William Burr

The Nixon Administration, the "Horror Strategy," and the Search for Limited Nuclear Options, 1969-1972: Prelude to the Schlesinger Doctrine

In early 1969 President Richard Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, received a brie fing on the U.S.nuclear war plan, the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). Appalled by the catastrophic scale of the SIOP, Nixon and Kissinger sought military options that were more credible than massive nuclear strikes. Participants in the Air Force Nuclear Options project also supported more flexible nuclear war plans.Although Kissinger repeatedly asked Defense Department of ficials to construct limited options, they were skeptical that it would be possible to control nuclear escalation or to introduce greater flexibility without weakening the SIOP.Interagency studies presented a mixed verdict about the desirability of limited options; nevertheless, continued White House pressure encouraged Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to sponsor a major review of nuclear targeting.In 1972 the Foster panel developed concepts of limited, selective, and regional nuclear options that were responsive to Kissingers interest in credible nuclear threats. The Foster panels report led to the controversial Schlesinger Doctrine and further efforts to revise the SIOP, but serious questions endured about the whole concept of controlled nuclear warfare.

Conducting Post-World War II National Security Research in Executive Branch Records: A Comprehensive Guide (review)

cated solely to examining the implementation of containment. Missing entirely is an in-depth discussion of Kennan’s stance during the Vietnam War, a war that critics often blame on Kennan and his containment strategy. An interview or even an op-ed article detailing his beliefs and alternative strategies would have added greatly to the discussion. Instead, nearly half the book (84 of 174 pages) consists of two interviews from 1965 and 1967 addressing Kennan’s relationship with the Dulles family, his opinion of John F. Kennedy, and the failure of Congress to ratify MFN trade status for Yugoslavia. Even more surprising is the mere two-page interview from 1996 assessing the collapse of the Soviet Union, the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (a step that Kennan opposed on grounds that look dubious in retrospect), and the future of U.S. foreign policy in the aftermath of the Cold War. Surely a more thorough interview or a series of Kennan’s op-ed articles could have been added to shed light on these seminal events. Jespersen’s volume also fails to evoke the sense of controversy surrounding Kennan. After all, it was not only Paul Nitze and his associates in the Truman administration who allegedly differed with Kennan. One of Kennan’s most prominent critics was none other than Walter Lippman, whose response to Kennan’s “X” article set the tone for the public debate during the next several decades about the meaning of containment. The interviewers seem so awed by Kennan that the transcripts are almost hagiographical, intended more to support the image of Kennan as the aggrieved, misunderstood paragon of U.S. foreign policy than to provide a careful analysis of Kennan’s views. Consequently, although this collection may be of use to undergraduates as a supplement to more complete texts, it will be of very limited value to more advanced students of foreign policy and the Cold War.

Nixon's nuclear ploy

Richard Nixon thought a secret, worldwide nuclear alert would remain unknown to the American public, and he was right. But his strategy–to threaten the Soviets into helping bring an end to the Vietnam war–was unsuccessful. They may not even have noticed.