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Featured researches published by William M. Arkin.


Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists | 1985

History of the nuclear stockpile

Robert S. Norris; Thomas B. Cochran; William M. Arkin

New details of the largely secret history of nuclear warhead production reveal that an astounding array of weapons has been created for every conceivable purpose by a gigantic, self-perpetuating system.


Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists | 1995

A tale of two Franks

William M. Arkin

Each in his own way is determined to protect the nuclear enterprise from public scrutiny or the popular will.


Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists | 1990

Beating swords into swords

Robert S. Norris; William M. Arkin

Nuclear warheads from Pershing 2 missiles eliminated under INF were converted and scheduled to return to air bases in Europe. The reuse question returned in the strategic arms reduction (START) talks in Geneva, which upon completion will eliminate thousands of weapons over a seven-year period. The US is aware that Soviet warheads are more generic in design than their US counterparts and could be reused to an even greater extent. While defense planners may concoct esoteric needs and characteristics to justify new nuclear weapons requirements, no justification has been offered for these new nuclear bombs entering the stockpile. The hard truth is that the Energy Department needs the work.


Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists | 1989

Nuclear disasters at sea, then and now

William M. Arkin; Joshua Handler

The historical record is sketchy but it offers ample proof that hundreds of accidents have involved nuclear-armed or nuclear-powered vessels. Naval nuclear weapons now number 15,000-16,000, and safety is not improving.


Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists | 1984

SDI — pie in the sky?

William M. Arkin

Proponents of the controversial Strategic Defense Initiatives (SDI)reverse arrowfeel that the will to succeed will be as significant a factor as capability in their effort to make defense a popular concept. They reject the idea that a defensive system must be perfect, and want to loosen the hold of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and Salt II. More than an improvement to deterrence, the goal of SDI is to make a technological leap over the Soviet Union to make its military investments obsolete. Scientists find research on defensive weapons more rewarding than work on offensive systems. Critics need to understand that the force of SDI is ideological in that it rejects the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD) and concedes that nuclear war is possible.


Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists | 1983

Nuclear weapons at sea

William M. Arkin

The U.S. Navy is considering different strategies as it deploys new nuclear weapons. Do these systems make nuclear war at sea more likely?


Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists | 1983

Pershing II and U.S. nuclear strategy

William M. Arkin

Assuring European support for deployment of Pershing II missiles depends upon their role as theater weapons. Announced plans to allow reloading of launchers suggest that Pershing II would have a strategic mission as well.


Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists | 2000

Saddam Hussein, winner

William M. Arkin

William M. Arkin A CCORDING TO DIPLOMATIC OBSERVERS, ALLIED officials, former inspectors, government sources, intelligence analysts, Iraqi defectors and Pentagon insiders, Saddam Hussein still dreams of weapons of mass destruction. Despite bombing, sanctions, and eradication efforts by the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency, experts believe that Iraq may be as close to the acquisition of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons as it was before the Gulf War. What to do about Iraq is a perpetual preoccupation attended to by a now enormous coterie of post-Desert Storm veterans who have manned action and inspection teams, technical groups, negotiating sessions, analysis shops, and policy offices. There is little consensus. Virtually everyone believes that renewed inspections are essential to maintain checks on Iraqi ambitions. But there is so much bad blood and soiled history about those inspections and how bombing ruined the hallowed effort, one wonders how the nonproliferation crowd can ever be satisfied.


Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists | 1995

U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces, End of 1998

Robert S. Norris; William M. Arkin

Quantitative data on operational nuclear weapons is tabulated and described in some detail in the article. Nuclear weapons categories reported include intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and bombers and weapons. The total number of warheads in the U.S. arsenal is approximately 7150, slightly lower than last year`s level of almost 8000 warheads. There are 1085 launchers and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines.


Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists | 1989

The buildup that wasn't

William M. Arkin

When Ronald Reagan told voters in 1984 that the United States had regained nuclear superiority, they believed him — and stopped supporting his expensive, troubled weapons programs.

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Robert S. Norris

Natural Resources Defense Council

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Thomas B. Cochran

Natural Resources Defense Council

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Hans M. Kristensen

Federation of American Scientists

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Milton M. Hoenig

Natural Resources Defense Council

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William Burr

National Security Archive

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