Wendy Smits

Why do business service firms employ fewer apprentices?: A comparison between Germany and The Netherlands

This paper analyses why in Germany and The Netherlands the share of apprentices in the business service sector is lower than in other economic sectors. A theoretical introduction surveys the potential reasons that could be responsible for this. The subsequent empirical analysis shows that the level of skill apprentices gain is the main explanation for the relatively low supply of apprenticeships in German business service enterprises. In The Netherlands, the option to hire skilled employees from full‐time schools instead of training apprentices seems to be crucial. For these reasons, this paper proposes to offer obligatory extra formal training in areas such as IT skills and foreign languages for the apprentices in business service firms in Germany in order to increase the attractiveness of the dual apprenticeship system for prospective apprentices as well as business service firms.

The Quality of Apprenticeship Training

Abstract This paper examines the relationship between a firm’s training motives and the quality of apprenticeship training. Data on training quality and training motives are obtained by interviewing former apprentices. The paper employs a novel measure for training quality based on subjective survey data on the firm’s training effort. It is found that firms that train apprentices because of a future need for qualified workers provide better quality training than firms that do not have future benefits from training.

How Large is the Compensating Wage Differential for R&D Workers?

The aim of this paper is to measure the extent to which lower wages in R&D functions reflect a preference effect. In contrast to the bulk of the literature on compensating wage differentials that compares wage levels of jobs with different attributes, we constructed measures of willingness to accept (WTA) and pay (WTP) for R&D jobs using the Contingent Valuation technique. Earnings regressions using OLS show an R&D wage penalty of about 3.5%. However, hedonic OLS regressions of WTA and WTP give significant relative preference parameters for R&D jobs that range from 0.19 to 0.22.

Empirical studies of employment and performance of scientists and engineers

Policy makers in both the USA and Europe are aware of the necessity to stimulate the employment as well as the performance of scientists and engineers. This issue includes a selection of papers on both topics, bringing together labour economists as well as economists who do research on innovation and R&D.

Imperfect Information and Training Quality

This paper develops a theoretical model in which the level of training provided by a firm is not observed by workers. It is therefore not possible to have training wages completely contingent upon the level of training provided. Training wages will be too high. This, in turn, prevents firms from recouping the full benefits from training and leads to underinvestment. The more general the training, the more severe this underinvestment problem. Copyright 2005 CEIS, Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

The Economics of the Apprenticeship System

Well-written and well-researched, this book succeeds in achieving a perfect blend of theory, evidence, and history. It will appeal to scholars in the fields of labour economics and human resource management, as well as those in private and public sectors working on policy development and planning of vocational education and training.