William G. Hyland

Nuclear fallacy : dispelling the myth of nuclear strategy

I T h e most recent stage in the great nuclear debate, which has now kept the strategic studies community busy and perplexed for a full decade, reflects disillusion with the more ambitious strategic concepts promoted by the Reagan administration and an attempt to come to terms with the new political situation created by the revival of arms control and the improvement in East-West relations. The tendency at the moment is to cut nuclear deterrence down to size, shifting the emphasis from nuclear to conventional strategy. The basic policy question is increasingly becoming one of how far this process can go. Are we to dispense with nuclear weapons altogether, as in different ways Reagan and Gorbachev have both advocated, or are we to stop short of that ultimate solution? Those who favor the general trend but recognize its limits have tended to argue that nuclear weapons now have no other role but to deter the use of those of the adversary. In particular, the United States can no longer with credibility promise its allies that it will initiate nuclear war on their behalf-even if they face a potentially mortal conventional attack. Advocates of this position comfort themselves with the observation that there is no reason why the allies need be unable to cope with conventional needs if only they would devote the necessary resources to the task.

The Causes and Prevention of War

In this unique book, Seyom Brown applies the analytical tools of the social and behavioral sciences to the study of international violence. Within this theoretical framework, he considers the phenomenon of war itself; its behavioral, political, institutional, and structural determinants; and the issues involved in the reduction of international conflict. This second edition, which focuses especially on the challenges and opportunities for maintaining peace in the post-Cold War world, incorporates three new chapters. New topics include the forms of collective violence, the culture of war, and the role of diplomacy. The concluding section has also been extensively revised to accommodate an integrated strategy for the prevention and control of war.