Adam William Chalmers

Trading information for access: informational lobbying strategies and interest group access to the European Union

Lobbying in the European Union (EU) is defined by an exchange of information: well-informed interest groups supply understaffed and pressed-for-time decision-makers with policy-relevant information for legitimate ‘access’ to the EU policy-making process. While we know quite a bit about the informational needs of decision-makers, an interest groups capacity to meet these needs remains relatively uncharted territory. This analysis examines the informational determinants of interest group access to the EU from a supply-side perspective; namely, how do different types of information and different tactics used to provide this information buy access to different EU decision-makers? Results from an empirical analysis indicate that information tactics are, on balance, more significant determinants of access than information types. The medium, in other words, is more important than the message. I also find that largely discredited ‘outside’ tactics, like organizing public events and launching media campaigns, are very important in granting interest groups access to EU decision-makers.

Interest organizations across economic sectors: explaining interest group density in the European Union

ABSTRACT The number of interest organizations (density) varies across policy domains, political issues and economic sectors. This shapes the nature and outcomes of interest representation. In this contribution, we explain the density of interest organizations per economic sector in the European Union on the basis of political and economic institutional factors. Focusing on business interest representation, we show that economic institutions structure the ‘supply’ of interest organizations by affecting the number of potential constituents, the resources available for lobbying and the geographical level of collective action of businesses. In contrast, we do not find consistent evidence that political institutions produce ‘demand’ for interest organizations by making laws, developing public policy or spending money. This is in contrast to the extensive evidence that such factors affect lobbying practices. The European Union interest system is (partially) shaped by economic factors, relatively independent from public policy or institutions.

Getting a Seat at the Table: Capital, Capture and Expert Groups in the European Union

European Commission expert groups provide powerful platforms from which interest organisations can steer the EU consultation process and weigh in on policy outcomes. Commission decision-makers and bureaucrats rely heavily on expert groups to provide expert policy advice on highly technical issues in the early stages of the policymaking process. Interest organisations provide this advice in order to have their voices heard at the EU level. But whose interests are being represented in these expert groups? Which types of interest organisations, in other words, get a seat at the table and why? This article, using data on over 800 expert groups and nearly 3,000 interest organisations, argues that expert group membership is largely a function of superior resources, EU-level interests and existing institutionalised ties to decision-makers. Far from simply addressing the Commission’s need for expertise, expert group membership is more a story of capital and capture.

Fiscal redistribution and public support for European integration

This article contributes to existing debates on public opinion toward European integration by examining when and why fiscal transfers and public support are systematically related. Drawing on economic and identity-related theories, we develop and test hypotheses about the links between European Union fiscal transfers among countries and subnational jurisdictions, and citizens’ support for European integration. Using a three-level analysis of residents in 143 regions in 16 European Union member states, we find a positive effect of European Union transfers among both countries and subnational jurisdictions on support for European integration among those with a European communal identity. We also find that this effect increases the more politically aware individuals are. The article sketches the broader implications of our findings for public opinion research on regional integration beyond the European Union.

With a lot of help from their friends: Explaining the social logic of informational lobbying in the European Union

This article examines the informational advantages of interest group networking strategies and how these relate to the provision of policy-relevant information to EU decision-makers. Interest groups obtain a great deal of policy-relevant information through their network connections. In particular, weak tie networks are strong in terms of information sharing among network members. Well-informed groups are best positioned to provide much needed information to EU decision-makers and to thus influence the EU policy-making process. Using original survey and interview data, this article tests the extent to which weak tie strategies help interest groups provide information to the Commission, Parliament and Council. A central finding of this article is that strong ties, rather than weak ties, grant the most important informational advantages.

Financial industry mobilisation and securities markets regulation in Europe

The 2007–2009 financial crisis has led to considerable debate about the role of financial industry actors in global regulatory processes. This article seeks to contribute to this debate by assessing when and why financial industry actors mobilise in order to influence securities markets regulations. Do these mobilisation patterns suggest undue influence by a small set of powerful industry actors, or do they reflect the engagement of a more diverse set of actors representing broader public interests? It is argued that variation in mobilisation patterns is a function of: (1) institutional opportunity (the openness and acces-sibility of regulatory politics); and (2) demonstration effects (how crises increase the salience of regulatory issues). Empirical analyses suggest that the financial crisis diminished the diversity of mobilising actors. This trend, however, is reversed when the news media disseminate information about the costs of weak financial regulation and thereby increase the salience of regulatory issues

In over their heads: Public consultation, administrative capacity and legislative duration in the European Union

What effect do online public consultations have on legislative duration in the European Union? While scholars are divided on whether consultations speed things up or slow things down, they agree that consultations affect how decision-makers think about legislative proposals. I argue that this is only part of the story: the impact of consultations on legislation duration is also a function of the administrative capacity of decision-makers and their staff to process consultation submissions. I test this argument using a unique data set of over 750 legislative proposals in the period 2009–2013. I find that consultations tend to have a negative impact on the time it takes to pass legislation. However, this negative effect is less pronounced when decision-makers have sufficient administrative capacity to process submissions.

Refiguring the European Union’s Historical Dimension

The European Union requires a stronger approach to social solidarity than has been offered in existing theory. Perhaps the exigency of this claim is nowhere more evident than in the recent failed referendums in France and the Netherlands. In both cases the narrow legal-economic sense of the EU won out over what was hoped to be an emerging European public sphere, indeed a shared sense of European identity rooted in history. This article asks what type of ‘history’ this identity requires. Approaching this problem from a theoretical perspective, I will outline why and how such a ‘history’ must accord with the existing limits set by post-and/or transnationalism itself. Second, I will question how well various attempts at writing such a ‘history’ have already managed in terms of these limits. Lastly, drawing on the current work of sociologist Ulrich Beck, I will put forward a theoretical alternative to the existing models.

Changing the Face of Advocacy? Explaining Interest Organizations’ Use of Social Media Strategies

Social media have increasingly been recognized as an important and effective tool for advocacy. A growing body of research examines the use of social media in grassroots and social movements as well as issues related to civic engagement, social capital, and voter turnout. The extent to which organized interest groups have adopted social media as an advocacy tool, however, has been relatively ignored. This article examines the determinants of the use of social media tools by a broad range of interest organizations. We argue that social media use needs to be understood as part of an interest organization’s larger set of news media lobbying strategies. We explain social media use as a function of two factors: first, the importance organizations place on trying to shape lobbying debates through the news media; second, the importance they place on shaping their public image via the news media. We test this argument using a unique data set of interest group advocacy in the European Union. Controlling for a host of competing explanations, regression results provide evidence supporting our central argument.

All spending is not equal: European Union public spending, policy feedback and citizens’ support for the EU

While public support is central to the problem-solving capacity of the European Union, we know little about when and why the EU can increase its citizens’ support through spending. Extensive research finds that citizens living in countries that are net beneficiaries of the EU budget are more supportive of the EU, assuming that citizens care equally about all forms of spending. It is argued in this article, however, that the amount of spending is only part of the story. Understanding the effects of spending on support requires a consideration of how transfers are spent. Drawing on policy feedback theories in comparative politics, it is shown that support for the EU is a function of the fit between the spending area and economic need in individuals’ immediate living context. Results from a statistical analysis of EU spending on human capital, infrastructure, agriculture, energy and environmental protection in 127 EU regions over the period 2001–2011 corroborate this argument. As the EU and other international organisations become increasingly publicly contested, the organisations themselves may increasingly try to shore up public support through spending, but they will only be successful under specific conditions.