Yoshitomo Ogawa

Optimal Tariffs Under a Revenue Constraint

This paper examines the optimal tariff structure under a revenue constraint. When a fixed level of tax revenue has to be collected from the tariff alone, no adjustment in tariff rates can achieve an efficient resource allocation, even in a small open economy. Hence, the optimal tariff problem arises under a revenue constraint. We show that the revenue-constrained optimal tariff structure is characterized by the following two rules: (i) the optimal tariff rate is lower for the import good that is a closer substitute for the export good, and (ii) the stronger the cross-substitutability between imports, the closer the optimal tariff is to uniformity. This provides a theoretical explanation for the finding in empirical studies that the efficiency loss from a uniform tariff structure is negligible.

The Byrd Amendment as Facilitating a Tacit International Business Collusion

We analyze the effect of the Byrd Amendment, which amended the US Tariff Act of 1930 to allow revenue from antidumping duties to be distributed to domestic import-competing firms. In an international duopoly framework it is shown that it urges the home firm to restrict output so that the foreign firm increases output and that revenue from the duties increases. Consequently, not only the home firm but also the foreign firm can be better off while only consumers are worse off. Home total surplus increases if the foreign rival firm is much more efficient, but otherwise decreases.

The Welfare Effects of Differential Tariff Rates

This paper considers a two-country, three-good economy in which one country imposes tariffs on import goods at a uniform rate, while the other country engages in free trade. In such an economy, we examine the welfare effects of changing tariff rates toward differential tariffs from uniform tariffs.

Tariffs Versus Production Subsidies as Industry Protection

This paper provides a welfare comparison of a tariff with a combination of a production subsidy to, and a commodity tax on, an import-competing commodity in a two-country economy. We treat some plausible situations of industry protection, including where the initial tariff is above the optimal tariff, where a certain output level of a tariff-imposed commodity must be maintained, and where there is positive externality of its domestic production. In those cases we explore the optimal combination of the production subsidy and the commodity tax and show it to be superior to the tariff from the welfare viewpoint.

The Structure of Optimal Tariff Rates under Retaliation

This paper examines theoretically the structure of optimal (Nash equilibrium) tariff rates under retaliation in a two-country economy with more than two traded goods. We provide a condition under which the equilibrium tariff rates become uniform in both countries, and explore the ranking of the equilibrium tariff rates in each country when the uniform tariff condition is not satisfied. The elasticities of compensated excess demands for goods play an important role in determining the ranking of the equilibrium tariff rates. This paper undertakes the analysis using a dual approach.