Zeynep K. Hansen

The Political Economy of Truth‐in‐Advertising Regulation during the Progressive Era

This paper explores the origins and effects of truth‐in‐advertising regulation during the Progressive Era. Was advertising regulation adopted in response to rent seeking on the part of firms that sought to limit the availability of advertising as a competitive device, or was advertising regulation desired because it furnished a mechanism through which firms could improve the credibility of advertising? We find the available evidence to be more consistent with the latter hypothesis.

The impact of group diversity on class performance: evidence from college classrooms

We combine class performance data from an undergraduate management course with students’ personal records to examine how group diversity affects group work performance and individual learning. Students are exogenously assigned to groups. We find that, on average, male-dominant groups performed worse in their group work and learned less (based on their grades in individually taken exams). This gender effect is highly significant in individual learning outcomes providing evidence that gender diversity is influential in the level and nature of knowledge transfers within groups. The results are robust to controlling for the team governance form, a unique feature in our study. Finally, racial diversity had no significant effect on group or individual performances.

A Multi-Dimensional View of Alliance Complexity and Value Division in Technology Sourcing Agreements

Most research on alliances ignores the structures of the underlying relationships as codified by contract. By overlooking these structures the complexity of the fundamental relationship is ignored. This is problematic since it is how these relationships are codified and how control rights are allocated that dictate how firms will benefit (or not) from an alliance. We present a novel method to analyze the determinants of alliance complexity in a multi-dimensional framework. We then look at the effect these same determinants have on the allocation of control rights between firms. From a transaction cost perspective we can begin to look at the cost/benefit of entering more (or less) complex agreements in terms of the allocation of rights (i.e., value appropriation). This approach provides a new framework in which to begin to think about the net effect alliance portfolios have on a firm.