Yf Reykers

Losing control: a principal-agent analysis of Russia in the United Nations Security Council's decision-making towards the Libya crisis

Russia’s behaviour in the United Nations Security Council remains poorly understood. Applying principal-agent insights, this article analyses the Russian abstention towards Resolution 1973, which authorised intervention during the 2011 Libya crisis. Introducing a triangle of delegation, it shows that preferences diverged regarding the means and aims of the intervention. The article also investigates the information asymmetries which characterised the decision-making and indicates that this affected the Russian capacity to control the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which implemented Resolution 1973. It argues that Russia can only effectively control such a UN-authorised intervention by using, or threatening to use, its veto power.

EU Battlegroups: High costs, no benefits

ABSTRACT This article reviews the gloomy saga of the EU Battlegroups, focusing on four questions: Where do they come from? What do they look like? What have they been hindered by? And where do they go from here? It builds upon earlier findings in the literature and adds novel insights based on original data. In doing so, the article pays particular attention to the standby nations’ constant calculation of political and financial costs. It argues that recognizing these cost–benefit calculations allows for identifying the most crucial areas to be tackled to make the EU Battlegroups functional. In addition, the article stresses that these considerations play out in a setting wherein the Battlegroups are just one among many policy instruments available for rapid response.

Parliamentary involvement, party ideology and majority-opposition bargaining: Belgian participation in multinational military operations

ABSTRACT This article examines the impact of parliamentary involvement in troop deployment decisions on restrictions on military mandates by examining the Belgian contribution to the 2011 Libya intervention and the coalition against the self-proclaimed Islamic State. More specifically, we analyse (1) the effect of party ideology on mandate preferences, and (2) the impact of bargaining between majority and opposition parties on the outcome of mandate negotiations. Our case study demonstrates that left-wing parties show a strong inclination toward imposing restrictions on the use of military force beyond humanitarian goals, while right-wing preferences tend to depend on the national interests at stake in the operation. With regard to majority-opposition bargaining, our study shows that the impact of opposition parties is dependent on the degree of contention between government and opposition parties, as well as on the extent to which the executive needs to seek support across its own majority.

Process-Tracing as a Tool to Analyse Discretion

Despite the decades of theorization, the causal processes in-between acts of delegation and agency discretion and autonomy are still not developed theoretically, with much ambiguity about how the model’s elements are causally connected. This chapter shows that process-tracing is a useful methodological tool for improving our theoretical and empirical understanding of the causal processes underlying the PA model. Process-tracing, as a case-study method, requires explicitly theorizing the causal mechanism that connects delegation to agency costs and forces the analyst to unpack the process empirically. The added-value of process-tracing is illustrated on the example of the Council Secretariat’s facilitating leadership in intergovernmental negotiations. It is claimed that process-tracing confronts the principal–agent model to closer logical scrutiny, ultimately leading to stronger causal claims and better theorization.

Multinational rapid response mechanisms: Past promises and future prospects

ABSTRACT Military rapid response mechanisms are generally understood as troops that are on standby, ready to be deployed to a crisis within a short time frame. Yet, the overall track record of the existing multinational rapid response mechanisms within the European Union, the African Union, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization remains disappointing, and the United Nations does not even have a rapidly deployable capacity anymore. Meanwhile, despite that calls for the further development of these mechanisms are still being voiced politically, scholarly literature remains fragmented. This is problematic as many of the obstacles faced by these organizations are similar. This forum uniquely compares experiences from the four aforementioned organizations. Drawing on these insights, this introductory article identifies some key factors that hamper or enable the development and deployment of multinational rapid response mechanisms.

No supply without demand: explaining the absence of the EU Battlegroups in Libya, Mali and the Central African Republic

ABSTRACT Although the sad track record of the EU Battlegroups has attracted considerable scholarly attention, analyses have largely focused on obstacles related to the provision of the Battlegroup troops and to the consensus within the EU Council, hence taking a supply-side perspective. This article calls for complementing this perspective with an analysis of the demand for their deployment. That implies analysing whether and why the EU Battlegroups were (not) considered as an option by those actors taking the initiative to intervene in a particular crisis. Applying a rational-institutionalist approach, this article explains the absence of the Battlegroups from three recent crises: Libya (2011), Mali (2013) and the Central African Republic (2013–2014). Using data from document analysis and elite interviews, it shows that once a rapid military reaction became urgent, the EU Battlegroups were not even considered as an option by those initiating an international reaction.

The Principal–Agent Model and Inter-Organizational Relations

This chapter assesses the explanatory power of the Principal–Agent (PA) model with regard to inter-organizational relationships in the United Nations (UN) context by focusing on the relationship between the UN and regional organizations, as framed by Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The introduction of this model to the study of international relations and organizations comes not only with challenges, but also with important opportunities. Most importantly, bringing the members (back) into the picture, it proves to be a relevant and workable research instrument for exploring and explaining how these institutions interact. This chapter discusses the main elements of the PA model, defining and contextualizing the notions of principal, agent, delegation, representation, autonomy and control. It reviews the relevant literature and defines the model’s limits and opportunities. In addition, this chapter discusses the model’s potential transferability to the fascinating but complex world of inter-organizational relations by zooming in on the relation between regional organizations and the UN. It analyzes the intervention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Libya in March 2011 through a PA lens, including its impact on the Syrian dossier.

Holding Accountable UN-Authorized Enforcement Operations: Tracing Accountability Mechanisms

ABSTRACT Is the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) capable and willing to hold accountable the forces which it authorizes? Although it is an often-voiced recommendation that the UNSC should step up its accountability efforts, such as by installing more strict reporting requirements to avoid mission creep, evaluations of the effectiveness thereof remain largely absent. This article suggests that a combination of process-tracing methods with insights from principal–agent theorization allows for systematically evaluating the UNSC’s efforts and capacity to hold accountable non-UN-led forces which it authorizes with a forceful mandate. Such an approach makes it possible to evaluate the causal relevance of particular accountability mechanisms, including reporting requirements, for avoiding mission creep. This is illustrated by an analysis of the NATO-led intervention in Libya of 2011. It is shown how a process-tracing assessment can lead to conclusions about the ineffectiveness of reporting requirements when a permanent member is involved in mandate implementation. The article concludes by calling for more systematic research into the importance of the implementer’s identity for explaining UNSC accountability efforts towards non-UN-led forces.

Book Review: Peace Operations (2nd Edition)Peace Operations (2nd Edition) by DiehlPaul F.BalasAlexandru. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014. 250pp., £15.99 (p/b), ISBN 9780745671819

In Machiavelli on International Relations, Marco Cesa has collected 60 excerpts from the writings of Machiavelli and organised them around key themes such as ‘survival and security’, ‘neutrality and alliances’ and ‘engaging in expansion’. The effect is to make the book analytically productive for two main reasons. First, by bringing together the corpus of Machiavelli’s literature on IR, it counterbalances the by and large neglect of Machiavelli by contemporary IR scholars. Second, Machiavelli’s distinctive dichotomies of domestic affairs/international affairs, ambition/fear and law/army demonstrate him to be a political innovator in the same way as Thucydides and Hobbes within Realist IR. For example, Machiavelli insightfully argued for an ‘offensive’ balance of power, since the world we live in is ‘anarchic’ with no central supranational governing power and since all states seek to maximise power. Sticking to the separation of politics and ethics, the book shows how Machiavelli contended that a state should use all means to maintain itself, including territorial expansion and breaking promises to other states. Cesa has avoided one of the major difficulties usually faced by contemporary readers of Machiavelli in that the latter’s illustrations of events related to the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and also included his observations drawn from his role as a diplomat for the Florentine Republic. To overcome this, the book has a 31-page introduction explaining the context of these writings. These explanations do not simply contextualise Machiavelli’s uncanny political observations, which reflected the political climate of his time, but if anything, they also show how relevant and applicable these perceptions are nowadays. Cesa also avoids another pitfall encountered by many students of politics, in that he depends less on the main works such as The Prince and Discourses and instead digs deeper into other pieces of Machiavellian literature such as the Art of War and the Legations as well as his letters of correspondence with colleagues and friends. The latter prove valuable not only by adding colour and a varied flavour but also by reinforcing how practical Machiavelli was. Nevertheless, given that Ceva began his book with an introduction expounding Machiavelli’s concepts, he could have ended his work with a more critical conclusion, for example, demonstrating the contradictions that grow out of Machiavelli’s dualism of power and justice, and how these attempts to reconcile power externally and justice internally for the same state sometimes leave Machiavelli’s thought uncomprehending and incomprehensive – which is the opposite of what the book as a whole seeks to portray.

The Ashgate Research Companion to Regionalisms by Timothy M. Shaw, J. Andrew Grant and Scarlett Cornelissen (eds). Farnham: Ashgate, 2012. 404pp., £85.00, ISBN 978 0 7546 7762 8

image warfare, Roger provides three conceptual terms. ‘Image munitions’ refers to images that are deployed as part of a strategic arsenal by political actors with the intention of achieving a strategic advantage over the enemy. These are responded to with ‘counter-image munitions’ that are used in order to shift attention away from, and replace, an opponent’s message. In turn, these munitions are reused and redeployed by actors who adapt their meaning for different political purposes in ‘remediation battles’. This conceptual framework is then explored in relation to four thematic case studies of political communications, suicides, executions and abuses in the War on Terror. This book is successful in providing an innovative analysis of images in the War on Terror. Particularly intuitive is Roger’s drawing together insights from visual culture and media studies to the field of security studies. Unlike other work that addresses issues of aesthetics and security, Roger’s conceptual framework is clear and easily applicable to themes, events and issues beyond those in his book. Roger’s argument that image warfare has replaced techno-war as the main paradigm of contemporary conflict will inevitably be contested. However, even if this isn’t the case, he persuasively highlights how images have been incredibly important in the War on Terror. By exploring a diverse range of images such as the official political communications of George W. Bush and Tony Blair, the 7/7 suicide attack video-wills and the abuse images of Abu Ghraib, this book provides an insightful analysis of the War on Terror that helps make sense of the impact of images in an age of rhizomatic media. This book will be interesting and, indeed, useful for students and researchers at all levels who are interested in the intersections of global politics, media, security and foreign policy.