Graham Allison

Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications

During the Tet holiday of 1968, North Vietnamese troops launched massive attacks on a large number of South Vietnamese cities. Why?

Can the United States Promote Democracy

Is it possible for the United States to promote democracy and pluralism? Are there potential actions, programs, and policies to be undertaken or avoided -that will encourage the development of an appropriate system of checks and balances, promote the participation of existing and emerging groups in the political life of foreign nations, strengthen the rule of law in such countries, and enhance the protection of minority rights and values? If such initiatives do exist, then what are their chances of success? What factors will encourage or retard their effectiveness? These questions, formerly addressed only in remote academic circles, have recently moved to the forefront of the American foreign policy debate. The democratic revolutions of 1989, coupled with the retreat of authoritarian regimes in Latin America and parts of Asia and Africa, have prompted a resurgence of interest throughout the U.S. government and society at large in promoting democracy. The 1989 Support for East European Democracy (SEED) legislation authorizing U.S. spending for these purposes presupposes that such objectives are obtainable. It reads:

Hawks, doves, and owls : an agenda for avoiding nuclear war

This book explores five paths toward nuclear conflict, concentrating on how changes in forces, technology, and political life affect the way events might travel down each path. The authors suggest ways to move the world back from danger. Their agenda is an extensive list of detailed policy recommendations to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis

blockbuster. In the first 16 years (for which figures are available), more than 70,000 copies of Essence of Decision were sold; by its 25th anniversary, more than 1,600 journal articles referenced in the Social Science Citations Index had cited the work. It was a staple on the reading lists. As controversial as it was famous, critiquing Essence of Decision became a cottage industry. In the recent publication of the second edition of Essence of Decision, Allison is joined by co-author Philip Zelikow, director of the Miller Center for Public Affairs at the University of Virginia, former Bush administration official, and Allisons former Harvard colleague. The second edition is as fascinating and as frustrating as the original, and surely will remain in the canon of political science. It is 78 pages longer than the original and is illustrated with up-to-date examples from the Clinton and Bush administrations. The authors meticulously use newly available historic materials on the case, and the theory chapters draw from more recent academic scholarship.

Chapter 7 – THE UTILITY DIRECTOR'S DILEMMA: THE GOVERNANCE OF NUCLEAR POWER

Publisher Summary This chapter discusses a realistic diagnosis of the problem of nuclear power in the United States. Nuclear power can be used to produce electricity, a commodity consumed by the nation in ever-increasing quantities. Before the oil shock of 1973, demand for electricity grew at about seven percent per year. Since the shock, growth has been reduced by more than half; however, it remains substantial. Americas hydroelectric potential has been exploited rather fully. Whatever the price, the supply is insecure. Natural gas, the fuel most readily substituted for oil, is also imported by virtually all of the industrialized Western nations, including the United States. Neither coal nor nuclear power alone can be counted upon to meet the energy needs. There are practical limits to the rate at which the nation can expand its capacity to mine and transport coal, and there are situations, in which nuclear is uneconomical or otherwise inappropriate. Moreover, both coal and nuclear power have important adverse effects upon public health and safety and upon the environment.

Military Capabilities and American Foreign Policy

Can the availability of a rapid response capability lead the United States to intervene militarily in situations where, without those ready forces, the U.S. government would decide that military intervention was not required? Secretary of Defense McNamara said no; Senator Richard Russell said yes. After examining the basic approaches to weapons selection that led McNamara and Russell to opposite conclusions, this article reviews recent instances—Dienbien— phu, Laos, Korea, the Bay of Pigs, and Vietnam—in which the presence or absence of a ready military option may have affected decisions about the use of force. A conclusion about who had the better part of the argument provides a base for drawing some implications concerning the full costs and benefits of military capabilities and the responsibilities of the secretary of defense.