is uncertainty about the appeal of candidates (Ryan 2011; Whitby 2014). The potency of insider endorsements likely has declined with the rise of social media, the changing campaign finance landscape, and the reemergence of populism in each party.