Jing-Dong Yuan

China's Role in Establishing and Building the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

In June 2001, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan established the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). While the immediate focus of the organization was to combat the so-called ‘three evils’—ethnic separatism, religious extremism, and international terrorism—the SCOs long-term viability and effectiveness in promoting regional stability and economic development depend on how member states build up common identity and cooperate on issues of mutual concern. This article looks at Chinas role in initiating the Shanghai-5/SCO structure within the broader framework of Beijings foreign and security policy interests and priorities in Central Asia and seeks to examine both the prospects for and the potential obstacles to its efforts in achieving key objectives for this new regional organization: management of ethnic and religious unrest, including the fight against terrorism and separatism; maintenance of stable borders; development of energy resources; and promotion of economic prosperity. In addition, the article will also examine the extent to which Beijing has used the opportunity to exercise leadership and whether or not China can extend its influence to Central Asia using the SCO as a vehicle.

Regional Institutions and Cooperative Security: Chinese Approaches and Policies

Abstract Chinese positions on multilateralism and regional institutions in managing Asia-Pacific security have undergone gradual but noticeable changes over the years. Beijings initial hesitation and to some extent, suspicion, was that multilateral forums could be used for small powers to gang up on China, especially regarding its defense modernization and territorial disputes in the South China Sea; that an outside major power like the United States could dominate these organizations; and that Taiwan could be granted official status and the Taiwan issue could be internationalized in multilateral discussions. China gradually became more involved in and of late has become a strong supporter of ARF activities since the Asian version of multilateralism, with an “ASEAN Way” of gradualism, consensus, informality in institution building and, more importantly, as an alternative to military alliances. However, China was, and remains today, opposed to transplanting the European security models to the Asia-Pacific...

Recent developments in China's export controls: New regulations and new challenges

Dr. Jing-dong Yuan is a Senior Research Associate in the East Asia Nonproliferation Program (EANP) at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies. He is co-author of the forthcoming study, ChinaIndia Relations: Cooperation or Conflict? (Lynne Rienner, 2003). Dr. Phillip C. Saunders is Director of EANP. He has worked on Asian security issues for the Council on Foreign Relations and for the U.S. Air Force. Stephanie Lieggi is a Research Associate at EANP. She worked from 1993 to 1997 at the OPCW PrepCom in The Hague, and from 1998 to 2000 as a researcher in Beijing.

The Evolution of China's Nonproliferation Policy since the 1990s: Progress, problems, and prospects

This article offers an overview of Chinas evolving nonproliferation policy over the past decade. It documents the key developments during this period and identifies both the internal and external factors that have brought about significant change in Chinese policy. It argues that Chinas growing recognition of the threats posed by WMD proliferation, image concerns, its interest in maintaining stable Sino-US relations, and the US policy initiatives aimed at influencing Chinese behavior are largely accountable for Beijings gradual acceptance of nonproliferation norms, pledges to adhere to selected multilateral export control guidelines, and the introduction of domestic export control regulations. It suggests that the future direction of Chinas nonproliferation policy to a large extent will depend on how Beijing and Washington manage their increasing differences over missile defenses and the Taiwan issue.

EFFECTIVE, RELIABLE, AND CREDIBLE:: China's Nuclear Modernization

Chinese nuclear doctrine is guided by the no-first-use (NFU) principle and strives to maintain an effective reliable and deterrent. For Beijing, the concept of deterrence has more of a qualitative rather than quantitative connotation. Labels such as minimum or limited deterrence do not capture the essence of Chinese doctrine, which is not defined by any numerical threshold, but by the level of sufficiency that guarantees a survivable, credible, and effective counter-deterrence and second-strike capabilities. Accordingly, China continues to regard nuclear weapons as largely political and psychological instruments, rather than for actual war fighting. The foundation of Chinese nuclear doctrine is increasingly being challenged, however, by growing U.S. nuclear primacy, the U.S. commanding lead in conventional weapons, especially precision-guided munitions, and the deployment of ballistic missile defenses. These developments threaten Chinas limited nuclear deterrence capabilities and raise questions about the viability of the NFU principle. How Beijing responds to such challenges will determine the future of its nuclear force modernization, the role of its nuclear weapons, and the prospects for nuclear disarmament.

Chinese Responses to U.S. Missile Defenses: Implications for Arms Control and Regional Security

Dr. Jing-dong Yuan is Senior Research Associate in the East Asia Nonproliferation Program (EANP) at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Dr. Yuan writes on Asia-Pacific security, Chinese defense and foreign policy, and arms control and nonproliferation issues. He is the co-author of China and India: Cooperation or Conflict? (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003).

Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper/13: Cooperative monitoring for confidence building: A case study of the Sino-Indian border areas

This occasional paper identifies applicable cooperative monitoring techniques and develops models for possible application in the context of the border between China and India. The 1993 and 1996 Sino-Indian agreements on maintaining peace and tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and establishing certain confidence building measures (CBMs), including force reductions and limitation on military exercises along their common border, are used to examine the application of technically based cooperative monitoring in both strengthening the existing terms of the agreements and also enhancing trust. The paper also aims to further the understanding of how and under what conditions technology-based tools can assist in implementing existing agreements on arms control and confidence building. The authors explore how cooperative monitoring techniques can facilitate effective implementation of arms control agreements and CBMS between states and contribute to greater security and stability in bilateral, regional, and global contexts.

Beijing’s institutional-balancing strategies: rationales, implementation and efficacy

ABSTRACT China has in recent years been actively engaged in multilateral diplomacy. From the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the One Belt, One Road initiative, Beijing is pursuing strategies and promoting norms that are viewed as concerted efforts by China to challenge some of the key institutional arrangements of the existing international order. This article seeks to discuss these contentious issues and assess the rationales, approaches and implications of Chinese diplomacy in initiating and promoting what can be considered as institutional-balancing strategies. The author suggests that the rationales behind these Chinese strategies have as much to do with Beijing’s shifting priorities and the need to address them as with reflecting a degree of dissatisfaction with existing multilateral institutions. And there are more marked differences in Chinese motivations and modalities in security arenas than in economic areas. However, it would be overstating Beijing’s intentions and capabilities if these China-sponsored initiatives are viewed as direct challenges to the existing international and regional orders.

Remapping Asia’s Geopolitical Landscape: China’s Rise, US Pivot, and Security Challenges for a Region in Power Transition

Jingdong Yuan points to geopolitical transformation in East Asia due to China’s rise and the changing balance of power, which affects Beijing’s foreign policy objectives, priorities, and tactics. Meanwhile, the US strategic rebalancing toward Asia and maritime disputes between China and neighboring states—among which are US allies—puts stability more at risk. Coming years will decide whether Asia continues to enjoy peace and prosperity or experiences growing great power rivalry.

The China Factor in South Korea's Foreign Relations

South Koreas foreign relations under President Park are characterised by a carefully crafted and balanced approach in both strengthening the traditional alliance with the United States and promoting a strategic partnership with China. The latter in particular is driven by the need to further expand economic ties and the hope that Beijing can help rein in Pyongyangs behaviours. North Koreas latest provocations threaten to unravel the premise of this approach.