Yoko Nagase

Waste Management Regulation: Policy Solutions and Policy Shortcomings

A model of packaging waste management is presented to explore the policy options available to governments to implement waste regulation in light of the Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR). Our model endogenizes the packaging design as an additional determinant for the overall amount of waste jointly with consumers’ sorting effort and producers’ output decisions. The model shows that the policies that yield the first-best allocation may not find public support. Furthermore, if the set of available policy instruments is limited, production and consumption of the good is likely to settle on a sub-optimal level even though the optimal allocation may be achievable. Finally, the model demonstrates that a landfill tax may actually increase landfill waste in the presence of tradable credits for recycling activities. The results shed light on some shortcomings of existing regulatory schemes such as the Producer Responsibility Obligations (Packaging Waste) Regulations of the UK.

BANKING UNION IN EUROPE: HOW MUCH CENTRALISATION IS NEEDED?

We examine the efficiency of banking regulation in a federation with two tiers of government and highly integrated banking systems. We assume that policy makers have incomplete information about banks’ true health, and banking sector turmoil can generate cross†border spill†over effects. We show that, in such an environment, the decentralisation of policy responsibilities for the regulation of banks can achieve the first†best allocation and ensure financial stability. While national governments design banking regulations, the federal policy maker authorises inter†regional income redistribution payments throughout the federation. Our results suggest that strengthening national responsibilities in banking regulation and supervision in the course of the further development of the European banking union may be advisable.

The social valuation of income: a survey approach

Purpose - – The purpose of this paper is to estimate survey-based values of the elasticity of marginal social valuation of income, an important welfare parameter in cost-benefit analysis. Design/methodology/approach - – A model relating equity welfare weights to income is developed, and iso-elasticity of marginal valuation of income is tested using survey data obtained from a sample of Turkish politicians who are instrumental in policy making. Findings - – Based on the survey feedback, formal statistical testing indicates that Turkish politicians, regardless of party allegiance, reveal preferences consistent with an iso-elastic marginal social valuation of income. The estimated value of the elasticity measure is close to unity for each of the political parties. Originality/value - – The originality of the paper is in terms of the survey method used to obtain from Turkish politicians estimates of the marginal social valuation of income. This welfare parameter is needed in the calculation of both social discount rates and welfare weights. The paper will be of interest to academics in the field of welfare economics as well as to practitioners involved in the appraisal of social projects and policies.