Alexander Brown

Equality of Resources

According to Dworkin’s initial characterisation, equality of resources is the view that a distributional scheme treats people as equals when it ‘distributes or transfers resources among them until no further transfer would leave their shares of the total resources more equal’ (Dworkin, 1981a, p. 186). He later clarifies that equal shares are best interpreted in terms of what he regards as two widely held intuitions about justice. The first is that the distribution of income and wealth is not fair when it reflects inequalities in the distribution of physical endowments and other features of brute luck. The second is that a fair distribution is dynamic in the sense that it allows the distribution at any given time to be sensitive to people’s ambitions, that is, choices about occupation, investment and consumption. So to treat people as equals is to try to make sure that the distribution of income and wealth at any given moment is ambition-sensitive but not endowment-sensitive (1981b, p. 311; 1985, p. 207). This abstract picture of equality of resources is complicated, however, by the interplay between endowment and ambition. This interplay means that it is nigh-on impossible to know what proportion of people’s income and wealth is due to each causal determinant ex post. In response to this ‘strategic problem’, Dworkin offers the hypothetical insurance scheme, where the aim is to realise equality of resources ex ante.

Equality of Welfare

Any thoughtful person coming to the ‘Equality of what?’ debate for the first time might be forgiven for thinking that it puts the cart before the horse. Surely the more crucial question is ‘Why equality?’ I shall return to that question in Chapter 4, to which I shall add a further question, ‘Equality among whom?’ But it is worth emphasising here that in his two famous articles of 1981, Dworkin does not ask the question, ‘Equality of what?’ Rather, he asks the subtly different question, ‘What is quality?’ Whereas Amartya Sen and G. A. Cohen start with the assumption that there is something substantive which justice requires people to have equal amounts of (Sen, 1980; Cohen, 1989), Dworkin begins with the different fundamental assumption that every citizen has a highly abstract right to be treated with equal concern. His task is to work out what it means to be treated with equal concern in matters of distribution. Hence, ‘What is equality?’

The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006: a Millian response

The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 represents a significant development in UK law. It extends the offence of incitement to racial hatred set out in the Public Order Act 1986 to make it also an offence to stir up hatred against persons on religious grounds. As the most celebrated liberal thinker of the nineteenth century, J.S. Mill might be expected to offer some lessons about the possible dangers of this sort of legislation. A Millian response to the 2006 Act is developed here by first applying Mill’s famous defence of free speech to the Lords amendments to the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill 2005 and then by looking at potential cases in which even freedom of expression loses its immunity when this is necessary to prevent harm to others. Three versions of the harm‐prevention justification for liberty‐limiting restrictions are assessed and it is argued that the most promising version is the claim that it may be permissible to punish incitement to racial and religious hatred not so much because it is itself a kind of harm but by virtue of the acts of discrimination, violence and injustice that are more likely to occur within a climate of hatred. Ultimately, however, this rationale must be weighed against what is, for Mill, the special value of free speech and may in the end justify intervention in only the most acute cases.

What is so special about online (as compared to offline) hate speech

There is a growing body of literature on whether or not online hate speech, or cyberhate, might be special compared to offline hate speech. This article aims to both critique and augment that literature by emphasising a distinctive feature of the Internet and of cyberhate that, unlike other features, such as ease of access, size of audience, and anonymity, is often overlooked: namely, instantaneousness. This article also asks whether there is anything special about online (as compared to offline) hate speech that might warrant governments and intergovernmental organisations contracting out, so to speak, the responsibility for tackling online hate speech to the very Internet companies which provide the websites and services that hate speakers utilise.

Principles of stakes fairness in sport

Fairness in sport is not just about assigning the top prizes to the worthiest competitors. It is also about the way the prize structure itself is organised. For many sporting competitions, although it may be acceptable for winners to receive more than losers, it can seem unfair for winners to take everything and for losers to get nothing. Yet this insight leaves unanswered some difficult questions about what stakes fairness requires and which principles of stakes fairness are appropriate for particular competitions. In this article I specify a range of different principles of stakes fairness (ten in total) that could regulate sporting competitions. I also put forward a theoretical method for pairing up appropriate principles of stakes fairness with given sporting competitions. Specifically, I argue that the underlying rationales for holding sporting competitions can provide useful guides for identifying appropriate principles of stakes fairness. I then seek to clarify and work through some of the implications of this method for a sample of real world controversies over sporting prize structures. I also attempt to refine the method in response to two possible objections from indeterminacy and relativism. Finally, I compare and contrast my conclusions with more general philosophical debates about justice.

What Should Egalitarians Believe if they Really are Egalitarian?:A reply to Martin O’Neill

In his article, ‘What Should Egalitarians Believe?’, Martin O’Neill argues, amongst other things, that egalitarians should reject both Telic and Deontic Egalitarianism and that they should adopt in their place a version of Non-Intrinsic Egalitarianism, specifically, the Pluralist Non-Intrinsic Egalitarian View. The central purpose of my article is to challenge O’Neill’s assumption that he can defend each of the various propositions that make up his position simultaneously. I do this with two arguments. First, I argue that in order to justify why egalitarians should adopt a version of Non-Intrinsic Egalitarianism, O’Neill is bound to rely on forms of egalitarianism that are either Telic or Deontic, and so he is no longer able to affirm that egalitarians should reject both Telic and Deontic Egalitarianism. Second, I argue that by allowing the inclusion of non-egalitarian reasons into the Pluralist Non-Intrinsic Egalitarian View, O’Neill opens the floodgates to an indefinite number of other non-egalitarian reasons, such that it is scarcely credible that the Pluralist Non-Intrinsic Egalitarian View really is an egalitarian view after all.

Single-cell in situ transcriptomic map of astrocyte cortical layer diversity

During organogenesis, patterns and gradients of gene expression underlie organization and diversified cell specification to generate complex tissue architecture. While the cerebral cortex is organized into six excitatory neuronal layers, it is unclear whether glial cells are diversified to mimic neuronal laminae or show distinct layering. To determine the molecular architecture of the mammalian cortex, we developed a high content pipeline that can quantify single-cell gene expression in situ. The Large-area Spatial Transcriptomic (LaST) map confirmed expected cortical neuron layer organization and also revealed a novel neuronal identity signature. Screening 46 candidate genes for astrocyte diversity across the cortex, we identified grey matter superficial, mid and deep astrocyte identities in gradient layer patterns that were distinct from neurons. Astrocyte layers formed in early postnatal cortex and mostly persisted in adult mouse and human cortex. Mutations that shifted neuronal post-mitotic identity or organization were sufficient to alter glial layering, indicating an instructive role for neuronal cues. In normal mouse cortex, astrocyte layer patterns showed area diversity between functionally distinct cortical regions. These findings indicate that excitatory neurons and astrocytes cells are organized into distinct lineage-associated laminae, which give rise to higher order neuroglial complexity of cortical architecture.

A Theory of Legitimate Expectations for Public Administration

It is an unfortunate but unavoidable feature of even well-ordered democratic societies that governmental administrative agencies often create legitimate expectations (procedural or substantive) on the part of non-governmental agents (individual citizens, groups, businesses, organizations, institutions, and instrumentalities) but find themselves unable to fulfil those expectations for reasons of justice, the public interest, severe financial constraints, and sometimes harsh political realities. How governmental administrative agencies, operating on behalf of society, handle the creation and frustration of legitimate expectations implicates a whole host of values that we have reason to care about, including under non-ideal conditions-not least justice, fairness, autonomy, the rule of law, responsible uses of power, credible commitments, reliance interests, security of expectations, stability, democracy, parliamentary supremacy, and legitimate authority. This book develops a new theory of legitimate expectations for public administration drawing on normative arguments from political and legal theory. Brown begins by offering a new account of the legitimacy of legitimate expectations. He argues that it is the very responsibility of governmental administrative agencies for creating expectations that ought to ground legitimacy, as opposed to the justice or the legitimate authority of those agencies and expectations. He also clarifies some of the main ways in which agencies can be responsible for creating expectations. Moreover, he argues that governmental administrative agencies should be held liable for losses they directly cause by creating and then frustrating legitimate expectations on the part of non-governmental agents and, if liable, have an obligation to make adequate compensation payments in respect of those losses.

Calcium Deregulation: Novel Insights to Understand Friedreich’s Ataxia Pathophysiology

Friedreich’s Ataxia (FRDA) is a neurodegenerative disorder, characterized by degeneration of dorsal root ganglia, cerebellum and cardiomyopathy. Heart failure is one of the most common causes of death for FRDA patients. Deficiency of frataxin, a small mitochondrial protein, is responsible for all clinical and morphological manifestations of FRDA. The focus of our study was to investigate the unexplored Ca2+ homeostasis in cerebellar granule neurons (CGNs) and in cardiomyocytes of FRDA cellular models to understand the pathogenesis of degeneration. Ca2+ homeostasis in neurons and cardiomyocytes is not only crucial for the cellular wellbeing but more importantly to generate action potential in both neurons and cardiomyocytes. By challenging Ca2+ homeostasis in CGNs, and in adult and neonatal cardiomyocytes of FRDA models, we have assessed the impact of frataxin decrease on both neuronal and cardiac physiopathology. Interestingly, we have found that Ca2+ homeostasis is altered both cell types. CGNs showed a Ca2+ mishandling under depolarizing conditions and this was also reflected in the endoplasmic reticulum (ER) content. In cardiomyocytes we found that the sarcoplasmic reticulum (SR) Ca2+ content was pathologically reduced, and that mitochondrial Ca2+ uptake was impaired. This phenomenon is due to the excess of oxidative stress under FRDA like conditions and the consequent aberrant modulation of key players at the SR/ER and mitochondrial level that usually restore the Ca2+ homeostasis. Our findings demonstrate that in both neurons and cardiomyocytes the decreased Ca2+ level within the stores has a comparable detrimental impact in their physiology. In cardiomyocytes, we found that ryanodine receptors (RyRs) may be leaking and expel more Ca2+ out from the SR. At the same time mitochondrial uptake was altered and we found that Vitamin E can restore this defect. Moreover, Vitamin E protects from cell death induced by hypoxia-reperfusion injury, revealing novel properties of Vitamin E as potential therapeutic tool for FRDA cardiomyopathy.

The Politics Behind the Introduction of Stirring Up Religious Hatred Offences in England and Wales

ABSTRACT What was and is the real function of the stirring up religious hatred offences in England and Wales? I canvass five possible explanations. In the end I come down on the side of a pluralistic explanation that combines the public order explanation and the client politics explanation in conjunction with the parity of protection explanation. I reject both the sop explanation and the anti-terrorism explanation.