Anders Wivel

Small States in the European Union: What Do We Know and What Would We Like to Know?

Recent developments in the European Union have created new opportunities and challenges for small member states, increasing the demand from policy-makers and diplomats for coherent and accessible analyses of the conditions and potential strategies of small states in the EU. Unfortunately, the academic literature on small states in the EU appears both diverse and fragmented: there is no agreement on how we should define a small state, what similarities we would expect to find in their foreign policies, or how they influence international relations. However, if we are to understand the challenges and possibilities currently faced by small EU member states, we need to systematise what we already know and to identify what we need to know. This article makes a modest contribution towards this goal by answering three simple questions: What is a small state in the European Union? How can we explain the behaviour of small EU member states? How do small states influence the European Union?

Maximizing Influence in the European Union after the Lisbon Treaty: From Small State Policy to Smart State Strategy

Abstract How do small states maximize their influence in the European Union? This article argues that the traditional small state approach to European integration is being undermined by formal and informal developments in the EU. Small states must therefore change their traditional policy focused on binding the great powers to a smart state strategy utilizing small state weakness to gain influence. We outline the basic characteristics of a smart state strategy and illustrate the practical applicability of the strategy by discussing three basic aspects of ideal type smart state behaviour: (1) the state as lobbyist, (2) the state as self‐interested mediator, and (3) the state as norm entrepreneur.

Between Paradise and Power: Denmark’s Transatlantic Dilemma

foreign policy priorities, the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington of 11 September 2001 resulted only in the small and predictable change that the fight against terror and the spread of weapons of mass destruction were explicitly mentioned as forming one of the specific foreign policy priorities within the new foreign policy agenda published by the Danish government in 2003. The mention was relatively brief and the tools traditional: the European Union was seen as the central forum for fighting terrorism (in close cooperation with the UN and the United States), and the United Nations as the key instrument in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons (Government of Denmark, 2003: 20–21). In 2004, this was followed up by a government report on terrorism underlining the continued importance of the UN, the EU and NATO (Government of Denmark, 2004). However, if we look instead at Danish security policy actions after 11 September 2001 and their match with Denmark’s traditional role as a country with a typical ‘Nordic’ foreign policy profile that underlines the importance of peaceful conflict resolution, international law and the United Nations, the effect of 9/11 on Danish security policy seems to have been much more dramatic. Denmark was a cosignatory of the ‘Letter of Eight’ in January 2003 supporting the US position on Iraq and effectively undermining the prospects for any common EU position on the issue, and it subsequently joined the US-led coalition in Iraq despite a lack of authorization from the UN Security Council. Moreover, the Danish government has consistently supported the invasion of Iraq and the ensuing efforts by the United States to fight Iraqi insurgents. Even though human rights concerns have been central to Danish foreign policy in the post-Cold War era, the government’s critique of the US policy of keeping prisoners at the US military base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, has been relatively mild and low-key. In sum, these actions all seem to point to a radical shift in Danish foreign policy in the wake of 9/11. Despite official statements, the current Danish foreign policy cannot be viewed simply as a continuation of traditional priorities. However, at the same time, the change is neither as recent nor as dramatic as it may seem at first when looking at security policy actions after 9/11. The shift has been in the making since the end of the Cold War, but the events of and since 11 September 2001 have changed its implications and presented Danish foreign policy decisionmakers with a dilemma between a European and a US approach to pursuing their most important security policy priorities. Special Section: European Security and Transatlantic Relations in the Age of International Terrorism: Challenges for the Nordic Countries

Security, profit or shadow of the past? Explaining the security strategies of microstates

Which factors determine the security strategies of microstates? Many microstates are either secluded island states or have very close political, economic and cultural ties to a larger neighbouring ‘protector state’. They have had, therefore, little use for more traditional alliance arrangements. However, the patterns of security cooperation between states have shifted as the significance of flexible ad-hoc coalition-building as a means to coordinate international interventions has increased. Consequently, the strategic security challenges and opportunities for microstates have been transformed. Focusing on the Operation Iraqi Freedom coalition, this article explores some of these challenges and opportunities. Three hypotheses regarding the decisions made by the respective microstates to join international ad-hoc coalitions are studied: (1) participation provides increased security, (2) participation provides economic gains, and (3) participation reflects the lessons of past security challenges. The explanatory powers of each hypothesis are examined using a comparative case study of 11 Pacific microstates.

The Power Politics of Peace Exploring the Link between Globalization and European Integration from a Realist Perspective

The purpose of this article is to explore globalization and European integration and the link between the two developments from a realist perspective. I demonstrate how realists have engaged in analyses of globalization and European integration but have so far failed to provide a link between the two developments. I argue that realists can convincingly provide such a link by utilizing the perspective’s often neglected process variables: socialization, competition and interaction capacity. Using these variables, I demonstrate how the dynamics of power politics perfectly consistent with realism may result in an international system characterized by actors and processes incompatible with realist predictions. The article is a contribution to the ongoing debate on the applicability of international relations theory to globalization and European integration and to the contemporary debate between realists and their critics on the development of the realist research programme.

Balancing against threats or bandwagoning with power? Europe and the transatlantic relationship after the Cold War

The United States has played an important role in European security since the early 20th century. From the time of the end of the Cold War, this role has changed as a consequence of the lack of a common territorial threat and the overwhelming power of the United States relative to Europe. How have European states responded to the challenges of the American world order? Are they adapting their security policies to match the challenges of US security policy and the American world order? What are the implications of the European response for the transatlantic relationship? This article seeks to describe and explain European security behaviour in the American world through the prism of two realist theories: balance of power realism and balance of threat realism. Despite sharing a common starting point in realist assumptions, each theory allows us to tell a different story about Europes position in the American world order as well as the opportunities and challenges it faces.

Vulnerability without capabilities? Small state strategy and the international counter-piracy agenda

ABSTRACT Today, small European states regularly need to go out of area and out of tried and tested institutional settings to defend their security interests. How do small European states meet this challenge most effectively? This analysis suggests that small states can influence multilateral decisions on international security by combining norm entrepreneurship with lobbying and taking on the role as an “honest broker”. However, economic capacity, an effective state administration, and interests compatible with the agendas of the great powers are key to success. Based on a comprehensive empirical material including 19 elite interviews as well as official documents and other written material, we process trace how one small European state, Denmark, influenced the development of international counter-piracy cooperation and the development of an international counter-piracy strategy for the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa and discuss which lessons the Danish case may hold for other small states.

Living on the edge: Georgian foreign policy between the West and the rest

Abstract This paper seeks to make three contributions to our understanding of small state foreign policy. First, the paper explains the foreign policy trajectory of one particular small state, Georgia, which has with limited success followed a foreign policy of inclusion into the West and its institutions. Second, the paper analyses how variations in statehood widen, narrow and transform the strategic options available to small states. Finally, the paper explores a number of small state foreign policy dilemmas and their consequences for policy success.

As Awkward as They Need to Be: Denmark’s Pragmatic Activist Approach to Europe

This chapter makes three contributions towards understanding Danish awkwardness. First, the chapter unpacks the characteristics of Danish awkwardness and explains how it has developed since the debate over whether or not to seek membership in the early 1970s. Second, the chapter discusses how Danish state identity, rooted in the context of deep societal changes in Danish society in the second half of the nineteenth century and in the first part of the twentieth century, has created a particular action space for Denmark’s engagement with the European integration project. Third, the chapter discusses Denmark’s strategies for managing awkwardness in the European Union.

How do small island states maximize influence? Creole diplomacy and the smart state foreign policy of the Seychelles

ABSTRACT A lack of capabilities is most often taken to imply a lack of influence. The foreign policy of the Seychelles provides a surprising case of successful small state diplomacy that counters this claim. With a population of less than 100,000 and a diplomatic service of 100 staff, Seychelles is recognized as a broker in international organizations and as an agenda setter in ocean governance. This article explores this success in four steps. First, we unpack why the current diplomatic success of Seychelles is a surprise. Second, drawing on literature on small state diplomacy, we identify three sources of small state influence: capability and location, political culture and institutional design, and political strategy. Third, we analyze recent Seychellois diplomacy in light of the four factors as well as the limitations of Creole small state diplomacy. We conclude by discussing what other small states may learn from the Seychelles.