David James Gill

Which depressed patients respond to ECT? The Nottingham results

The Nottingham electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) trial was designed with a simulated treatment group to test prospectively the power of delusions or agitation to predict response. The response of patients without retardation and without delusions was examined retrospectively as well because of doubts over the usefulness of ECT for this subgroup. Deluded/nondeluded and agitated/nonagitated subtypes responded significantly to real treatment. Neither delusions nor agitation predicted greater treatment response. Patients without retardation, with or without delusions responded to real ECT, supporting the continuing prescription of ECT for these patients as well.

Reconsidering the value of covert research: the role of ambiguous consent in participant observation

In this article, we provide a nuanced perspective on the benefits and costs of covert research. In particular, we illustrate the value of such an approach by focusing on covert participant observation. We posit that all observational studies sit along a continuum of consent, with few research projects being either fully overt or fully covert due to practical constraints and the ambiguous nature of consent itself. With reference to illustrative examples, we demonstrate that the study of deviant behaviors, secretive organizations and socially important topics is often only possible through substantially covert participant observation. To support further consideration of this method, we discuss different ethical perspectives and explore techniques to address the practical challenges of covert participant observation, including; gaining access, collecting data surreptitiously, reducing harm to participants, leaving the site of study and addressing ethical issues.

Britain and the bomb: nuclear diplomacy, 1964-1970

Drawing on primary sources from both sides of the Atlantic, Britain and the Bomb explores how economic, political, and strategic considerations have shaped British nuclear diplomacy. The book concentrates on Prime Minister Harold Wilsons first two terms of office, 1964-1970, which represent a critical period in international nuclear history. Wilsons commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and his support for continued investment in the British nuclear weapons program, despite serious economic and political challenges, established precedents that still influence policymakers today. The continued independence of Britains nuclear force, and the enduring absence of a German or European deterrent, certainly owes a debt to Wilsons handling of nuclear diplomacy more than four decades ago. Beyond highlighting the importance of this period, the book explains how and why British nuclear diplomacy evolved during Wilsons leadership. Cabinet discussions, financial crises, and international tensions encouraged a degree of flexibility in the pursuit of strategic independence and the creation of a non-proliferation treaty. Gill shows us that British nuclear diplomacy was a series of compromises, an intricate blend of political, economic, and strategic considerations.

The Ambiguities of Opposition: Economic Decline, International Cooperation, and Political Rivalry in the Nuclear Policies of the Labour Party, 1963–1964

This article explores the twenty-month period between Harold Wilson securing the leadership of the opposition in February 1963 and the General Election of October 1964. It considers how Wilson balanced his own approach to nuclear weapons with the demands of the party and broader international constraints. As the Leader of the Opposition principally sought to satisfy the needs of the party, which often came at the expense of a more conciliatory negotiating position with Washington. In private discussions with foreign officials, he vigorously contested any future commitments to nuclear sharing, and cast doubt on Britains future as a nuclear power. International pressures, however, eventually led the Leader of the Opposition to produce a number of subtle caveats to his negotiating position. In contrast to this private and more aggressive style of nuclear diplomacy, Wilsons public position was far more ambivalent and intentionally ambiguous. Claims that he could not make a final decision on the future of the Polaris programme, and thus nuclear sharing, until he was in power provided a convenient way to keep the party united without necessarily committing to cancellation. Wilsons criticisms of the Polaris programme also complemented the Labour Partys efforts to highlight the Conservative governments perceived mishandling of the national economy.

Ministers, Markets and Missiles: The British Government, the European Economic Community and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1964–68

Existing accounts of British efforts to achieve a nuclear non-proliferation treaty between 1964 and 1968 largely overlook the later stages of decision making within the Labour government. Scrutiny of previously classified sources reveals that a desire for entry into the European Economic Community had a much larger influence on the content and conduct of British non-proliferation policy than previously suggested. By 1967, Prime Minister Harold Wilson sought a secondary role in treaty negotiations, and left the running to the superpowers. This avoided unnecessary conflict with the countries of the Community, resentful of the Treatys discriminatory terms, and helped to protect Britains application to join the EEC. Although this bid was unsuccessful, ambitions for future membership continued to influence non-proliferation policy in 1968. Indeed, a desire for future entry into the EEC helps to explain why Britain became the first nuclear weapon state to ratify the Treaty.

Constructing Trustworthy Historical Narratives: Criteria, Principles, and Techniques

Organizational scholars increasingly recognize the value of employing historical research. Yet the fields of history and organization studies struggle to reconcile. In this article, we contend that a closer connection between these two fields is possible if organizational historians bring their role in the construction of historical narratives to the fore and open their research decisions up for discussion. We provide guidelines to support this endeavor, drawing on four criteria that are prevalent within interpretive organization studies for developing the trustworthiness of research: credibility, confirmability, dependability and transferability. In contrast to the traditional use of trustworthiness criteria to evaluate the quality of research, we advance the criteria to encourage historians to generate more transparent narratives. Such transparency allows others to comprehend and comment on the construction of narratives thereby building trust and understanding. We convert each criterion into a set of guiding principles to enhance the trustworthiness of historical research, pairing each principle with a practical technique gleaned from a range of disciplines within the social sciences to provide practical guidance.

Strength in Numbers: The Labour Government and the Size of the Polaris Force

Abstract Previous historical accounts have simplified the Labour governments decision to commission a four-boat strategic nuclear deterrent, or ‘Polaris force’, in early 1965. Utilising previously classified sources, this article shows that a number of key strategic concerns led the decision-making process. Nevertheless, broader economic and diplomatic considerations were also important in determining the size of the Polaris force. A tremendous balance of payments deficit and ongoing debates regarding levels of conventional and nuclear involvement in NATO certainly influenced the governments final decision. Moreover, competing strategic and economic interests resulted in continued debate throughout the decision-making process.

Harold Wilson's Cold War: the Labour government and East-West politics, 1964–1970

was more concerned with its human rights policy and geopolitical strategy as well as seeking to impose its will on Europe. The volume ends with some useful chapters on the renewed battle of ideas. While Oliver Bange offers new insights into German–German relations during the early 1980s, Laura Fasanaro and Duccio Bassosi together with Giovanni Bernardini do so regarding 1970s Eurocommunism in Italy. Given the diverse approaches and events, it is shame that no conclusion or epilogue is provided at the end of this volume. But considering its heterogeneity, it would most likely have proven a near-impossible task for the editor. Crucially, this book points to the complexities of the post-Helsinki era, as the world moved away from pure bipolarity and as new challenges and new actors were emerging that are still with us today. It is certain, then, that Nuti’s book offers its readers a first glance at cutting edge research on the late 1970s and early 1980s. It will be valuable to two kinds of readers: researchers, who will find that this volume will prompt them to ask many more questions and seek answers in multiple archives, and to students or scholars, who can learn immensely from some of these early insights now. In other words, Nuti’s conference proceedings should have a place on any university’s Cold War course reading list.