Wendy A. Stock

Age Discrimination Laws and Labor Market Efficiency

In Lazears model of long‐term incentive contracts, age discrimina‐tion laws barring age‐ based involuntary terminations preclude such contracts, reducing efficiency. Alternatively, such laws may serve as precommitment devices for these contracts, without pre‐venting firms from offering strong financial incentives to induce retirement at specific ages. In this case, age discrimination laws may encourage Lazear contracts, hence increasing efficiency. We assess evidence on these alternative interpretations using variation in state and federal age discrimination laws. The evidence indicates that age discrimination laws steepen age‐earnings profiles for co‐horts entering the labor market, suggesting that these laws encour‐age the use of Lazear contracts.

The Labor Market Effects of Disability Discrimination Laws

We present new evidence on the effects of disability discrimination laws based on variation induced by state-level antidiscrimination measures passed prior to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The evidence expands upon other research that focuses solely on the impact of the ADA by using a “quasi-experimental” framework that generates treatment and comparison groups. We find that disability discrimination laws are associated with lower relative earnings of the disabled, with slightly lower disabled relative labor force participation rates, but are not associated with lower relative employment rates for the disabled once we control for preexisting employment trends among the disabled.

So You Want To Earn a Ph.D. in Economics? How Long Do You Think It Will Take?.

The elapsed time taken to earn a Ph.D. in economics is analyzed with data from 618 1996-97 Ph.D.s. A duration model indicates that students supported by fellowships, and those holding a prior masters degree finish faster. Americans, those who take jobs before completing their degree, and those with children take longer. Kids slow the progress of women, but not men. The only difference among fields is more time required for industrial organization and international economics. There is no difference in time-to-degree between men and women, married and single students, older and younger students, and those enrolled in larger or smaller Ph.D. programs.

The Market for New Ph. D. Economists in 2002

A period of malaise in the mid-1990’s led to a contraction in enrollment at many economics Ph.D. programs. The resulting reduction in the supply of new Ph.D. economists, combined with a smaller contraction in demand for new Ph.D. economists, generated, as the Wall Street Journal reported, a “hot pursuit” for some economics Ph.D.’s, with “even low-level candidates [being] treated like big shots” (Jon E. Hilsenrath, 2001 p. B1). As might be expected, the scarcity of new economics Ph.D.’s that materialized at the end of the decade appears to have induced more enrollments in economics Ph.D. programs, with annual matriculations rising by about 25 percent between fall 1998 and fall 2002 (Charles E. Scott and Siegfried, 1999–2003). Predictions for the current job market are mixed. On the one hand, demand may expand as some academic departments whose hiring had been constrained by financial exigency return to active recruiting (Jennifer Jacobson, 2003). On the other hand, the aftermath of the recession continues to limit some public-university budgets at the same time that the supply of new economics Ph.D.’s may start to expand, resulting in a job market for American Ph.D.’s that The Economist (2003 p. 60) describes as “bleak.” Five years ago we reported the results of a comprehensive survey of the labor market for economics Ph.D.’s graduating in 1996 –1997 (Siegfried and Stock, 1999). In contrast to other social-science and science disciplines, most economists who graduated with a doctorate in 1996 –1997 found full-time careertracking jobs that paid well (those in permanent full-time jobs in the United States earned an average starting salary of

Time-to-Degree for the Economics Ph.D. Class of 2001-2002

61,000). Many of those employed in business and industry, however, were not satisfied with their jobs despite receiving a significant salary premium relative to academics. Here we report results from a new survey of the class of economics Ph.D.’s graduating in 2001–2002. This information should be of interest to current and prospective Ph.D. students, of use to advisors of undergraduates considering graduate study in economics, and of assistance to faculty concerned with the employment prospects of applicants they admit to their doctoral programs. For methodological details consult our earlier report (Siegfried and Stock, 1999).

Agricultural Graduate Earnings: The Impacts of College, Career, and Gender

Based on the median salary for full-time jobs held by new Ph.D. economists in the United States, a rough estimate of the opportunity cost of taking an additional year to earn an economics Ph.D. was

No-Fault Divorce Laws and the Labor Supply of Women with and without Children.

74,000 in 2002. The median time required to earn a Ph.D. for the class of 2002 was 5.5 years, up from 5.25 years for the class of 1997. If the three-month difference is interpreted as 200 students (i.e., roughly onequarter of the class of 2002) taking a year longer to complete their degrees and get a job than did their counterparts from the class of 1997, it implies an increase from 1997 to 2002 in the annual opportunity cost of producing Ph.D. economists exceeding

Effect of Graduate-Program Rank on Success in the Job Market

14.5 million. A growing elapsed time required to earn a Ph.D. also may affect application and matriculation decisions of students who are weighing alternative careers (T. Aldrich Finegan et al., 2006). We examine the time required to earn a Ph.D. in economics for those graduating between July 1, 2001, and June 30, 2002, using survey responses from 398 graduates and 121 thesis advisors of nonrespondents among the cohort. The 519 graduates for whom we have information comprise 61 percent of the 850 individuals estimated to have earned a Ph.D. in the United States in 2002 (Siegfried and Stock, 2004). Based on survey responses from the graduates, we examine whether demographic attributes, type of undergraduate training, and type of financial aid are systematically related to either the time required to write a dissertation or to earn a Ph.D. Using a similar earlier survey (Siegfried and Stock, 2001), we also compare time-to-degree across cohorts.

Ph. D. Program Learning and Job Demands: How Close Is the Match?

Survey data were used to identify determinants of starting and current salaries of agricultural graduates from Kansas State University from 1976–97. Salaries were significantly influenced by major field, advanced degrees, job location, gender and family variables, motivation for accepting a job, and job mobility. Salary structures were estimated separately for male and female alumni. Women earned less than men, after controlling for observed differences between the two groups. Decomposition of the salary differential revealed that gender salary differences were primarily due to differences between sexes in starting salaries, field of study, job experience, and higher returns to married men. Copyright 1999, Oxford University Press.

Attrition in Economics Ph.D. Programs

We use a difference-in-difference-in-difference estimator to compare changes in labor force participation, weeks, and hours of work associated with no-fault divorce laws, allowing for differential responses for married women with and without children. Although other research has found that the labor supply of women in general does not respond to no-fault divorce laws, we find that no-fault divorce laws are associated with increases in the labor supply of married mothers relative to married nonmothers, even after controlling for changes in female labor supply in states without no-fault divorce laws and for property division rules associated with the laws.