Zakary L. Tormala

Thought confidence as a determinant of persuasion: The self-validation hypothesis

Previous research in the domain of attitude change has described 2 primary dimensions of thinking that impact persuasion processes and outcomes: the extent (amount) of thinking and the direction (valence) of issue-relevant thought. The authors examined the possibility that another, more meta-cognitive aspect of thinking is also important-the degree of confidence people have in their own thoughts. Four studies test the notion that thought confidence affects the extent of persuasion. When positive thoughts dominate in response to a message, increasing confidence in those thoughts increases persuasion, but when negative thoughts dominate, increasing confidence decreases persuasion. In addition, using self-reported and manipulated thought confidence in separate studies, the authors provide evidence that the magnitude of the attitude-thought relationship depends on the confidence people have in their thoughts. Finally, the authors also show that these self-validation effects are most likely in situations that foster high amounts of information processing activity.

What doesn't kill me makes me stronger: the effects of resisting persuasion on attitude certainty.

The present research proposes a metacognitive framework for understanding resistance to persuasion. It is suggested that when people resist persuasion, they can become more certain of their initial attitudes. Several experiments demonstrated that when participants resisted persuasion, attitude certainty increased, but only when the attack was believed to be strong. For attacks believed to be weak, certainty was unchanged. It was also demonstrated that attitude certainty only increased when people actually perceived that persuasion had been resisted. This increased certainty was shown to have implications for resistance to subsequent attacks and the correspondence between attitudes and behavioral intentions. These findings suggest that when people perceive their own resistance, they form inferences about their attitudes that adjust for situational factors.

Implicit Ambivalence From Attitude Change: An Exploration of the PAST Model

Traditional models of attitude change have assumed that when people appear to have changed their attitudes in response to new information, their old attitudes disappear and no longer have any impact. The present research suggests that when attitudes change, the old attitude can remain in memory and influence subsequent behavior. Four experiments are reported in which initial attitudes were created and then changed (or not) with new information. In each study, the authors demonstrate that when people undergo attitude change, their old and new attitudes can interact to produce evaluative responses consistent with a state of implicit ambivalence. In Study 1, individuals whose attitudes changed were more neutral on a measure of automatic evaluation. In Study 2, attitude change led people to show less confidence on an implicit but not an explicit measure. In Studies 3 and 4, people whose attitudes changed engaged in greater processing of attitude-relevant information than did individuals whose attitudes were not changed.

Self-Validation of Cognitive Responses to Advertisements

Two studies tested the notion that the confidence consumers have in their cognitive responses to an ad can increase or decrease the favorability of product attitudes. Increasing confidence in positive thoughts enhanced advertisement effectiveness. Increasing confidence in negative thoughts reduced advertisement effectiveness. These self-validation effects occurred regardless of the type of product and regardless of whether thought confidence was measured or induced through an experimental manipulation. The present research also demonstrated that source credibility can influence consumer attitudes by affecting thought confidence. Finally, thought confidence was distinguished from other potentially related thought dimensions. Antecedents, moderators, and consequences of self-validation effects are described.

Unpacking attitude certainty: Attitude clarity and attitude correctness

Attitude certainty has been the subject of considerable attention in the attitudes and persuasion literature. The present research identifies 2 aspects of attitude certainty and provides evidence for the distinctness of the constructs. Specifically, it is proposed that attitude certainty can be conceptualized, and empirically separated, in terms of attitude clarity (the subjective sense that one knows what ones attitude is) and attitude correctness (the subjective sense that ones attitude is correct or valid). Experiment 1 uses factor analysis and correlational data to provide evidence for viewing attitude clarity and attitude correctness as separate constructs. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrate that attitude clarity and attitude correctness can have distinct antecedents (repeated expression and consensus feedback, respectively). Experiment 4 reveals that these constructs each play an independent role in persuasion and resistance situations. As clarity and correctness increase, attitudes become more resistant to counterattitudinal persuasive messages. These findings are discussed in relation to the existing attitude strength literature.

Resistance to Persuasion and Attitude Certainty: The Moderating Role of Elaboration

Recent research (Tormala & Petty, 2002) has demonstrated that when people resist persuasive attacks, they can under specifiable conditions become more certain of their initial attitudes. The present research explores the role of elaboration in determining when this effect will occur. Using both self-reported differences in situational elaboration (Study 1) and chronic individual differences in the need for cognition (Study 2), it is demonstrated that resisting persuasion increases attitude certainty primarily when elaboration is high. When elaboration is low, resisting persuasion does not appear to impact attitude certainty. These findings shed light on the role of metacognitive factors in resistance to persuasion, pinpointing the conditions under which these factors come into play.

Resisting Persuasion by the Skin of One's Teeth: The Hidden Success of Resisted Persuasive Messages

Recent research has suggested that when people resist persuasion they can perceive this resistance and, under specifiable conditions, become more certain of their initial attitudes (e.g., Z. L. Tormala & R. E. Petty, 2002). Within the same metacognitive framework, the present research provides evidence for the opposite phenomenon--that is, when people resist persuasion, they sometimes become less certain of their initial attitudes. Four experiments demonstrate that when people perceive that they have done a poor job resisting persuasion (e.g., they believe they generated weak arguments against a persuasive message), they lose attitude certainty, show reduced attitude-behavioral intention correspondence, and become more vulnerable to subsequent persuasive attacks. These findings suggest that resisted persuasive attacks can sometimes have a hidden yet important success by reducing the strength of the target attitude.

Ease of Retrieval Effects in Social Judgment: The Role of Unrequested Cognitions

The present research explores a new mechanism for ease of retrieval effects in social judgment. It is suggested that in the most common ease of retrieval paradigm, when it is difficult for people to generate or retrieve the specific type of cognition requested (e.g., positive thoughts about an issue or memories of assertive behavior), they are more likely to spontaneously generate or retrieve unrequested cognitions (e.g., negative thoughts about the issue or memories of unassertive behavior), and the presence of these unrequested cognitions can affect social judgment. In 4 experiments, participants were asked to generate a high (difficult) or low (easy) number of cognitions in a given direction. Across experiments, when participants were asked to generate a high number of cognitions, they also had more unrequested cognitions, and these unrequested cognitions played a mediating role in the ease of retrieval effect on judgment. In the 3rd and 4th experiments, this mechanism was found to be independent of previously identified mediators.

Individual differences in resistance to persuasion: The role of beliefs and meta-beliefs

Contents: Foreword. Part I: Introduction. E.S. Knowles, J.A. Linn, The Importance of Resistance to Persuasion. Part II: Nature of Resistance in Persuasion. D.T. Wegener, R.E. Petty, N.D. Smoak, L.R. Fabrigar, Multiple Routes to Resisting Attitude Change. K. Fuegen, J.W. Brehm, The Intensity of Affect and Resistance to Social Influence. Z.L. Tormala, R.E. Petty, Resisting Persuasion and Attitude Certainty: A Meta-Cognitive Analysis. P. Brinol, D.D. Rucker, Z.L. Tormala, R.E. Petty, Individual Differences in Resistance to Persuasion: The Role of Beliefs and Meta-Beliefs. R.J. Shakarchi, C.P. Haugtvedt, Differentiating Individual Differences in Resistance to Persuasion. Part III: Strategies for Overcoming Resistance. E.S. Knowles, J.A. Linn, Approach-Avoidance Model of Persuasion: Alpha and Omega Strategies for Change. S.J. Sherman, M.T. Crawford, A.R. McConnell, Looking Ahead as a Technique to Reduce Resistance to Persuasive Attempts. S. Dal Cin, M.P. Zanna, G.T. Fong, Narrative Persuasion and Overcoming Resistance. J.M. Quinn, W. Wood, Forewarnings of Influence Appeals: Inducing Resistance and Acceptance. B.T. Johnson, A. Smith-McLallen, L.A. Killeya, K.D. Levin, Truth or Consequences: Overcoming Resistance to Persuasion With Positive Thinking. J.Z. Jacks, M.E. OBrien, Decreasing Resistance by Affirming the Self. B.J. Sagarin, R.B. Cialdini, Creating Critical Consumers: Motivating Receptivity by Teaching Resistance. C.P. Haugtvedt, R.J. Shakarchi, B.M. Samuelsen, K. Liu, Consumer Psychology and Attitude Change. Part IV: Conclusion. E.S. Knowles, J.A. Linn, The Promise and Future of Resistance and Persuasion.

Assimilation and Contrast in Persuasion The Effects of Source Credibility in Multiple Message Situations

The present research explores a contextual perspective on persuasion in multiple message situations. It is proposed that when people receive persuasive messages, the effects of those messages are influenced by other messages to which people recently have been exposed. In two experiments, participants received a target persuasive message from a moderately credible source. Immediately before this message, participants received another message, on a different topic, from a source with high or low credibility. In Experiment 1, participants attitudes toward the target issue were more favorable after they had first been exposed to a different message from a low rather than high credibility source (contrast). In Experiment 2, this effect only emerged when a priming manipulation gave participants a dissimilarity mindset. When participants were primed with a similarity mindset, their attitudes toward the target issue were more favorable following a different message from a high rather than low credibility source (assimilation).