Angela Kallhoff

Plants in Ethics: Why Flourishing Deserves Moral Respect

ANGELA KALLHOFF

Why societies need public goods

The most distinctive features of public goods are usually understood to be the difficulty of excluding potential beneficiaries and the fact that one appropriator’s benefits do not diminish the amount of benefits left for others. Yet, because of these properties (non-excludability and non-rivalry), public goods cause market failures and contribute to problems of collective action. This article aims to portray public goods in a different light. Following a recent reassessment of public goods in political philosophy, this contribution argues that public goods are particularly suitable for sustaining a well-ordered society. Public goods contribute to social inclusion, they support the generation of the public, and they strengthen a shared sense of citizenship. This article scrutinizes these functions of public goods and offers a discussion of the interventionist thesis which states that governments should sustain public goods.

Water Justice: A Multilayer Term and Its Role in Cooperation

Abstract In discussing water justice, this paper distinguishes four concepts of water justice: Distributive justice claims a fair share of water, ecological justice focuses on the integrity of water as a vulnerable resource, cultural justice addresses values attached to water reservoirs, and procedural justice explicates fair procedures in negotiating water conflicts. After having given an overview over recent contributions to the various meanings of water justice, the paper tries to answer the question of how standards of justice can be integrated into an approach that overcomes the alleged tragedies of the commons. It focuses on the example of a water reservoir whose access conditions provoke conflicts among neighbors.

Consumer citizenship: a self-contradictory concept?

The concept of consumer citizenship relates to two discourses in contemporary political philosophy. In particular, the concept of citizenship is currently in three central traditions in political philosophy: the traditions of political liberalism, of civic republicanism and of deliberative democracy. Yet, against each of these backgrounds, consumer citizenship looks like a degraded form of citizenship. Because of this result of the first section, I shall take a different stance on consumer citizenship. This concept is in one line with recently explored ‘qualified concepts of citizenship’, i.e. ‘ecological citizenship’. Section two discusses the implications of this approach to consumer citizenship. A third section first states that as a result of the first two approaches, consumer citizenship looks like a self-contradictory concept. Yet, a more thorough look at the tensions in that concept contributes to another interpretation: Consumer citizenship highlights tensions of the concept of citizenship more generally. In particular, consumer citizenship provides an antipode to the concept of consumer sovereignty.

Justifiable Killing in War? For Taking the Soldier's Stance Seriously in War Ethics

The paper builds on a current debate in the philosophy of war, which are rules that contribute to the containment of war and to a system of fair rules in warfare. Both are key issues in the “jus in bello” as a central part of war ethics. Recently, philosophers have questioned a general exculpation of soldiers in that context. Instead of restricting the debate on “justifiable killing” to the “jus ad bellum,” which explores moral restrictions in startingwarfare, philosophers examinemoral implicationswhen soldiers kill inwar. Even though epistemic limitations and duties of soldiers need to be taken into account, the paper argues for a more detailed exploration of acts of killing in war by soldiers.

Realistischer Humanismus: Martha Nussbaum über die menschliche Natur

Martha Nussbaum hat nie einen ethischen Naturalismus vertreten. Unabhangig davon, wie genau ein ethischer Naturalismus interpretiert wird, muss diese Aussage am Anfang der Untersuchung des Verhaltnisses von Nussbaums Ethik und Themen des ethischen Naturalismus stehen. Dies gilt insbesondere auch dann, wenn ein ethischer Naturalismus nicht mit der These identifiziert wird, moralische Eigenschaften seien durch naturwissenschaftlich erklarte Eigenschaften zu ersetzen, sondern eine neo-aristotelisch konzipierte werthafte Naturvorstellung ebenfalls dem ethischen Naturalismus zugerechnet wird.

Neues zur Theorie des Gerechten Krieges: Die Wende zum Soldaten und Fragen der Kriegsmoral

Abstract In Just War Theory, the leading paradigm is a normative assessment of war among nation states. As an effect of that perspective, the duties and obligations of soldiers as well as the issues of culpability have received only very little attention. Recently, philosophers have questioned this restriction in order to discuss war ethics from a different angle. Research now focuses on the single soldier’s decisions on the battlefield and their moral assessment. This paper looks at the “criterion of liability” introduced by Jeff McMahan. It explains consequences of this new approach to war ethics, including the focus on reason-giving narratives. An interdisciplinary framework introduces recent historical findings on the single soldier’s “morality”. This paper argues that the shift of attention gives insight into the many facets of “morality” in the context of war.

The Committed Soldier: Religion as a Necessary Supplement to a Moral Theory of Warfare

Abstract The right-making properties of wars, if there are any, have been scrutinized in Just War Theory. Recently, authors have turned to a blind spot in that context: Just War Theory has started to focus on moral implications of warfare regarding soldiers who fight a war. In this contribution, we reconstruct that recent turn of normative theory towards the soldier. We argue that in order to give a conclusive account of the moral implications of the soldiers actions, it is necessary to include religion. Religion is not only part of the motivational setting of ‘the committed soldier’; it is also an important institutional factor in realizing war. In order to explain the various functions of religion, we discuss examples of religiously committed soldiers in World War I. Research in this context reveals clusters of personal religious convictions, a religiously founded culture of comradeship, and a visible organization of collectivity in terms of religious institutions. Our claim is that this acknowledgment of religion contributes to another theoretical twist in Just War Theory.

Menschliche Natur und Glück

Glück ist nachAristoteles das höchste, erstrebenswerte Gut (EN I.2 1095a 14–19)1. Menschen sind nicht nur gut beraten, nach seiner Verwirklichung zu trachten. Vielmehr sind sie von Natur aus auf die Verwirklichung des Glücks angelegt. Diese auch als „teleologische Prämisse“ bezeichnete Voraussetzung der aristotelischen Ethik wird zu Beginn des ersten Buches artikuliert (EN I.1 1094a 1–3; EN I.2 1095a 14–19). Gerade diese Vorstellung des Aristoteles widerstrebt jedoch heutigen Annahmen über das Glücksstreben desMenschen. Dies gilt in zwei Hinsichten: Erstens ist die Annahme einer natürlichen Tendenz zum Guten fragwürdig. Dies gilt insbesondere deshalb, weil Aristoteles dashöchsteGut, nachdemalleMenschen streben, nicht nurmit demGlück identi ziert. Vielmehr wird in der Folge auch das Glück mit dem guten, und das heißt bei Aristoteles „tugendhaften“ Leben gleichgesetzt (EN I.6 1098a 17–18). Menschliche Strebungen sind jedoch vielfältig. Neben demHang zum Guten steht gleichrangig der Hang zum Bösen. Zweitens wir das Glück in der Regel heutzutage anders kategorisiert: Glück ist nicht eine Lebensform, die durch den Besitz von Tugenden geprägt ist. Glück ist eine Hochstimmung, ein Gefühl, vielleicht auch etwas, das einemMenschen zufällt. Während Aristoteles mit der Eudaimonia ein ethisch gutes Leben meint, ist Glück nach heutigem Verständnis eine psychische Verfasstheit, die aus dem Zusammentre en verschiedener Faktoren resultiert. Man könnte also schon an dieser Stelle resümieren: Aristoteles interpretiert das Glück in einer Weise, die uns heute fremd geworden ist. Wird die aristotelische Ethik insgesamt zum Gegenstand der Untersuchung gemacht, wird dies noch deutlicher. Die aristotelische Ethik ist eine Tugendethik. Tugenden sind Tüchtigkeiten des Charakters und des Intellekts (EN I.13 1103a 5–6; EN II.1 1103a 13–17). Die tugendhafte Person weiß mit ihren Anlagen so umzugehen, dass die erworbenen Tugenden das gute Leben in der Gemeinschaft fördern. Gegenstand der aristotelischen Auseinandersetzung ist mithin nicht das Glück der Person, sondern ihr ethisch gutes Leben. Zwar ist der Ethikbegri noch weiter, als wir es seit der

Addressing the commons: normative approaches to common pool resources

Some of the critical natural resources, i.e. lakes, the seas, clean air and the atmosphere, exemplify structures of common pool resources. They are rival but non-excludable, at least highly non-excludable. Therefore, common pool resources are particularly vulnerable. In order to protect them, it has been argued that entrance barriers need to be modelled against the background of two criteria: (1) Overuse and forms of harmful use need to be prevented; and (2) access conditions need to correspond to justified claims of participation in common pool resources. Both criteria respond to normative claims. The first condition can be spelled out in terms of sustainability. The second claim has been discussed in theories on ecological justice. The particular theoretical challenge that I wish to address in this paper results from an apparent tension between both criteria. In this contribution I shall first introduce the concept of a common pool resource and discuss its meaning in environmental ethics. As a second step, I shall discuss aspects of the theory of the commons of Elinor Ostrom. Her approach includes a differentiation of the category of property which helps to address both normative criteria simultaneously. Most importantly, her discussion includes debate over a normative perspective on the commons which needs to be made explicit. As a third step, I shall go back to the concept of environmental rights and group rights and ask whether or not these categories are helpful in discussing legitimate access to common pool resources. My overall aim is not to present a normative approach to common pool resources, but rather to introduce and test whether or not the categories of property and of rights are useful in addressing the theoretical challenge of the two conflicting criteria mentioned above.