Zuzana Murdoch

Measuring the ‘Bridging’ versus ‘Bonding’ Nature of Social Networks: A Proposal for Integrating Existing Measures

Recent research illustrates that two distinct interpretations and operationalizations of ‘bridging’ and ‘bonding’ social networks co-exist in the literature (based on links between diverse networks or between socio-economic groups within a given network, respectively), and that these do not coincide in empirical applications. The present contribution first confirms this conclusion using data from the United Kingdom. Then, we suggest a simple way to integrate both existing approaches into a more general measure of bridging and bonding. Applying this more general index to UK and Flemish data, a) provides stronger empirical support for the idea that memberships in bridging groups are more strongly linked to positive civic values than those in bonding ones, and b) shows that the extended index behaves more consistently across institutional settings (i.e. Flanders and the UK) than both underlying measures independently.

How to Make Head or Tail of 'Bridging' and 'Bonding'?: Addressing the Methodological Ambiguity

A distinction has recently been proposed between bridging (or encompassing) and bonding (or inward-looking) social networks. However, existing theoretical contributions remain vague as to the fundamental meaning of both concepts. As a consequence, two distinct interpretations have developed alongside each other. In the present paper, we employ data on voluntary association membership in Flanders to empirically illustrate that both approaches can lead to substantially different outcomes and therefore appear to tap into different dimensions of bridging versus bonding. These findings underline the problematic nature of the current conceptual ambiguity. We conclude that should the bridging/bonding distinction add meaningfully to our understanding of the external effects of social networks, it is essential to resolve the conceptual and methodological imprecision.

Contracted Government: Unveiling the European Commission’s Contracted Staff

Over the past two decades, reliance on short-term contracted staff has increased in government institutions across the Western world. This tendency towards ‘contracted government’ may be strengthened during periods of economic and financial stress. This article therefore poses the following questions: First, does ‘contracted government’ lead to civil servants less loyal and attentive to the concerns of ‘their’ government institutions? Secondly, and more generally, what factors shape the behavioural perceptions of contracted government staff? Benefiting from a new, full-scale survey among seconded national experts in the European Commission, this study shows that contracted Commission staff are largely integrated and committed to the Commission and its administrative sub-units. The general lesson learned is that when under contract, contracted personnel seem mainly loyal and attentive to the concerns of the government institution under which they formally serve. This finding dispels fears that contracted government officials may serve several masters. Theoretically, the behavioural perceptions of contracted Commission officials are explained with reference to their primary organisational affiliation towards the Commission and its sub-units, as well as by the internal organisational composition of the Commission services.

On Trojan Horses and revolving doors: Assessing the autonomy of national officials in the European Commission

National officials working in international bureaucracies regularly invoke the fear that member states strategically use such officials for influencing decision making and agenda-setting to their advantage. This article theoretically analyses conditions under which the autonomy of national civil servants in international bureaucracies might become compromised. The ensuing predictions are then tested using a unique survey among seconded national experts (SNEs) in the European Commission (N ≈ 400). Finally, evaluating the characteristics linked to reduced autonomy among SNEs in the Commission, the article illustrates that these officials are, in practice, likely to be relatively independent from member state influence.

Institutional Dynamics in International Organizations: Lessons from the Recruitment Procedures of the European External Action Service

This article examines how organizational designs develop by proposing a novel theoretical framework that views organizational change as resulting from a dialectic process between interpretive agents. The key claim is that existing formal procedures (such as recruitment processes, our empirical focal point) are subject to involved actors’ interpretive efforts. This results in a bargaining situation based on the interpretations of the principal actors, which may induce a feedback loop whereby the original procedures are amended. The empirical relevance of the theoretical argument is illustrated via a case study of the hiring procedures in the European External Action Service.

Organization Theory and the Study of European Union Institutions: Lessons and Opportunities

Most scholarship in modern organization theory maintains a near-exclusive focus on private-sector settings. In contrast, this article argues that complex public-sector organizational systems – such as the European Union (EU) – can provide a very relevant laboratory to both fine-tune organization theoretical propositions and test them empirically. I first draw attention to the value-added of organization theory for the study of EU institutions. Then, I turn to these institutions’ capacity to present a springboard for theoretical development in organization theory, and bring forward a number of avenues for further research on the intersection of EU studies and organization theory that can push forward both research fields.

Administrative legitimacy and the democratic deficit of the European Union

ABSTRACT This article suggests a new concept of measurement for the EU’s oft-alleged democratic deficit based on two contributions. First, we turn attention to the administrative staff involved in policy-making rather than the (un)accountability of EUs’ parliamentarians and executive agents. Second, building on the idea that policy-makers’ legitimacy depends on the extent to which they can claim to represent some groups or social interests, we assess the extent to which Commission officials’ preferences reflect European citizens’ policy stance. Our results indicate a statistically significant positive correlation between the policy preferences of EU administrative staff and their home country population, which, we argue, can provide EU administrators a basic degree of legitimacy relative to their home country.

The Temporary Commission Bureaucrat

The current economic and financial crisis has hit the European economies and their national public finances hard. In their efforts toward budget consolidation, many EU member states are trying to cut administrative expenditure. As in earlier times of substantial (financial) strain, government institutions facing fiscal austerity may tend to initiate budget cuts thereby downsizing permanent staff and upsizing short-term contracted staff (Hall, 2002). This trend — referred to in this chapter as a shift toward ‘contracted government — follows one of the curative prescriptions of the New Public Management (NPM) reform wave and is designed to promote greater flexibility in, and performance of’, public services (Laegreid and Wise, 2007). Although this trend has been extensively studied for national-level bureaucracies (for example, Hall, 2002; Lagreid and Wise, 2007), contracted government above the state has thus far escaped comprehensive analysis. Moreover, whereas NPM-inspired reforms mainly concerned outsourcing government capacities toward the private sector, ‘contracted government’ involves outsourcing public servants that already are ‘good bureaucrats’ from one government institution to another. Based on novel survey data, this chapter of fers a comprehensive analysis of contracted government at actor level — that is, among seconded national experts (SNEs) — within the Commission.

The Advance of a European Executive Order in Foreign Policy? Recruitment Practices in the European External Action Service

Since its inception, the European Union has been almost permanently ‘under construction’ and, over the course of several decades, it has gradually extended its reach, both geographically (i.e., covering more countries) and substantively (i.e., covering more policy areas). Important structural and procedural changes within the different European institutions have also tended to increase its ability to act in a significant number of diverse policy areas (see e.g., Christiansen, 2002; Christiansen and Vanhoonacker, 2008; Kassim, 2006, 2010; Dijkstra, 2010). Since such ‘action capacities’ bolster European institutions’ abilities vis-a-vis member states in the struggle for power (Panebianco, 1988; Moe and Wilson, 1994), such developments have been interpreted as an expression of executive order formation at the European level (Trondal, 2012; Trondal and Peters, 2013), transcending the Westphalian order (Batora and Spence, introductory chapter of this volume).