Hans-Ferdinand Angel

Processes of believing — a review and conceptual account

Abstract Processes of believing are thought to have an important impact on the control of human behavior. Recently, neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies have shown that believe processes involve brain areas known to be involved in emotion-related and cognitive processing. But there is a discrepancy between the increasing interest in empirical research and the lack of coherent terminology and conceptualization. We will show that in processes of believing, the medial frontal cortex plays a critical role within a widespread cortico-subcortical network owing to its role in valuation of internal and external events and in subjective control of action. Also, we will describe a model of processes of believing that integrates the divergent neurophysiological and conceptual aspects as a starting point for further interdisciplinary research questions.

Psychology of religion and spirituality: meaning-making and processes of believing

For a long time, psychology of religion did not earn much scientific interest – at least not in Europe. The publication of the Handbook of the Psychology of Religion and Spirituality edited by Palo...

Credition: From the Question of Belief to the Question of Believing

This article will argue why belief can be seen as ill-defined phenomenon and highlight some especially problematic aspects of our understanding of belief. It will introduce into the discussion a fundamental change from a more static notion of belief to an understanding of believing as a fluent process. The term “credition” was conceived in order to serve as a bridge between different processes such as cognition, affection, functions of believing, belief development, and even evolution. Under the general term “credition,” we can reflect all verbrelated aspects of beliefs and belief systems. Finally the chapter will give insights in the “model of credition” which seems to represent the believing process.

The Theory of Credition and Philosophical Accounts of Belief: Looking for Common Ground

The nature and function of belief and the goal of believing have been central topics in Western philosophical and theological traditions since Antiquity. Basic questions have been asked, for instance, about the relationship between belief and knowledge, belief in God or gods, and the nature of believing itself. Is belief somehow inferior to knowledge, and how is it related to evidence? In this chapter, we introduce some historical and contemporary philosophical discussions about these issues and explore a number of ways in which the theory of credition could benefit from engaging with the philosophical literature on belief. We begin by looking at some historical and contemporary accounts of the relationship between belief and knowledge. After that, we address the perennial association of religion with belief. Finally, we conclude the chapter by making some preliminary suggestions as to how we could relate philosophical debates and discussions to the theory of creditions. We suggest that philosophy has much to give to the theory of credition and vice versa.

Violations of Expectations As Matter for the Believing Process

For the purpose of this communication it is postulated that violation of expectation means a disturbing event or conflict interfering with a previously established mental state that affords a firm belief or confident feeling. According to this hypothesis a violation of an expectation contradicts predictions and intentions that have been attained on stored experiences, valuations, and actual mood. We will argue that the notion of belief as static or stable which is usually described by expressions such as “my belief” or “our general belief” has to be extended to accommodate the process of belief formation. The credition model emphasizes the procedural aspect of belief by which the “process of believing” becomes similar to other psychological processes. We will describe that the “violation of expectation” can be decoded from the credition perspective and has brain functional correlates.

Soziale Nachhaltigkeit als Thema der Anthropologie

Wir Menschen sind als Akteurinnen und Akteure der Schlussel, wenn es darum geht, nachhaltige Entwicklung in unser Leben und Wirken zu integrieren. Dabei spielen Themen wie Existenzsicherung und die Befriedigung der menschlichen Bedurfnisse, Generationengerechtigkeit und sozialer Zusammenhalt – aber auch die Einflusse von Globalisierung und modernen Technologien auf die Gestaltung unseres individuellen Lebens – eine entscheidende Rolle. Wir werden gepragt von unseren Umwelten und determiniert von unseren (daraus entstehenden) Werten. Daher ist es das individuelle Glauben, welches das menschliche Handeln bestimmt und wodurch Fragen der Ethik, der Identitat und Kultur sowie der personlichen Werthaltungen zu uberaus unterschiedlichen Auffassungen in unserem Zugang zu Nachhaltigkeit fuhren. Losungsansatze beziehen sich auf verschiedene Perspektiven und Sichtweisen von sozialer Nachhaltigkeit, diese mussen sich auf die Erhaltung der menschlichen Lebensgrundlagen beziehen und nicht nur auf Effizienzstrategien, d. h. auf die Uberwindung sozialer Probleme durch technologische Innovationen, sondern insbesondere auf Suffizienzstrategien, d. h. auf die individuellen Verhaltensanderungen und damit das Verandern von Lebensstilen ausgerichtet sein – anthropologische Disziplinen wie die Philosophie, die Theologie und die Psychologie zeigen uns dabei durchaus neue Wege.

From Believing to Belief: A General Theoretical Model

Cognitive neuroscience research has begun to explore the mental processes underlying what a belief and what believing are. Recent evidence suggests that believing involves fundamental brain functions that result in meaningful probabilistic representations, called beliefs. When relatively stable, these beliefs allow for guidance of behavior in individuals and social groups. However, they are also fluid and can be modified by new relevant information, interpersonal contact, social pressure, and situational demands. We present a theoretical model of believing that can account for the formation of both empirically grounded and metaphysical beliefs.

Introduction: What We Do Not Know About Believing – Approaching a New Scientific Hot Spot

The human propensity to believe is one of the most fascinating phenomena of mankind. Since antiquity, philosophers have spent time and energy trying to understand how and why humans are touched and influenced by their beliefs. Nevertheless “belief” remains a strange phenomenon; it is both wanted and unwanted. Knowledge-based societies as well as either secular or strict religious worldviews can cast belief in a very negative light. Also, from a scientific point of view belief can be considered overly complex and heavily interwoven with religion. This chapter argues against the underestimation of the relevance of belief. It highlights the predominant use of the noun “belief” as one of the basic problems in both everyday speech and scientific research. But an understanding of belief that reduces it to only a noun is not sufficient. Beliefs are expressions and results of activities. This means that believing does not exist only as a noun, but also as a verb. We are active when we do what we call “to believe.” The chapter explains that we are at the crossroads of a change in perspective from examining “belief” to examining “believing”. This change will foster our understanding of the more fundamental “process of believing” and enable us to analyze the process of how believing works in the human mind. Thus, the chapter provides an overview of the book, which starts with two introductory chapters and clusters the following chapters according to scientific disciplines (“neuroscience,” “philosophy,” “theology, religious studies, and anthropology,” “social sciences,” and “natural and computer sciences”) though many of them reflect an interdisciplinary approach.

Nachhaltigkeit – (fast) reine Glaubenssache

Gerade unter dem Eindruck des in Paris unterzeichneten neuen Klimaabkommens werden wir – wenn wir die Zukunft unserer Lebensraume und Okosysteme sicherstellen wollen – neue Ansatze und Zugange benotigen, um die Komplexitaten unserer Gesellschaften unter den vorhandenen Rahmenbedingungen (Globalisierung, soziale Probleme und Disparitaten, Informationsflut, Technologiehorigkeit etc.) zu begreifen und in der Folge zu einem neuen Miteinander durch veranderte Kommunikationskulturen zu finden. Aufbauend auf die Erkenntnisse unserer Wissensgesellschaft werden Glaubensprozesse (nicht im Sinne des religiosen Glaubens) mit besonderem Augenmerk auf die Bedeutung von Emotionen bei der Bewertung von nachhaltigen Entwicklungsprozessen beleuchtet, die Rolle von bewussten und unbewussten Glaubensprozessen (Creditionen) wird sichtbar gemacht. Es wird konkret dargestellt, wie unsere individuellen Glaubensprozesse – die durch unsere Umwelten, insbesondere durch unsere personliche Biographie, unsere Sozialisation sowie unsere daraus resultierenden Wertesysteme gepragt sind – unsere Weltanschauung und damit unsere Handlungen beeinflussen. Durch die Sichtbarmachung von (Welt-)Anschauungen konnen positive, aber auch bedrohliche (Struktur-)Entwicklungen in Form von Szenarien aufgezeigt und transparent gemacht werden. Dadurch entstehen neue Handlungsspielraume, weil das „harte Wissen“ neu bewertet bzw. gedeutet wird. In anderen Worten ausgedruckt: „Vom Umdenken gelangen wir zum Umhandeln.“