Alfred Schutz

Strukturen der Lebenswelt

Die folgenden Uberlegungen beziehen sich auf die Struktur der von Husserl so genannten „Lebenswelt,“ in der wir als Menschen unter Mitmenschen in naturlicher Einstellung Natur, Kultur und Gesellschaft erfahren, zu ihren Gegenstanden Stellung nehmen, von ihnen beeinflust werden und auf sie wirken. In dieser Einstellung ist die Existenz der Lebenswelt und die Typik ihrer Inhalte als bis auf Widerruf fraglos gegeben hingenommen. Wie Husserl gezeigt hat, vollzieht sich unser Denken unter der Idealitat des „und so weiter“ und des „ich kann immer wieder“: Die erstere fuhrt zu der Annahme, das, was sich bisher in unserer Erfahrung als gultig erwiesen hat, auch weiterhin gultig bleiben werde; die letztere fuhrt zu der Erwartung, das ich, was ich bisher in dieser Welt und auf sie wirkend vollbringen konnte, in Hinkunft wieder und immer wieder vollbringen konnen werde. Wir konnen daher von Grundannahmen sprechen, die fur die naturliche Einstellung in der Lebenswelt charakteristisch sind und selbst als fraglos gegeben angesetzt werden: Namlich Annahmen der Konstanz der Weltstruktur, der Konstanz der Gultigkeit unserer Erfahrung von der Welt und der Konstanz unserer Vermoglichkeit, auf die Welt und in ihr zu wirken.

Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action

“Neither common sense nor science can proceed without departing from the strict consideration of what is actual in experience.” This statement by A. N. Whitehead is at the foundation of his analysis of the Organization of Thought.1 Even the thing perceived in everyday life is more than a simple sense presentation.2 It is a thought object, a construct of a highly complicated nature, involving not only particular forms of time-successions in order to constitute it as an object of one single sense, say of sight,3 and of space relations in order to constitute it as a sense-object of several senses, say of sight and touch,4 but also a contribution of imagination of hypothetical sense presentations in order to complete it.5 According to Whitehead, it is precisely the last-named factor, the imagination of hypothetical sense presentation, “which is the rock upon which the whole structure of common-sense thought is erected” 6 and it is the effort of reflective criticism “to construe our sense presentation as actual realization of the hypothetical thought object of perceptions.” 7 In other words, the so-called concrete facts of common-sense perception are not so concrete as it seems.

Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences

The title of my paper refers intentionally to that of a Symposium held in December, 1952, at the annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association.2 Ernest Nagel and Carl G. Hempel contributed highly stimulating comments on the problem involved, formulated in the careful and lucid way so characteristic of these scholars. Their topic is a controversy which for more than half a century has split not only logicians and methodologists but also social scientists into two schools of thought. One of these holds that the methods of the natural sciences which have brought about such magnificent results are the only scientific ones and that they alone, therefore, have to be applied in their entirety to the study of human affairs. Failure to do so, it has been maintained, prevented the social sciences from developing systems of explanatory theory comparable in precision to those offered by the natural sciences and makes debatable the empirical work of theories developed in restricted domains such as economics.

The Problem of Rationality in the Social World

The problem suggested by the terms “rationality” or “rational action” as used in current literature is most certainly central to the methodology and epistemology of the scientific study of the social world. The terms themselves, however, are not only used with many different meanings — and this sometimes in the writings of the same author as, for instance, Max Weber — but they represent only very inadequately the underlying conceptual scheme. In order to bring out the concealed equivocations and connotations, and to isolate the question of rationality from all the other problems surrounding it, we must go further into the structure of the social world and make more extensive inquiries into the different attitudes toward the social world adopted, on the one hand, by the actor within this world, and, on the other hand, by the scientific observer of it.

On multiple realities

In a famous chapter of his Principles of Psychology William James analyzes our sense of reality.1 Reality, so he states, means simply relation to our emotional and active life. The origin of all reality is subjective, whatever excites and stimulates our interest is real. To call a thing real means that this thing stands in a certain relation to ourselves. “The word ‘real’ is, in short, a fringe.” 2 Our primitive impulse is to affirm immediately the reality of all that is conceived, as long as it remains uncontradicted. But there are several, probably an infinite number of various orders of realities, each with its own special and separate style of existence. James calls them “sub-universes” and mentions as examples the world of sense or physical things (as the paramount reality), the world of science, the world of ideal relations, the world of “idols of the tribe”, the various supernatural worlds of mythology and religion, the various worlds of individual opinion, the worlds of sheer madness and vagary.3 The popular mind conceives of all these sub-worlds more or less disconnectedly, and when dealing with one of them forgets for the time being its relations to the rest. But every object we think of is at last referred to one of these sub worlds.“

Choosing Among Projects of Action

Our purpose here is the analysis of the process by which an actor in daily life determines his future conduct after having considered several possible ways of action. The term “action” shall designate human conduct as an ongoing process which is devised by the actor in advance, that is, which is based upon a preconceived project. The term “act” shall designate the outcome of this ongoing process, that is, the accomplished action. Action, thus, may be covert — for example, the attempt to solve a scientific problem mentally — or overt, gearing into the outer world. But not all projected conduct is also purposive conduct. In order to transform the forethought into an aim and the project into a purpose, the intention to carry out the project, to bring about the projected state of affairs, must supervene. This distinction is of importance with respect to covert actions. My phantasying may be a projected one, and therefore, an action within the meaning of our definition. But it remains mere fancying unless what W. James called the voluntative “fiat” supervenes and transforms my project into a purpose. If a covert action is more than “mere fancying,” namely purposive, it shall be called for the sake of convenience a “performance.”

Symbol Reality and Society

Present day discussion of the problem of symbolic reference shows several bewildering features.

Making Music Together

Music is a meaningful context which is not bound to a conceptual scheme. Yet this meaningful context can be communicated: The process of communication between composer and listener normally requires an intermediary: an individual per-former or a group of co-performers. Among all these participants there prevail social relations of a highly complicated structure.

The Social World and the Theory of Social Action

At first sight it is not easily understandable why the subjective point of view should be preferred in the social sciences. Why address ourselves always to this mysterious and not too interesting tyrant of the social sciences, called the subjectivity of the actor? Why not honestly describe in honestly objective terms what really happens, and that means speaking our own language, the language of qualified and scientifically trained observers of the social world? And if it be objected that these terms are but artificial conventions created by our “will and pleasure” and that therefore we cannot utilize them for real insight into the meaning which social acts have for those who act, but only for our interpretation, we could answer that it is precisely this building up of a system of conventions and an honest description of the world which is and is alone the task of scientific thought; that we scientists are no less sovereign in our system of interpretation than the actor is free in setting up his system of goals and plans; that we social scientists in particular have but to follow the pattern of natural sciences, which have performed with the very methods we should abandon the most wonderful work of all time; and, finally, that it is the essence of science to be objective, valid not only for me, or for me and you and a few others, but for everyone, and that scientific propositions do not refer to my private world but to the one and unitary life-world common to us all.

Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World

The subject of the present paper is the theoretical analysis of various aspects of the notion of equality in the common-sense thinking of concrete social groups. The general idea of equality in the philosophical or religious sense is not within the scope of our investigation, and therefore is intentionally omitted. It is sufficient for our purpose to acknowledge that all common-sense aspects of equality are merely secularizations of more or less clearly conceived ethical or religious principles which are just taken for granted beyond question. Consequently, no attempt has been made at referring the common-sense notion of equality to the idea of the dignity of man, to the relation of the soul to God, or to the Right of Nature.