Yoshinobu Kumata

EVALUATING TWO-STAGE VOTING SYSTEMS IN MAYORAL ELECTION:A SIMULATION

It cannot be assumed a priori that the number of candidates to beselected in the first stage of two-stage votingsystems should be two. This optimality, however, is shown by Fishburn(1976)by comparing the results of the two-stage voting with those of the simple malority voting, i. e., the pair comparison rule. This paper shows the same conclusion through computer simulation, with another framework for evaluating election, and indicates that the performance of two-stage voting systems is better than that of one-stage voting systems.

THE EFFECT OF VOTERS' PREFERENCE STRUCTURE APPEARED THROUGH MAYOR'S ELECTION ON THE TRAJECTRY OF THE STATE OF SOCIAL SYSTEM

Policy-making and -execution by representatives make a great impact on social system. If inappropriate representatives are elected and unsuitable policies are executecd, unreasonable social impact and enormous social cost will be produced. Scientific knowledge on the way of electing representatives are now desired. Most mayors seems to be re-elected if they want. Some mayors, however, fail and new mayors win in some cities. This paper aims to analyse relation between change of mayors and voters preference structure. A conceptual model of mayors election is built so as to analyse the effect of voters preference structure on the state of social system. Computer simulation shows the results:a mayor elected is changed more often and the state of social system becomes more unstable as the preference structure of voters changes from Goal-Realization-Oriented to Policy-Attitude-Oriented. Hotellings Theorem(Median Voters Theorem)is shown as a special case by the simulation.