Albert Carnesale

Living With Nuclear Weapons

At Harvard President Derek Boks request, six Harvard professors explain nuclear arms issues to help citizens understand all sides of the national security debates. The goal is to encourage public participation in policy formulation. The book emphasizes that escapism will not improve security; that idealistic plans to eliminate nuclear weapons are a form of escapism. Learning to live with nuclear weapons, they suggest, requires an understanding of the current nuclear predicament and the implications of alternative weapons and policy choices. After reviewing these matters, they emphasize that informed persons will continue to disagree, but that knowledge will improve understanding and appreciation of their differences and improve the quality of policy debates. 54 references, 5 figures, 2 tables. (DCK)

Hawks, doves, and owls : an agenda for avoiding nuclear war

This book explores five paths toward nuclear conflict, concentrating on how changes in forces, technology, and political life affect the way events might travel down each path. The authors suggest ways to move the world back from danger. Their agenda is an extensive list of detailed policy recommendations to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

Superpower arms control. Setting the record straight

This book identifies the preconceptions about the arms control process and tests them against the historical record of negotiations and accords. The result is much-needed evidence and analysis of issues too often obscured by emotion and ideology, as well as important new conclusions about how arms control agreements have - or have not - influenced verification, meaningful restraints on new technology development, Soviet domestic policy, and U.S. defense spending.

The solid angle subtended at a point by a circular disk

Abstract The solid angle subtended at a point by a circular disk can be well-represented by the product of an analytical expression and a slowly-varying correction factor.

ICBM Vulnerability: The Cures Are Worse Than the Disease

I T h e Soviet Union has the means to destroy the United States. An attack by only a fraction of the thousands of nuclear warheads now deployed on Soviet long-range missiles and bombers would be sufficient to annihilate most Americans, to destroy our material accomplishments, and to transform our country into a wasteland. We have virtually no defense against such an attack. Our nation is vulnerable, and has been for decades. The Soviets could also destroy a substantial portion of our military might. Land armies, surface ships, airfields, theater-based nuclear forces, and command, control, and communications facilities are especially vulnerable. Of the strategic forces, those at greatest risk are the ballistic missile submarines in port (normally about half of the SSBN force) and those long-range bombers not on alert (normally about two-thirds of the bomber force). These vulnerabilities too have been recognized for decades. The comparative newcomer to the world of vulnerability concerns is the land-based ICBM force, for it is only recently that the numbers, yields, and accuracies of Soviet ICBM warheads have approached the levels required to pose a meaningful threat to a large number of hardened silos. Opinions differ on whether this threat is credible in light of the substantial uncertainties inherent in predictions of the outcome of such a complex, sophisticated, unprecedented, and untestable attack. But in theory at least, a large fraction (perhaps as high as ninety percent) of America’s ICBM silos could be at risk within the next few years. Heightened awareness of this potential vulnerability has been an important factor in the perception of declining American strategic power, in the rhetorical opening of the “window of vulnerability,” and in the demise of SALT 11. Why, it might be asked, should one worry about ICBM vulnerability? Why should this particular instance of vulnerability deserve our attention any more than the other vulnerabilities cited previously? Some observers believe that a survivable land-based ICBM force is essential to U.S. security; others find the need less than compelling, but still substantial; and still others

Chapter 7 – THE UTILITY DIRECTOR'S DILEMMA: THE GOVERNANCE OF NUCLEAR POWER

Publisher Summary This chapter discusses a realistic diagnosis of the problem of nuclear power in the United States. Nuclear power can be used to produce electricity, a commodity consumed by the nation in ever-increasing quantities. Before the oil shock of 1973, demand for electricity grew at about seven percent per year. Since the shock, growth has been reduced by more than half; however, it remains substantial. Americas hydroelectric potential has been exploited rather fully. Whatever the price, the supply is insecure. Natural gas, the fuel most readily substituted for oil, is also imported by virtually all of the industrialized Western nations, including the United States. Neither coal nor nuclear power alone can be counted upon to meet the energy needs. There are practical limits to the rate at which the nation can expand its capacity to mine and transport coal, and there are situations, in which nuclear is uneconomical or otherwise inappropriate. Moreover, both coal and nuclear power have important adverse effects upon public health and safety and upon the environment.

On limiting technology by negotiated agreement

The substance of my remarks tonight will be far narrower in scope than the prescribed title of my talk would indicate. This reflects two considerations: first, this topical meeting is focused on technologies associated with nuclear weapons systems; and, second, President Reagan recently (i.e., on March 23, 1983) called for ‘‘a program to counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive.’’ In light of these considerations, I will concentrate tonight on the case of anti‐ballistic missile (ABM) systems as an example of a countinuing effort to limit technology by negotiated agreement?Why limit ABM systems? After all, such systems are defensive in nature, not offensive. Defensive systems are intended to protect people and the things of value to them. It is the offensive systems that cause death and destruction. Why don’t we just go ahead and deploy the best available ABM system, and develop and test even better systems for deployment in the future?