Anthony Yates

Hybrid Inflation and Price-Level Targeting

In this paper we investigate the properties of monetary regimes that combine price-level and inflation targeting. We look both at an optimal control and at a simple rule characterisation of these regimes. We derive numerical results by modelling the economy as a small-scale open-economy RE model calibrated on UK data. We conclude that: (1) the relative merits of price-level and inflation targeting, as well as of mixes of these two, depend on particular modelling and policy assumptions; and (2) these merits do not always change gradually and/or monotonically as we move from one regime to another.

Are U.K. Inflation Expectations Rational

This paper tests for unbiasedness in inflation expectations drawn from a survey of UK employees by Gallup. It focuses on the econometric difficulties presented by having a small sample, there being overlapping forecast horizons and by trying to make inference when the data appear to be non-stationary. Applying a method of inference suggested by Inder (1993) the paper concludes that measured expectations systematically overstate inflation. The paper checks the robustness of this result by looking at alternative survey data and by using alternative techniques for modelling the long run.

Are There Downward Nominal Rigidities in Product Markets

This paper looks at disaggregated price data in the UK to see if there is evidence of downward nominal rigidity: are prices less likely to fall after a downward shock than they are to rise after an upward shock? The test is to see if, as the mean inflation rate falls, the skewness, or the tendency for price changes to bunch-up at zero, rises. The paper finds no convincing evidence of downward nominal rigidity.

Rational Expectations and Fixed-Event Forecasts: An Application to UK Inflation

In this paper a version of the rational expectations hypothesis is tested using fixed-event inflation forecasts for the UK. Fixed-event forecasts consist of a panel of forecasts for a set of outturns of a series at varying horizons prior to each outturn. The forecasts are the prediction of fund managers surveyed by Merrill Lynch. Fixed-event forecasts allow tests for whether expectations are unbiased in a similar fashion to the rest of the literature. But they also permit particular tests of forecast efficiency to be conducted - whether the forecasts make best use of available information - that are not possible with rolling event data. The results show evidence of a positive bias in inflation expectations. Evidence for inefficiency is much less clear cut.

Monetary policy and data uncertainty

One of the problems facing policymakers is that recent releases of data are liable to subsequent revisions. This paper discusses how to deal with this, and is in two parts. In the normative part of the paper, we study the design of monetary policy rules in a model that has the feature that data uncertainty varies according to the vintage. We show how coefficients on lagged variables in optimised simple rules for monetary policy increase as the relative measurement error in early vintages of data increases. We also explore scenarios when policymakers are uncertain by how much measurement error in new data exceeds that in old data. An optimal policy can then be one in which it is better to assume that the ratio of measurement error in new compared to old data is larger, rather than smaller. In the positive part of the paper, we show that the response of monetary policy to vintage varying data uncertainty may generate evidence of apparent interest rate smoothing in interest rate reaction functions: but we suggest that it may not generate enough to account for what has been observed in the data.

Estimating Time-Variation in Measurement Error from Data Revisions; An Application to Forecasting in Dynamic Models

Over time, economic statistics are refined. This means that newer data are typically less well measured than old data. Time or vintage-variation in measurement error like this influences how forecasts should be made. Measurement error is obviously not directly observable. This paper shows that modelling the behaviour of the statistics agency generates an estimate of this time-variation. This provides an alternative to assuming that the final releases of variables are true. The paper applies the method to UK aggregate expenditure data, and demonstrates the gains in forecasting from exploiting these model-based estimates of measurement error.

The pitfalls of speed-limit interest rate rules at the zero lower bound

We show that interest rate rules that feed back on the growth rates of target variables (such as output or asset prices) may induce recessions in the presence of a zero lower bound, through purely self-fulfilling dynamics. This pathology is illustrated in a small New Keynesian model with interest rates responding to the growth rate of output, and in a version of a model by Matteo Iacoviello where interest rates respond to the growth rate of house prices and credit. Our results provide a cautionary note, contrasting with previous work which has suggested several desirable properties of speed-limit rules, namely that they are devices enabling the policymaker (i) to side-step uncertainty about natural rates, (ii) to counter booms and busts in asset prices or (iii) to implement optimal commitment policies.

Monetary Policy Delegation and Equilibrium Coordination

This paper revisits the argument that the stabilisation bias that arises under discretionary monetary policy can be reduced if policy is delegated to a policymaker with redesigned objectives. We study four delegation schemes: price level targeting, interest rate smoothing, speed limits and straight conservatism. These can all increase social welfare in models with a unique discretionary equilibrium. We investigate how these schemes perform in a model with capital accumulation where uniqueness does not necessarily apply. We discuss how multiplicity arises and demonstrate that no delegation scheme is able to eliminate all potential bad equilibria. Price level targeting has two interesting features. It can create a new equilibrium that is welfare dominated, but it can also alter equilibrium stability properties and make coordination on the best equilibrium more likely.