Samuel P. Huntington

Democracy's Third Wave

DEMOCRATISATION S THIRD WAVE AND THE CHALLENGES OF. HUNTINGTON DEMOCRACYS THIRD WAVE TAIWAN AUTHORITARIANISM. WHAT IS THIRD WAVE DEMOCRACY WHAT DOES THIRD YOUTUBE. BASIC INCOME’S THIRD WAVE OPENDEMOCRACY. WAVES OF DEMOCRATIZATION SPRINGERLINK. THE THIRD WAVE OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA. THE THREE WAVES OF DEMOCRATIZATION ACADEMIA EDU. DEMOCRACY’S THIRD WAVE BY SAMUEL P HUNTINGTON TAVAANA. THIRD WAVE DEMOCRACY REVOLVY. DEMOCRACY’S THIRD WAVE LESSONS AND LEGACIES. HUNTINGTON S 1991 DEMOCRACY S THIRD WAVE TAIWAN. THE THIRD WAVE OF DEMOCRATIZATION THE FULL WIKI. WAVE OF DEMOCRACY WIKIPEDIA. THE THIRD WAVE DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH. THE THIRD WAVE BY SAMUEL HUNTINGTON A BOOK REVIEW BY. MODERNIZATION THEORY AND “THIRD WAVE DEMOCRACY” INTERNAL. THE THIRD WAVE DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE 20TH CENTURY. THE ARAB SPRING A FOURTH WAVE OF DEMOCRATIZATION. JOD AT 25 YEARS DEMOCRACY’S THIRD WAVE BY SAMUEL P. THE THIRD WAVE DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH. SAMUEL HUNTINGTON THE THIRD WAVE PDF WORDPRESS COM. CIVIL SOCIETY IN DEMOCRACY S THIRD WAVE IMPLICATIONSFOR. DEMOCRACY S THIRD WAVE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY. COMMONLIT THE THIRD WAVE FREE READING PASSAGES AND. DEMOCRACY S THIRD WAVE ?LIM VE MEDENIYET. DEMOCRACY S THIRD WAVE SUMMARY BY RAQUELMALDO1. DEMOCRACY S THIRD WAVE HUNTINGTONSAMUEL P THE THIRD. WHAT IS THE THIRD WAVE OF DEMOCRACY ANSWERS COM. WHAT IS DEMOCRACY DEMOCRACY S THIRD WAVE. THE THIRD WAVE DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH. DEMOCRACY’S FOURTH WAVE PHIL HOWARD. IS THE THIRD WAVE OVER UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA. THIRD WAVE DEMOCRACY NEWIKIS COM. THIRD WAVE DEMOCRACY DEFINITION OF THIRD WAVE DEMOCRACY. REVIEW – A SECOND LOOK AT HUNTINGTON’S THIRD WAVE THESIS. THE FLOW AND EBB OF DEMOCRACY S THIRD WAVE MONGOLIAJOL. THE THIRD WAVE OF DEMOCRACY IN EASTERN EUROPE. MODERNIZATION THEORY AND “THIRD WAVE DEMOCRACY” INTERNAL. C5 DEMOCRACYS THIRD WAVE SLIDESHARE. THIRD WAVE DEMOCRACY REVOLVY. THE ARAB SPRING A FOURTH WAVE OF DEMOCRATIZATION. TRACKING DEMOCRACY S THIRD WAVE WITH THE POLITY III. DEMOCRACY’S THIRD WAVE SAMUEL HUNTINGTON. DEMOCRACY S THIRD WAVE SAMUEL HUNTINGTON FLASHCARDS QUIZLET. PROJECT MUSE IS THE THIRD WAVE OVER. DEMOCRACY S THIRD WAVE TODAY DIAMOND LARRY CURRENT. CIVIL SOCIETY IN DEMOCRACY S THIRD WAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR. PROJECT MUSE DEMOCRACY S THIRD WAVE

The Hispanic Challenge

The persistent inflow of Hispanic immigrants threatens to divide the United States into two peoples, two cultures, and two languages. Unlike past immigrant groups, Mexicans and other Latinos have not assimilated into mainstream U.S. culture, forming instead their own political and linguistic enclaves-from Los Angeles to Miami-and rejecting the AngloProtestant values that built the American dream. The United States ignores this challenge at its peril. By Samuel P. Huntington Huddled masses: Mexican workers gather at the Smithfield hog plant in Tar Heel, North Carolina, to celebrate asaints feast day in June 2000. They were hired to replace American workers who quit over low wages.

Political Development and Political Decay

Among the laws that rule human societies,” de Tocqueville said, “there is one which seems to be more precise and clear than all others. If men are to remain civilized or to become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which the equality of conditions is increased.”1 In much of the world today, equality of political participation is growing much more rapidly than is the “art of associating together.” The rates of mobilization and participation are high; the rates of organization and institutionalization are low. De Tocquevilles precondition for civilized society is in danger, if it is not already undermined. In these societies, the conflict between mobilization and institutionalization is the crux of politics. Yet in the fast-growing literature on the politics of the developing areas, political institutionalization usually receives scant treatment. Writers on political development emphasize the processes of modernization and the closely related phenomena of social mobilization and increasing political participation. A balanced view of the politics of contemporary Asia, Africa, and Latin America requires more attention to the “art of associating together” and the growth of political institutions. For this purpose, it is useful to distinguish political development from modernization and to identify political development with the institutionalization of political organizations and procedures. Rapid increases in mobilization and participation, the principal political aspects of modernization, undermine political institutions. Rapid modernization, in brief, produces not political development, but political decay.

The Lonely Superpower

During the past decade global politics has changed fundamentally in two ways. First, it has been substantially reconfigured along cultural and civilizational lines, as I have highlighted in the pages of this journal and documented at length in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order Second, as argued in that book, global politics is also always about power and the struggle for power, and today international relations is changing along that crucial dimension. The global structure of power in the Cold War was basically bipolar; the emerging structure is very different. There is now only one superpower. But that does not mean that the world is unipolar. A unipolar system would have one superpower, no significant major powers, and many minor powers. As a result, the superpower could effectively resolve important international issues alone, and no combination of other states would have the power to prevent it from doing so. For several centuries the classical world under Rome, and at times East Asia under China, approximated this model. A bipolar system like the Cold War has two superpowers, and the relations between them are central to international politics. Each superpower dominates a coalition of allied states and competes with the other superpower for influence among nonaligned countries. A multi polar system has several major powers of comparable strength that cooperate and compete with each other in shifting patterns. A coalition

The West: Unique, Not Universal

In recent years Westerners have reassured themselves and irritated others by expounding the notion that the culture of the West is and ought to be the culture of the world. This conceit takes two forms. One is the Coca-colonization thesis. Its proponents claim that Western, and more specifically American, popular culture is enveloping the world: American food, clothing, pop music, movies, and consumer goods are more and more enthusiastically embraced by people on every continent. The other has to do with modernization. It claims not only that the West has led the world to modern society, but that as people in other civilizations modernize they also westernize, aban doning their traditional values, institutions, and customs and adopt ing those that prevail in the West. Both theses project the image of an emerging homogeneous, universally Western world?and both are to varying degrees misguided, arrogant, false, and dangerous. Advocates of the Coca-colonization thesis identify culture with the consumption of material goods. The heart of a culture, however, involves language, religion, values, traditions, and customs. Drinking Coca-Cola does not make Russians think like Americans any more

The Erosion of American National Interests

The years since the end of the Cold War have seen intense, wide ranging, and confused debates about American national interests. Much of this confusion stems from the complexity of the post-Cold War world. The new environment has been variously interpreted as involving the end of history, bipolar conflict between rich and poor countries, movement back to a future of traditional power politics, the proliferation of ethnic conflict verging on anarchy, the clash of civilizations, and conflicting trends toward integration and fragmen tation. The new world is all these things, and hence there is good reason for uncertainty about American interests in it. Yet that is not the only source of confusion. Efforts to define national interest presuppose agreement on the nature of the country whose interests are to be defined. National interest derives from national identity. We have to know who we are before we can know what our interests are.

Conservatism as an Ideology.

Does conservative political thought have a place in America today? The answer to this question depends upon the general nature of conservatism as an ideology: its distinguishing characteristics, its substance, and the conditions under which it arises. By ideology I mean a system of ideas concerned with the distribution of political and social values and acquiesced in by a significant social group. Interpretations of the role and relevance of conservative thought on the contemporary scene vary greatly. Underlying the debate, however, are three broad and conflicting conceptions of the nature of conservatism as an ideology. This essay deals with the relative merits of these concepts.

Transnational Organizations in World Politics

These twelve organizations appear to have little in common. They are public and private, national and international, profit-making and charitable, religious and secular, civil and military, and, depending on ones perspective, benign and nefarious. Yet they do share three characteristics. First, each is a relatively large, hierarchically organized, centrally directed bureaucracy. Second, each performs a set of relatively limited, specialized, and, in some sense, technical functions: gathering intelligence, investing money, transmitting messages, promoting sales, producing copper, delivering bombs, saving souls. Third, each organization performs its functions across one or more international boundaries and, insofar as is possible, in relative disregard of those boundaries.

Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe

F o r a quarter century the slow but continuing trend in NATO strategy-and in thinking about NATO strategy-has been from emphasis on nuclear deterrence to emphasis on conventional deterrence. When it became clear that the famous Lisbon force goals of 1952, embodied in MC 14/1, had no hope of realization, NATO strategy appropriately stressed the deterrent role of nuclear weapons, in terms of both massive retaliation by U.S. strategic forces and the early use of tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe. This strategy was codified in MC 14/2 in 1957. Shortly thereafter, however, the development of Soviet strategic nuclear capabilities and, more particularly, the massive deployment by the Soviets of theater nuclear weapons raised serious questions as to the desirability of NATOs relying overwhelmingly on early use of nuclear weapons to deter Soviet attack. In the following years, the emphasis shifted to the need for stronger conventional forces capable of mounting a forward defense of Germany for a period of time and to a strategy of flexible response, in which, if deterrence failed and if conventional defenses did not hold, NATO would have the options of resorting to tactical, theater, and eventually strategic nuclear weapons. In 1967 this strategy became official NATO policy in MC 14/3. The past several years have seen increasing support for shifting the deterrent emphasis even further in the conventional direction. This perceived

A Revised Theory of American Party Politics.

The traditional theory of American politics holds that the pervasive characteristic of our major parties is their similarity. Both parties are presumed to support similar policies and to make similar appeals to similar groups. Inherent in this theory is the view that the parties are most evenly balanced numerically where they are most alike in programmatic terms. This follows because both parties will almost equally represent all groups of the population and because each party will be directing special appeals to that middle element whose support means the difference between victory and defeat. On the other hand, where one party is definitely dominant, the opposition party in that area will tend to be isolated and of an extremist nature of one sort or another. Professor Schattschneider has summed up this theory as follows: