Anthony M. Evans

Fast but Not Intuitive, Slow but Not Reflective: Decision Conflict Drives Reaction Times in Social Dilemmas

When people have the chance to help others at a cost to themselves, are cooperative decisions driven by intuition or reflection? To answer this question, recent studies have tested the relationship between reaction times (RTs) and cooperation, reporting both positive and negative correlations. To reconcile this apparent contradiction, we argue that decision conflict (rather than the use of intuition vs. reflection) drives response times, leading to an inverted-U shaped relationship between RT and cooperation. Studies 1 through 3 show that intermediate decisions take longer than both extremely selfish and extremely cooperative decisions. Studies 4 and 5 find that the conflict between self-interested and cooperative motives explains individual differences in RTs. Manipulating conflictedness causes longer RTs and more intermediate decisions, and RTs mediate the relationship between conflict and intermediate decisions. Finally, Studies 6 and 7 demonstrate that conflict is distinct from reflection by manipulating the use of intuition (vs. reflection). Experimentally promoting reliance on intuition increases cooperation, but has no effects on decision extremity or feelings of conflictedness. In sum, we provide evidence that RTs should not be interpreted as a direct proxy for the use of intuitive or reflective processes, and dissociate the effects of conflict and reflection in social decision making.

The Unthinking or Confident Extremist? Political Extremists Are More Likely Than Moderates to Reject Experimenter-Generated Anchors:

People with extreme political opinions are alternatively characterized as being relatively unthinking or as confident consumers and practitioners of politics. In three studies, we tested these competing hypotheses using cognitive anchoring tasks (total N = 6,767). Using two different measures of political extremity, we found that extremists were less influenced than political moderates by two types of experimenter-generated anchors (Studies 1–3) and that this result was mediated by extremists’ belief superiority (Study 2). Extremists and moderates, however, were not differentially influenced by self-generated anchors (Study 2), which suggests that extremists differentiated between externally and internally generated anchors. These results are consistent with the confident-extremist perspective and contradict the unthinking-extremist perspective. The present studies demonstrate the utility of adopting a basic cognitive task to investigate the relationship between ideology and cognitive style and suggest that extremity does not necessarily beget irrationality.

Social Environment Shapes the Speed of Cooperation

Are cooperative decisions typically made more quickly or slowly than non-cooperative decisions? While this question has attracted considerable attention in recent years, most research has focused on one-shot interactions. Yet it is repeated interactions that characterize most important real-world social interactions. In repeated interactions, the cooperativeness of one’s interaction partners (the “social environment”) should affect the speed of cooperation. Specifically, we propose that reciprocal decisions (choices that mirror behavior observed in the social environment), rather than cooperative decisions per se, occur more quickly. We test this hypothesis by examining four independent decision time datasets with a total of 2,088 subjects making 55,968 decisions. We show that reciprocal decisions are consistently faster than non-reciprocal decisions: cooperation is faster than defection in cooperative environments, while defection is faster than cooperation in non-cooperative environments. These differences are further enhanced by subjects’ previous behavior – reciprocal decisions are faster when they are consistent with the subject’s previous choices. Finally, mediation analyses of a fifth dataset suggest that the speed of reciprocal decisions is explained, in part, by feelings of conflict – reciprocal decisions are less conflicted than non-reciprocal decisions, and less decision conflict appears to lead to shorter decision times.

Bounded prospection in dilemmas of trust and reciprocity

Knowing when to trust others is an important social skill, but recent findings suggest that humans struggle with this dilemma—trusting strangers more than they should. Although trust decisions often do not meet the standards of rationality, they appear to be boundedly rational. We present a model of heuristic trust, according to which people focus on their own potential outcomes (what may be gained or lost from trusting), but neglect the probabilities of those outcomes occurring. We examine how trustors form expectations of reciprocity, and how those expectations relate to optimal trust decisions: some previous research suggests that people underestimate the probability of reciprocity and, relative to their subjective expectations, trust strangers too much. In contrast, our heuristic model allows for fine-grained predictions of when people trust too much and when they trust too little. The accuracy of trust depends on the selection and use of available cues; errors occur when trustors neglect valid, but difficult to process, cues and overemphasize salient cues lacking validity.

The reputational consequences of generalized trust

The present research examines the reputational consequences of generalized trust. High-trust individuals are seen as moral and sociable, but not necessarily competent. When controlling for other traits, there is a negative relationship between trust and perceived competence (Studies 1 and 2). Compared with optimism, generalized trust has stronger effects on morality and sociability (Study 2). Furthermore, people judge those who do not discriminate between trustworthy and untrustworthy groups (unconditional trustors) more negatively than those who only trust groups that are, in fact, trustworthy (conditional trustors). Unconditional trust and unconditional distrust are both viewed negatively (Study 3), even after controlling for attitudinal similarity (Study 4). Critically, both generalized trust and discriminant ability (i.e., conditional trust) have independent reputational benefits (Study 5). These studies suggest that generalized trust plays an important role in how we perceive and judge others.

Cooperation and decision time

We review two fundamentally different ways that decision time is related to cooperation. First, studies have experimentally manipulated decision time to understand how cooperation is related to the use of intuition versus deliberation. Current evidence supports the claim that time pressure (and, more generally, intuition) favors cooperation. Second, correlational studies reveal that self-paced decision times are primarily related to decision conflict, not the use of intuition or deliberation. As a result, extreme cooperation decisions occur more quickly than intermediate decisions, and the relative speed of highly cooperative versus non-cooperative decisions depends on details of the design and participant pool. Finally, we discuss interpersonal consequences of decision time: people are judged based on how quickly they cooperate, and decision time is used as a cue to predict cooperation.

Effects of facial skin smoothness and blemishes on trait impressions

People make trait inferences based on facial appearance, and these inferences guide social approach and avoidance. Here, we investigate the effects of textural features on trait impressions from faces. In contrast to previous work, which exclusively manipulated skin smoothness, we manipulated smoothness and the presence of skin blemishes independently (Study 1) and orthogonally (Study 2). We hypothesized that people are particularly sensitive to skin blemishes because blemishes potentially indicate poor health and the presence of an infectious disease. We therefore predicted that the negative effect of blemished skin is stronger than the positive effect of smoothed skin. The results of both studies are in line with this reasoning. Across ratings of trustworthiness, competence, maturity, attractiveness, and health, the negative influence of skin blemishes was stronger and more consistent than the positive influence of skin smoothness (Study 1). Moreover, the presence of skin blemishes diminished the positive effect of skin smoothness on attractiveness ratings (Study 2). In sum, both facial skin blemishes and facial skin smoothness influence trait impression, but the negative effect of blemished skin is larger and more salient than the positive effect of smooth skin.