William H. Riker

A Theory of the Calculus of Voting

Much recent theorizing about the utility of voting concludes that voting is an irrational act in that it usually costs more to vote than one can expect to get in return.1 This conclusion is doubtless disconcerting ideologically to democrats; but ideological embarrassment is not our interest here. Rather we are concerned with an apparent paradox in the theory. The writers who constructed these analyses were engaged in an endeavor to explain political behavior with a calculus of rational choice; yet they were led by their argument to the conclusion that voting, the fundamental political act, is typically irrational. We find this conflict between purpose and conclusion bizarre but not nearly so bizarre as a non-explanatory theory: The function of theory is to explain behavior and it is certainly no explanation to assign a sizeable part of politics to the mysterious and inexplicable world of the irrational.2 This essay is, therefore, an effort to reinterpret the voting calculus so that it can fit comfortably into a rationalistic theory of political behavior. We describe a calculus of voting from which one infers that it is reasonable for those who vote to do so and also that it is equally reasonable for those who do not vote not to do so. Furthermore we present empirical evidence that citizens actually behave as if they employed this calculus.3

Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions

While contemporary political science (as, for example, in such subjects as political socialization, studies of public opinion, etc.) tends to emphasize the study of values and tastes (because of an assumption that political outcomes—like market outcomes—are determined by the amalgamation of individual preferences), the older tradition of political science emphasized the study of institutions. The line of research in political theory followed during the last generation has involved seeking an equilibrium of tastes; but it has revealed that such an equilibrium exists only rarely, if at all. The inference then is that prudence in research directs the science of politics toward the investigation of empirical regularities in institutions, which, though congealed tastes, are “unstable constants” amenable to scientific investigation.

The Two-party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science

Science involves the accumulation of knowledge, which means not only the formulation of new sentences about discoveries but also the reformulation of empirically falsified or theoretically discredited old sentences. Science has therefore a history that is mainly a chronicle and interpretation of a series of reformulations. It is often asserted that political science has no history. Although this assertion is perhaps motivated by a desire to identify politics with belles lettres, it may also have a reasonable foundation, in that political institutions may change faster than knowledge can be accumulated. To investigate whether propositions about evanescent institutions can be scientifically falsified and reformulated, I examine in this essay the history of the recent and not wholly accepted revisions of the propositions collectively called Duvergers law: that the plurality rule for selecting the winner of elections favors the two-party system. The body of the essay presents the discovery, revision, testing, and reformulation of sentences in this series in order to demonstrate that in at least one instance in political science, knowledge has been accumulated and a history exists.

The Justification of Bicameralism

The main disadvantage of unicameral legislatures operating by simple majority rule is that, when politics is two-dimensional, they allow the adoption of out-of-equilibrium policies. Since in such cases a majority opposed to what a majority has adopted, the result is majority tyranny. To minimize such tyranny, it is necessary to delay action until a true majority in society is arrived at. Of the several methods of delay — supermajorityism, multipartyism, multicameralism — the best is multicameralism because it allows for simple majority rule when politics is one-dimensional (and hence when a median voter equilibrium is likely to exist) yet discourages decision when politics is two-dimensional (and hence when, almost certainly, no equilibrium exists).

The Heresthetics of Constitution-Making: The Presidency in 1787, with Comments on Determinism and Rational Choice

One contemporary method of reconciling the conflict in methodology between determinism and indeterminism is the notion of rational choice, which allows for both regularities in behavior and artistic creation. A detailed explanation of artistry within the rational choice context has not yet been developed, so this essay offers such an explanation in terms of the notion of heresthetics or the dynamic manipulation of the conditions of choice. The running example used throughout is the decision on the Constitutional Convention of 1787 on the method of selecting the president.

An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation

We assume that in a conflict between a nation with a nuclear capability and one without, the conflict may become nuclear, while, in a conflict between two nuclear powers, the conflict is unlikely to become nuclear by reason of fear of retaliation. Then, as the number of nations with nuclear weapons increases, the chance of bilateral conflict becoming nuclear initially increases and then decreases to zero when all nations are nuclearly armed. Empirical evidence suggests that nuclear deterrence does in fact work in the way the model assumes. We set forth an expected utility model for initiating conflict when nuclear weapons are held by both sides, by one side, and by neither side. While there are dangers in proliferation, these dangers may not be as great as dangers of asymmetry in nuclear power.

Some Ambiguities in the Notion of Power.

The notion of power is often said to be central to the analysis of politics. But while that analysis is a very ancient activity, the conceptual clarification of the notion of power has been undertaken only in the past generation. The reason for this discrepancy I leave to the historians of political ideas. In this introduction I merely observe that the clarification has not proceeded as far as is needed, so that we are still not at all sure of what we are talking about when we use the term. Nevertheless there is light ahead, owing especially to some formal definitions that have been offered in recent years by Shapley and Shubik, March, Dahl, Cartwright, and Karlsson. By reason of the formality of these definitions the issues of meaning have been more sharply delineated than was previously possible. Hence we have reached the point, I believe, where we may confront definitions with each other and specify precisely how they differ. In so doing we may be able to resolve some of the ambiguities remaining in the concept of power. In that hope this essay is written.

Bargaining in a Three-Person Game

Games are paradigms of many political events, especially those that involve partial or complete conflicts of interest among the participants. As paradigms, they display in relatively simple social interaction the same fundamental forces found in the more complex interactions of the grander political events whose structure they share. This is the feature of games that makes them attractive vehicles for both theorizing and experimentation in the social sciences. The scientific expectation is that, by studying the quasi-political interaction of games-where the variations among institutional, psychological, and ideological components of behavior are minimized-one will be able to understand more profoundly the basic political activities of bargaining, forming coalitions, and choosing strategies. This more profound understanding is a consequence of obtaining answers to the following questions:

The Senate and American Federalism

Commentary. This essay, along with chapter 2 (on the invention of centralized federalism), provides the essential data for the proposition that the main centralization of our federalism occurred in 1787. Casual observation suggests that the Senate was progressively detached from state legislatures’ control until the final separation in 1913. But the evidence here assembled indicates that the connection was always tenuous. State legislatures, ostensibly Senators’ constituents, were actually never more than convenient electors. Hence the real centralization was the change in 1787 from state delegates to Congress to United States Senators. The framers, intent on reducing the role of the states, reduced it so much that the Senate, despite appearances, was, from the beginning, a national body.

The Economic and Political Liberalization of Socialism: The Fundamental Problem of Property Rights

All our previous political experience, and especially, of course, the experience of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, offers little hope that democracy can coexist with the centralized allocation of economic resources. Indeed, simple observation suggests that a market economy with private property rights is a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for the existence of a democratic political regime. And this accords fully with the political theory of liberalism, which emphasizes that private rights, both civil and economic, be protected and secure. At the same time, our previous experience also indicates that market economies are more successful than centrally planned economies not only in producing, but also in distributing, both private and collective goods. This economic experienee is supported by neoclassical economic theory, which treats clearly defined and secure rights to private property as essential to a market economy.