Tim Haesebrouck

NATO Burden Sharing in Libya: A Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis

This study aims to explain the pattern of contributions to NATO’s military campaign in Libya. It combines collective action theory with hypotheses on balance of threat, alliance politics, and domestic constraints in a multicausal framework, which is tested with qualitative comparative analysis. The results suggest novel inferences on the interactions between partisan politics, and the benefits states wish to secure by contributing to a multilateral operation. Contrary to conventional wisdom, parties situated at the left of the ideological spectrum were more inclined to support Operation Unified Protector than parties situated at the right. Whereas left-wing governments participated if they had the resources to contribute significantly to the fulfillment of the protection mandate and either highly valued their alliance with the United States or were not facing imminent elections, right-wing governments only contributed if their countries’ interests were threatened by the crisis in Libya or their participation was critical for the operation’s success.

Fractured politics? The comparative regulation of shale gas in Europe

ABSTRACT European countries have developed strikingly different responses to shale gas and fracking. Some have imposed outright bans, while others have issued permits and even awarded generous tax breaks to the industry. To explain this puzzling variance, this article builds a theoretical framework that focuses on energy security, economic competitiveness, the party composition of government, public opinion, multilevel governance and democratic tradition. It then conducts a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) of the regulation of shale gas in 16 European Union member countries. We find that the level of public concern is a sufficient condition for restrictive regulation. Other conditions only work in combination with others, while energy security and democratic tradition have no impact on the regulation of shale gas and fracking. The findings indicate that the uptake of shale gas is not simply a function of structural factors such as geology or population density, but rather the result of political factors.

Parliamentary involvement, party ideology and majority-opposition bargaining: Belgian participation in multinational military operations

ABSTRACT This article examines the impact of parliamentary involvement in troop deployment decisions on restrictions on military mandates by examining the Belgian contribution to the 2011 Libya intervention and the coalition against the self-proclaimed Islamic State. More specifically, we analyse (1) the effect of party ideology on mandate preferences, and (2) the impact of bargaining between majority and opposition parties on the outcome of mandate negotiations. Our case study demonstrates that left-wing parties show a strong inclination toward imposing restrictions on the use of military force beyond humanitarian goals, while right-wing preferences tend to depend on the national interests at stake in the operation. With regard to majority-opposition bargaining, our study shows that the impact of opposition parties is dependent on the degree of contention between government and opposition parties, as well as on the extent to which the executive needs to seek support across its own majority.

Burden Sharing in CSDP Military Operations

Abstract Military burden sharing has been a subject of repeated debates in NATO and the UN. Despite more modest goals, the European Union’s (EU) Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) has experienced no fewer difficulties in garnering men, money, and materiel. While this may not come as a surprise, the fact that some EU member states have carried disproportionate shares of the burden of CSDP operations is a puzzle that remains unaccounted for. We address this gap by analyzing determinants of contribution levels to CSDP operations. In employing an innovative multi-method design that combines insights from collection action theory with those from integrated theories of military burden sharing, our results indicate that EU countries tend to contribute in positive disproportion with their capabilities when they have a strong peacekeeping tradition and elections are distant. In contrast, they undercontribute when small trade volumes with the area of operations combine with a weak peacekeeping tradition.

EU member state participation in military operations: a configurational comparative analysis

Abstract Contrary to what the EU’s image as a civilian power suggests, the EU member states have had 50,000–100,000 troops deployed outside their home countries for most of the post-Cold-War period. Although the vast majority of these troops were active in operations with a strong European presence, the member states’ patterns of military engagement differ significantly. This study provides a systematic analysis of the member states’ contributions to military operations. More specifically, it examines which (combinations of) conditions consistently led to participation in EUFOR Congo, UNIFIL II, EUFOR Chad, the 2011 military intervention in Libya and the air strikes against the Islamic State. Methodologically, it builds on most different similar outcome/most similar different outcome and qualitative comparative analysis. The results of the analysis show that four conditions account for the bulk of the member states’ patterns of military engagements: military resources, competing deployments, UN peacekeeping tradition and regional trade.

National behaviour in multilateral military operations

What accounts for the diverging contributions to multinational military operations? Over two decades ago, Bennett, Lepgold and Unger published a seminal study that aimed to explain the division of the burdens of the Desert Storm Coalition. This article reviews four recent monographs on national behaviour in multinational operations against the backdrop of their conclusions. While the four reviewed titles suggest that the bulk of the conclusions of Bennett, Lepgold and Unger’s study hold beyond the scope of the Desert Storm Coalition, each of them also makes a distinct contribution to the literature. Baltrusaitis offers three excellent case studies on burden sharing in the 2003 Iraq War, Davidson provides essential insights on the impact of alliance value and threat and the studies of Auerswald and Saideman and Mello invoke important domestic variables that were not structurally examined by Bennett, Lepgold and Unger. Altogether, the reviewed titles provide convincing explanations for the behaviour of democratic states in US-led operations. Consequently, the article concludes by arguing that the most promising avenue for future research would be to focus on military operations in which the United States has a more limited role and on the contributions of non-democratic states to multinational operations. Auerswald DP and Saideman SM (2014) NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Baltrusaitis DF (2010) Coalition Politics and the Iraq War: Determinants of Choice. Boulder, CO: First Forum Press. Davidson J (2011) America’s Allies and War: Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Mello P (2014) Democratic Participation in Armed Conflict Military Involvement in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.