Ashton B. Carter

Catastrophic Terrorism: Tackling the New Danger

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. But todays terrorists, be they international cults like Aum Shinrikyo or individual nihilists like the Unabomber, act on a greater variety of motives than ever before. More ominously, terrorists may gain access to weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear devices, germ dispensers, poison gas weapons, and even computer viruses. Also new is the worlds dependence on a nearly invisible and fragile network for distributing energy and information. Long part of the Hollywood and Tom Clancy repertory of nightmarish scenarios, catastrophic terrorism has moved from far-fetched horror to a contingency that could happen next month. Although the United States still takes conventional terrorism seriously, as demon strated by the response to the attacks on its embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August, it is not yet prepared for the new threat of catastrophic terrorism.

How to Counter WMD

WORST PEOPLE VS. WORST WEAPONS PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH has rightly proclaimed that keep ing the worst weapons out of the hands of the worst people is Washingtons highest national security priority. But so far, the United States has attacked the people much more vigorously than the weapons. The war on terrorism that Washington is fighting and the war on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that it needs to fight are related but not identical. The attacks of September 1i, 2001, stimulated a comprehensive overhaul of U.S. counterterrorism practices and agencies. The United States went on the offensive in Afghanistan and around the world; border and immigration controls were tight ened; emergency response was fortified; and a new Department of Homeland Security was created. But counterproliferation policies have not been overhauled. The most significant action taken by the United States to counter WMD since September 11 has been the invasion of Iraq. Although at the time intelligence suggesting a recrudescence of Saddam Husseins WMD programs appeared to justify the war, it now seems that the intelligence was incorrect. Meanwhile, North Korea has quadrupled its stock of plutonium, a far graver setback to counterproliferation than anything Saddam might have been pursuing. A distracted admin istration has left the initiative for curbing Irans evident nuclear ambitions to two groups that failed to support the Iraq invasion: the Europeans

Satellites and Anti-Satellites: The Limits of the Possible

I Analysis of the complex anti-satellite (ASAT) issue is still in its infancy. There are signs, however, that the subject will have to grow up fast in the coming year. The Geneva arms control negotiations seem likely to depart the familiar terrain of strategic and theater nuclear weapons and launch into the lesser-known reaches of space. As the ASAT issue gains prominence, members of the national security community will need to acquaint themselves with its specialized jargon and technologies. Just as a rudimentary understanding of throwweight, flight times, and post boost vehicles is indispensable to discussion of strategic forces and arms control, so a modest knowledge of orbits and satellites is necessary for informed discussion of ASAT. One purpose of this article is to provide that background to non-technical readers. Military and technical analysis, of course, will play only a modest part in the ASAT policy process, getting submerged quickly in the swirl of domestic politics, posturing at the negotiating table, legalisms, and bureaucratic interests. In addition, the political agenda of conciliation or competition with the Soviet Union is a paramount, and within limits legitimate, basis for supporting or rejecting an arms control approach. Yet behind these political

Perturbative QCD in a covariant gauge

Abstract We present detailed calculations of the moments of structure functions, performed explicitly in a covariant gauge starting from familiar techniques. The results illustrate the central features of perturbative QCD (universal factorization of mass singularities, ladderization, etc.) and provide insight into their origin.

Current and Future Military Uses of Spacea

The civilian space program is a cultural activity, designed to express people’s sense of adventure, the progress of technology, and national prowess. Economic or scientific utility is not the standard applied in designing the civilian space program, despite some hopeful talk about growing crystals and performing electrophoretic separations at zero g. The military space program is completely different. In our military program, the benchmark of success is not technological advance or novelty, but military capability and related national security. It is unfortunate that we sometimes tend to carry over to the military space program the mystique that underlies the civilian program. This mystique reflected equally in urgings that we “must seize the high ground” and that we “must avoid militarizing space”is not very helpful in perceiving what kind of military space program we need or in managing it. This talk begins with the premise that however special or dramatic space might appear, it should be regarded merely as another medium for national security activities. We should apply to military missions conducted from space the same standards of cost-effectiveness, survivability, and trade-offs with alternatives that we apply to our other military decisions. The drama can be taken into account after we have gotten our bearings in a more hard-headed military sense. I will not in this paper emphasize arms control as a solution to security problems in space, to the neglect of unilateral military initiatives and acts of self-restraint.

A Fuel-Cycle Fix

A new international regime could stop nations before they enter the proliferation “red zone.”

ASAT and BMD

The topic of discussion is the relationship between ASAT and ballistic missile defence. The paper1 that has been distributed at the Symposium is chiefly about the antisatellite issue, and deals only indirectly with this topic.