Yoel Guzansky

Israel and the Arab Gulf states: from tacit cooperation to reconciliation?

The Gulf states have preferred to adhere to the basic Arab position vis-à-vis Israel, albeit supplementing such positions with their own, sometimes significant, adjustments. However the common threat from Iran has become a source of rapprochement between them and Israel, even if the establishment of ‘normal relations’ remains dependent on progress in the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians, Arab consensus and GCC politics. The two sides, each with their own logic, seem to prefer to maintain a dual policy that on the one hand accepts the lack of normalization but on the other hand maintains active, albeit tacit, ties.

Israel’s relations with the Gulf states: Toward the emergence of a tacit security regime?

ABSTRACT By drawing on the literature about security regimes, this article posits the idea that a particular type of regime, which can be termed a “tacit security regime” (TSR), has begun to emerge between Israel, on the one hand, and several Gulf Arab states, on the other. It is a regime which, unlike liberal institutional variants that attempt to privilege the promotion of collective norms, remains configured around perceptions of threats to be countered and strategic interests to be realized. By examining the development, scope, and scale of this nascent TSR, this article explores the extent to which Israel, mindful of Washington, DC’s regional retrenchment, sees the emergence of such a regime as redefining the political and strategic contours of Israel’s relations with much of the Middle East.

The Rational Limitations of a Nonconventional Deterrence Regime: The Iranian Case

The question of how to measure a states rationality and compatibility with deterrence must be confronted in order to address the broader theoretical discussion concerning the credibility and effectiveness of deterrence. This article broadens Janice Steins three-condition model of potential constraints of deterrence as a theory and a strategy. It then applies this revised model as a means of identifying potential obstacles to a future nonconventional deterrence regime with Iran, concluding with an assessment as to whether this analysis can support the argument that such a future deterrence regime would be stable.

The Other “Gulf” State: Yemen

“At the eve of the fourth year of unrest and instability in the Middle East, Yemen is on the verge of the abyss. Elite power struggles, sectarian rebellions, tribal clashes, spreading separatism, and Islamic fundamentalist terrorism in the country have combined to create a chaotic reality in which alliance formations and lines of confrontations change regularly and at a feverish pace. The intensification of the Houthi Rebellion in late 2014 has bolstered the sectarian dimension of the country’s internal clash. While the eyes of the international community remain focused on the struggle against the “Islamic State” organization, a challenge with local and international implications continues to intensify on the doorsteps of Yemen’s neighbors and the countries of the West. The primary concern has to do with the possible collapse of the Yemeni state, which is located in close proximity to the oil producers of the Persian Gulf and major shipping routes.

Introduction: Defensive Monarchies

This book will discuss Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf states, the threats with which they must contend, and the manner in which they are choosing to do so. While the focus of this analysis will revolve around the relations of these Arab Gulf states with Iran, a country that has played a central role in their threat perception since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, this research will also consider the relations with each other and with the United States, and the effect of other regional events and forces that impact considerations, chief among them the Arab Upheavals.

The Gulf Cooperation Council: From Cooperation to Unity?

The turmoil in the Arab world and the escalating struggle with Iran has resulted in GCC attempts to inoculate themselves against potential risks and to strengthen their legitimacy. This process includes a Saudiled initiative to transform the organization into a more unified body. Efforts to date have proven unpopular among some of the other Gulf states, who worry about Riyadh’s intentions, suggesting that it may be an overly ambitious endeavor. This in turn punctures the veneer of unity created by the “Arab Spring” and manifested, inter alia, in the shared opposition to Qaddafi and Assad.

The United Arab Emirates

The UAE has significant relations with Iran that are precipitated by their vast commercial ties. However, these relations are complicated by a long-standing territorial dispute between the two countries. Since the intensifying of sanctions on Iran, the UAE has been compelled to lessen its cooperation with the Islamic Republic. The Emirate of Dubai has been one of the main points of Iranian commercial activity prohibited by sanctions. In the wake of Dubai’s economic bail out, though, the Emirate was leveraged into fuller compliance with the international sanctions on Iran. While this has diminished ties between the UAE and Iran, the Iranian business community continues to use its neighbor to evade sanctions.

Conclusion: The Rising Gulf

The Gulf is a major front for addressing the dangers that can be expected to affect the future of the Middle East and beyond. The emerging trends there will increase its importance as a theater of events critical to global security, stability, and prosperity. So far, the capability of the Gulf regimes, to cope with the regional turmoil, along with the relative weakening of traditional Arab political centers has helped to turn the Gulf states into the most stable and influential forces in the Arab world. However, it also intensifies competition among them for influence and prestige that undermines efforts toward increased cooperation.

Defense Cooperation in the GCC

The Arab Gulf states have systematically worked to tighten their cooperation in various fields. However, progress toward increased defense collaboration continues to be slow due to a number of factors including fear of angering neighboring countries, particularly Iran; protecting state sovereignty; and reliance on other forms of defense, such as national militaries and foreign allies. The history of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) shows that when its member states face serious external threats, their disagreements are often sidelined in order to promote a more visible unified front. Nevertheless, past experience also indicates, such efforts may be held hostage by inner-GCC rivalries and therefore make only marginal contributions to security in the Gulf.

The Changing Dynamic of American-GCC Relations

In spite of the Gulf states’ dependence on external support, in particular that of the United States, they have begun to question Washington’s willingness to guarantee their security and provide political reinforcement. This is a direct result of US policy toward America’s Arab allies during the “Arab Spring” toward Syria, and the possible rapprochement between Iran and the United States. These doubts are liable to affect the willingness of the Gulf states to tow America’s line in the region. The sense among some of the Gulf elite is that, while no good alternative to the United States’ military power exists, particularly as a counterweight to Iran’s growing strength, America’s steadfastness in the region is in question.