Hans Mouritzen

Choosing Sides in the European Iraq Conflict: A Test of New Geopolitical Theory

Abstract Focusing on the Euro-Atlantic conflict over the Iraq war operation in early 2003 (the ‘European Iraq conflict’), the purpose of the present article is to explain the pattern of Atlantic (vs. Continental) predispositions among European countries. It argues that this is the best suited conflict in the post-Cold War era to illuminate this stable and fundamental pattern. Whereas systemic power distribution, size, public opinion, or government ideology all fail to account for the positioning of states in the conflict (and balance of threat applies only modestly), a theory of ‘past and present geopolitics’ is outlined that seems able to explain states’ predispositions and, hence, their positionings in this specific situation. It is remarkable that ‘old-fashioned’ geopolitical dynamics can be identified even within the Euro-Atlantic zone of ‘peace and prosperity’—not only at its fringes, but also in its very heart.

The Nordic–Baltic Area: Divisive Geopolitics at Work

States in the Nordic–Baltic area reacted heterogeneously to the Iraq War operation: Denmark chose to participate; Iceland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania supported the operation diplomatically or materially; whereas Norway, Finland and Sweden were negative. The research tool used to explain this pattern is the parsimonious theory of ‘past and present geopolitics’, taking issue with systemic neorealism, primarily. In spite of official rhetoric emphasizing Baghdad or New York (the UN), states’ driving forces were mainly found in their different salient environments. The primary explanation, proximate power balancing, was at work regarding Denmark, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Iceland, with no big neighbour, could enjoy profit bandwagoning, while Sweden and Finland followed ‘standard operating procedures’. A minor aberration from expectations is noted regarding Finland: its EU balancing rather than US balancing of Russia. The Norwegian ‘no’ and Danish warfare were both an expression of geopolitical freedom of manoeuvre.

The interplay of geopolitics and historical lessons in foreign policy: Denmark facing German post-war rearmament

Realist theory can no longer afford to neglect cases where policy-makers’ ‘lessons of the past’ play a role in foreign policy decisions. The case of Denmark confronting the prospect of German post-war rearmament should illustrate an interplay between the state’s geopolitical necessity — acquiescence in German NATO membership and rearmament due to Soviet military proximity — and policy-makers’ lessons from the recent German occupation of Denmark (that led to Danish inclinations to reject such membership). In other words, this is a case of strong and countervailing pressures. The article examines how the interplay unfolded, including the tactics politicians used to counterbalance and overrule any ‘inconvenient’ lessons. Whereas geopolitical pressures clearly dominated the ‘competition’, one historical lesson could be used as a negotiation asset to bluff foreign powers on the related Schleswig issue. The general thesis articulated in this article is that the state’s external freedom of action, as a gate-keeper, may allow or forbid lessons to play a role. Studying only situations characterized by wide freedom of action gives us a biased picture of foreign policy, implying that policy-makers are free to enact whatever peculiarities or constructions — in the case of this article, historical lessons — are available to them. However, such situations remain only special cases of foreign policy.

Stifled by her Own Success?: A Geopolitical Perspective

Seldom has a European Union theme been given such priority as has enlargement in connection with the Danish Presidency. Since invitations were issued to all 10 EU applicants, it is fair enough to judge the Presidency as a success measured against its own yardstick (cf. the contributions of Friis and Miles in this symposium; also Miles, 2003). However, it is rarely if ever asked whether the Presidency was also a success for Denmark (not even within the country’s own debate). It was, of course, a success in a PR sense, but was it also a success from a geopolitical perspective? EU enlargement is, inter alia, a matter of geopolitics. First, geographically contiguous territories are (normally) added to those of the existing Union. Over a relatively short time-span, Denmark has moved from a position of EU ‘outpost’ to a position at the Union’s centre. Second, as more political units are integrated, each unit gets a smaller portion of the ‘political pie’ in terms of influence on common decisions. Let us see what these two developments are likely to imply for Denmark’s EU profile and influence.1 Any implication analysis of this kind will necessarily be fairly sketchy, given that broad issues are covered within limited space and also that the Presidency is barely over at the time of writing. The analysis is also at the mercy of a wealth of unknown factors and coincidences in the political process, any of which may affect the outcome.

Small States and Finlandisation in the Age of Trump

In a multipolar world with weak institutions, and where the alternative can be chaos and war, Finlandisation is better than its reputation.

Learning to assert themselves: Small states in asymmetrical dyads – two Scandinavian dogs barking at the Russian bear

By measuring foreign policy assertion, we document that Danish and Swedish Russia policies have fluctuated widely in the 21st century, as well as in relation to each other. Specifically, big assertion leaps took place in 2002 (Denmark) and 2008 (Sweden). Having conceptualised and operationalised small state assertion, we proceed to the explanation of these leaps. The same factor turns out to be the efficient explanation in both cases: an individual policy-maker’s so-called ‘lesson of the past’ – what he believes ‘history teaches us’. It is shown how existing theory of lessons of the past can contribute to the understanding of small state assertion in asymmetrical dyads, but only if the proper permissive circumstances are identified. First and foremost these amount to the presence of a reasonable foreign policy action space.