Dean Lacy

The Vote-Stealing and Turnout Effects of Ross Perot in the 1992 U.S. Presidential Election

Including abstention as a choice in vote choice models enables one to calculate the votestealing and turnout effects of third-party candidates. A model of the vote including abstention also produces parameter estimates and marginal effects for some explanatory variables that differ from the results of a model that excludes abstention. We present two multinomial probit models of vote choice in the 1992 U.S. presidential election. One model includes abstention as a choice; the other does not. The model that includes abstention reveals that Ross Perot increased turnout by nearly three percentage points in 1992, and his candidacy decreased Clintons margin of victory over Bush by seven percentage points. Under compulsory voting, Clintons margin of victory barely increases, and Perots vote share remains nearly constant.

A Problem with Referendums

When some voters have nonseparable preferences across multiple binary issues, majority rule may not select a Condorcet winning set of outcomes when one exists, and the social choice may be a Condorcet loser or Pareto-dominated by every other set of outcomes. We present an empirical example of one such paradox from voting on the Internet. We evaluate potential solutions to the problem of nonseparable preferences in referendums, including set-wise voting, sequential voting, and vote-trading. Sequential voting and vote-trading prevent the selection of Condorcet losers and universally Pareto-dominated outcomes. Legislatures facilitate sequential voting and vote-trading better than referendums, suggesting that referendums increase the quantity of participants in democratic decision-making but decrease the quality of participation.

Elections in Double-Member Districts with Nonseparable Voter Preferences

We derive Nash equilibrium candidate strategies in a double-member district election when voters have nonseparable preferences for candidates in a single-dimensional policy space. When candidates are elected simultaneously, nonseparable voter preferences create multiple equilibria, including some in which candidates adopt extreme positions. The results are robust to limited voter uncertainty about candidate interaction in the legislature. Nonseparable voter preferences create incentives for the formation of political parties and disincentives for candidates to moderate their positions.

Information and Heterogeneity in Issue Voting: Evidence from the 2008 Presidential Election in Taiwan

The vast majority of studies of the effects of issues and the economy on vote choice estimate average effects of these variables across the electorate. We posit that different voters may use issues and the economy differently in their vote decisions. Specifically, the effects of issues and the economy may vary by a voter’s general level of political information. We test the effects of information on issue voting and the economy in the 2008 presidential election on Taiwan. Our findings show that the independence versus unification issue was still the most important issue in the 2008 election, and voters with greater levels of political information show a larger effect of the issue on their vote choice. The national economy is also significant as a predictor of vote choice while personal economic conditions are not. Voter information has a slight influence on sociotropic voting, with more informed voters showing a larger effect of the national economy on their vote decisions than less informed voters. The latter finding contradicts recent work on attribution bias in economic voting.

Nonseparable Preferences and Issue Packaging in Elections

In this chapter we develop a model in which candidates have fixed positions on a single issue dimension on which one candidate has an advantage by being closer to the median voter. The disadvantaged candidate can introduce a new issue to win the election. When all voters have separable preferences and the advantaged candidate moves last on the new issue, there is no way for the disadvantaged candidate to win. When some voters have nonseparable preferences over the issues, the disadvantaged can take a position that the advantaged candidate cannot beat. Candidates in an election can benefit from introducing new issues, but only when some voters have nonseparable preferences. Using data from a 2004 survey, we show that a substantial percentage of US voters have nonseparable preferences for many issues of public policy, creating incentives and opportunities for political candidates to package issues.