Adam P. Liff

Racing toward Tragedy?: China's Rise, Military Competition in the Asia Pacific, and the Security Dilemma

In the post–Cold War period, scholars have considered the Asia Pacific to be ripe for military competition and conflict. Developments over the past decade have deepened these expectations. Across the region, rising military spending and efforts of various states to bolster their military capabilities appear to have created an increasingly volatile climate, along with potentially vicious cycles of mutual arming and rearming. In this context, claims that Chinas rapid economic growth and surging military spending are fomenting destabilizing arms races and security dilemmas are widespread. Such claims make for catchy headlines, yet they are rarely subject to rigorous empirical tests. Whether patterns of military competition in the Asia Pacific are in fact attributable to a security dilemma–based logic has important implications for international relations theory and foreign policy. The answer has direct consequences for how leaders can maximize the likelihood that peace and stability will prevail in this economically and strategically vital region. A systematic empirical test derived from influential theoretical scholarship on the security dilemma concept assesses the drivers of bilateral and multilateral frictions and military competition under way in the Asia Pacific. Security dilemma–driven competition appears to be an important contributor, yet the outcome is not structurally determined. Although this military competition could grow significantly in the near future, there are a number of available measures that could help to ameliorate or manage some of its worst aspects.

Cyberwar: A New ‘Absolute Weapon’? The Proliferation of Cyberwarfare Capabilities and Interstate War

Abstract This article examines the implications of the proliferation of cyberwarfare capabilities for the character and frequency of war. Consideration of strategic logic, perceptions, and bargaining dynamics finds that the size of the effect of the proliferation of cyberwarfare capabilities on the frequency of war will probably be relatively small. This effect will not be constant across all situations; in some cases the advent of cyberwarfare capabilities may decrease the likelihood of war. On the other hand, the use of computer network attack as a brute force weapon will probably become increasingly frequent.

Demystifying China's Defence Spending: Less Mysterious in the Aggregate

Chinas limited transparency concerning its defence spending harms strategic trust, but foreign analysts often lose sight of important realities. Specific details remain unclear, but Chinas defence spending overall is no mystery – it supports PLA modernization and personnel development as well as its announced objectives of securing Chinas homeland and asserting control over contested territorial and maritime claims, with a focus on the Near Seas (the Yellow, East, and South China seas). This article offers greater context and perspective for Chinese and Western discussions of Chinas rise and concomitant military build-up through a nuanced and comprehensive assessment of its defence spending and military transparency.

Japan's Defense Policy: Abe the Evolutionary

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s historic April visit to Washington capped the most significant two-year period in Japan’s defense reform in decades. Since his unlikely return as prime minister in December 2012, Abe has declared that “Japan is back,” expressed his desire for it to be a “first-tier” power, and sketched out an ambitious vision for a U.S.–Japan “Alliance of Hope.” With the April announcement of new Guidelines for U.S.–Japan Defense Cooperation and two major security bills currently under debate in Japan’s Diet, 2015 is already a historic year for Japanese defense policy and the U.S.–Japan alliance. To some, bold defense reforms under Abe make him Japan’s most transformative leader since post-WWII Occupation-era Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida. No doubt, the Abe administration’s accomplishments are many. Since December 2013, Japan has established a National Security Council and released its first-ever National Security Strategy, championing a new doctrine of “Proactive Contributions to Peace”; updated the seminal 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines; passed a controversial secrets protection law; and significantly revised a decades-old ban on arms exports. Last July, Abe’s Cabinet “reinterpreted” Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution to partially lift a longstanding, self-imposed prohibition on exercising the U.N.-sanctioned right to collective self-defense. These reforms have culminated in April’s Guidelines— the first update since 1997—and the now-pending slate of security legislation.

Whither the Balancers? The Case for a Methodological Reset

Post-Cold War, balancing theory has fallen on “hard times.” A question of crucial importance for 21st-century peace and stability concerns how Asia–Pacific secondary states are responding militarily to Chinas rise. Chinas rapid growth, military modernization, and controversial policies vis-à-vis contested space and territories on its periphery make it a prime candidate for counterbalancing behavior. Yet several recent studies claim that secondary states are accommodating, even bandwagoning with, Beijing. This study challenges these claims, attributing them largely to problematic research designs not uncommon in the wider balancing literature. It proposes a methodological corrective, arguing for widespread employment of an alternative analytical framework relying on clearer definitions and explicitly delineated sets of 21st-century-relevant metrics reflecting the myriad ways contemporary militaries enhance their capabilities in response to perceived threats. Applied systematically to original analysis of the contemporary Asia–Pacific, this framework uncovers what existing studies miss—evidence of practically significant and accelerating balancing against China.

Installing a Safety on the ‘Loaded Gun’? China’s institutional reforms, National Security Commission and Sino–Japanese crisis (in)stability

Abstract As China’s active assertion of its claim to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has increasingly crowded the surrounding waters and airspace with military and paramilitary forces, the risk of a Sino–Japanese crisis has reached unprecedented heights. Neither side wants conflict, but the increased frequency and proximity at which vessels and aircraft encounter one another means that overall risk has grown proportionately. Were a miscalculation or even an unintended low-level incident to occur, de-escalation would hinge on each side’s respective internal crisis management capabilities and political leaders’ ability to communicate expeditiously. This article analyzes China’s side of the ledger. Specifically, it assesses the extent to which institutional reforms since the 2001 US–China EP-3 crisis have ameliorated longstanding weaknesses in China’s crisis management capabilities and its ability to communicate via hotlines with Japan. While significant issues and obstacles to further urgently needed improvements remain, with the establishment of a Central National Security Commission (CNSC) and other recent reforms, Beijing may finally be achieving modest improvements. Bilaterally, however, no Sino–Japanese crisis hotline exists to date.

From management crisis to crisis management? Japan’s post-2012 institutional reforms and Sino-Japanese crisis (In)stability

ABSTRACT Since 2012, China’s assertion of its sovereignty claim to the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has significantly raised the risk of a potentially escalatory political-military crisis with Japan. As circumstances worsen, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has championed major institutional reforms aimed at centralizing Japanese security policy decision-making and vastly improving crisis management. This article assesses these reforms’ significance for ameliorating Japan’s long-standing internal crisis management weaknesses, and enhancing its ability to communicate with Beijing promptly under challenging conditions. While significant issues remain, recent developments – especially the establishment of Japan’s first-ever National Security Council – demonstrate significant progress. Bilaterally, however, important firebreaks remain conspicuously absent.

The Proliferation of Cyberwarfare Capabilities and Interstate War, Redux: Liff Responds to Junio

Timothy Junio’s response to Thomas Rid’s and my articles represents precisely the kind of progressive scholarship from which the nascent international relations/security studies literature on cyber-related issues stands to benefit. I thank him for the opportunity to respond to his critique, and I applaud the editors of this journal for their continuing support of scholarship related to the important topic of cyberwarfare. Junio’s response contains two major criticisms of my June 2012 article in this journal: First, he takes issue with an alleged contention that ‘cyber ‘‘war’’ has never happened and probably will not happen’. Second, he argues that a ‘central problem’ with my argument is that I ‘do not commit to a theoretical framework regarding the causes of war’. Below, I address each of these criticisms in turn.

China and the US Alliance System

In recent years, scholarship examining US and security allies’ responses to Chinas rapidly growing power and “assertive” policies towards its neighbours has proliferated. The English-language literature remains relatively one-sided, however. Crucial to understanding the complex forces driving strategic competition in the contemporary Asia-Pacific are comprehensive surveys of how Chinese views are evolving. This study draws extensively on Chinese sources to update existing scholarship, much of it two decades old, with a particular focus on recent Chinese reactions to major developments concerning the US-centred alliance system – a foundational element of the 65-year-old regional order. Beijing expresses deepening frustration towards, and even open opposition to, recent alliance strengthening, and instead champions alternative security architectures free of what it alleges to be “exclusive,” “zero-sum,” “Cold-war relic” US-centred alliances. Proposals for concrete pathways to operationalizing these abstract visions that take into account contemporary political and security realities (for example, North Korea), however, appear less forthcoming.

Japan’s National Security Council: Policy Coordination and Political Power

ABSTRACT In 2013, Japan established its first-ever National Security Council (NSC) as the leading edge of ambitious reforms to its foreign-policy-relevant institutions. Within weeks, Japan’s new national security tripod was firmly in place: the top-level, political NSC ‘control tower’ as well as Japan’s first-ever National Security Strategy and National Security Secretariat. Ever since, the NSC has played a central role in every major aspect of the Japanese strategic trajectory that has attracted so much global attention (and controversy) in the ‘Abe era’. This study analyzes the motivations driving Japan’s decision to establish an NSC, the institution’s key characteristics and functioning, and offers a preliminary assessment of the current and likely future implications of this historic institutional reform. Beyond the NSC’s impact on policy, of potentially greater long-term significance is its effects on Japan’s foreign-policy decision-making processes: in particular, expanded Kantei-centered political leadership of national security affairs and more ‘whole-of-government’ approaches specifically designed to transcend the ‘vertical hurdles’ traditionally dividing Japan’s powerful bureaucracies. The goal of these reforms is as straightforward as it is ambitious: to transform Japan’s ability to flexibly and independently cope with a rapidly changing, increasingly complex, and ever more uncertain security environment in East Asia and beyond.